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Abstract 
This thesis introduces of a system of tense logic called nominal tense logic (NTL), and 
several extensions. Its primary aim is to establish that these systems are logically inter- 
esting, and can provide useful models of natural language tense, temporal reference, and 
their interaction. 
Languages of nominal tense logic are a simple augmentation of Priorean tense logic. 
They add to the familiar Priorean languages a new sort of atomic symbol, nominals. Like 
propositional variables, nominals are atomic sentences and may be freely combined with 
other wffs using the usual connectives. When interpreting these languages we handle the 
Priorean components standardly, but insist that nominals must be true at one and only 
one time. We can think of nominals as naming this time. 
Logically, the change increases the expressive power of tensed languages. There are 
certain intuitions about the flow of time, such as irreflexivity, that cannot be expressed 
in Priorean languages; with nominals they can. The effects of this increase in expressive 
power on the usual model theoretic results for tensed languages discussed, and com- 
pleteness and decidability results for several temporally interesting classes of frames are 
given. Various extensions of the basic system are also investigated and similar results 
are proved. In the final chapter a brief treatment of similarly referential interval based 
logics is presented. 
As far as natural language semantics is concerned, the change is an important one. A 
familiar criticism of Priorean tense logic is that as it lacks any mechanism for temporal 
reference, it cannot provide realistic models of natural language temporal usage. Natural 
language tense is at least partly about referring to times, and nowadays the deictic and 
anaphoric properties of tense are a focus of research. The thesis presents a uniform treat- 
ment of certain temporally referring expressions such as indexicals, and simple discourse 
phenomena. 
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However the thesis also has a secondary aim: to establish the importance of sorting 
in intensional logic. NTL and all the other systems treated here are examples of sorted 
intensional languages. General logical questions concerning sorting are discussed, and 
the possibility of using sorted intensional languages to provide event logics is raised. 
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This thesis is primarily an essay on temporal logic, and more specifically, tense logic. 
It introduces a system called nominal tense logic (NTL), and several extensions, and 
attempts to establish two things: that these systems are logically interesting, and that 
they can provide useful models of natural language tense, temporal reference, and their 
interaction. 
Languages of nominal tense logic are a simple augmentation of Priorean tense logic. 
They add to the familiar Priorean languages a new sort of atomic symbol, nominals. 
We follow the usual conventions and represent ordinary propositional variables by means 
of p, q, r and so on; nominals are typically represented by means of i, j and k. Like 
propositional variables, nominals are atomic sentences. We can freely make wffs in the 
usual way, using both sorts of atom, out of the usual connectives A, -,, P, F, H, and G. 
Wffs of NTL thus look much like wffs of ordinary tense logic: typical examples are the 
purely nominal wff, FFi -> Fi; the purely Priorean wff, Gp --> Fp; and the mixed wff 
F(iAp). 
When interpreting these languages we handle the Priorean component in the usual 
fashion, but place a constraint on the interpretation of nominals: we insist that nominals 
must be true at one and only one time. We can think of nominals as naming the time 
they are true at, and have thus added a mechanism of temporal reference to Priorean 
tense logic. A great part of the thesis is concerned with exploring the logical and formal 
semantical consequences of this simple change. 
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Logically, the change increases the expressive power of tensed languages. There are 
certain natural constraints on the flow of time, such as irreflexivity, that cannot be ex- 
pressed in Priorean languages; with nominals they can. In fact, by using both nominals 
and variables we can pin down both the natural numbers and the integers up to isomor- 
phism. This increase in expressive power effects all the usual model theoretic results for 
tensed languages - for example p-morphisms no longer preserve validity - nonetheless 
it is possible to give completeness and decidability results for many temporally interesting 
classes of frames. 
As far as natural language semantics is concerned, the change is an important one. A 
familiar criticism of Priorean tense logic is that as it lacks any mechanism for temporal 
reference, it is simply incapable of providing realistic models of natural language temporal 
usage. As writers such as Reichenbach have argued, tense is about referring to times; 
and nowadays the deictic and anaphoric properties of tense are the focus of research. As 
we shall see, the simple devices we introduce in this thesis enable us to cope with a wide 
range of temporally referring expressions rather routinely. 
Nominals, and languages of nominal tense logic, don't do all the work in the thesis. 
Once the idea of referring to instants using atomic sentences has been accepted, it seems 
natural to try referring to extended periods. Accordingly, interval nominals are intro- 
duced. These refer to intervals in just the same way that nominals refer to points of 
time - interval nominals are constrained in their interpretation to be true only at the 
set of points in some unique interval. Once systems with nominals and interval nominals 
have been defined it becomes natural to introduce a further operator in addition to the 
Priorean pair F and P. The operator is here called the shifter. Actually its just a uni- 
versal modality L - it means `true at all times' - but in combination with a nominal or 
an interval nominal it provides a smooth way of ̀ shifting' the point of evaluation to the 
point (or interval) named. Languages with nominals, interval nominals, and the shifter 
are called languages of TREF, and these are the languages in which much of our work on 
natural language is done. 
However the thesis is not just about tense logic, but has a secondary theme: sorted 
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intensional languages. Nominals, interval nominals, and ordinary variables are all exam- 
ples of sorts, and NTL and TREF are both sorted intensional languages. The thesis tries 
to show that the idea of sorting in intensional frameworks is logically interesting, and 
suggests that it has a potentially wider significance for natural language semantics than 
merely providing models of temporal reference. 
The word `sort' has been used already: nominals were described as a new sort of 
atom. The analogy intended with first order sorted languages should be clear: each sort 
embodies a different type of information. Nominals always encode `single point of time 
information' and interval nominals encode `single interval information'. Knowing what 
sort an atom belongs to already tells us something. We may not know what it names, 
but we know what it can name. However although different sorts have different semantic 
import, the different types of information they embody are combined in syntactically 
uniform fashion. `Mixed yet uniform' is the best description of the calculi considered 
here. 
Logically, the interesting thing about sorting in intensional frameworks is that it does 
make a difference - witness the new expressive powers of nominals. Here the analogy 
with first order sorted languages breaks down interestingly. Sorting first order languages 
results in syntactic sugar; sorting intensional languages can lead to rich new frameworks. 
By and large, the discussion of sorting in this thesis confines itself to nominals and 
interval nominals. Even so, a number of more general logical concerns emerge (the 
importance of classes of models rather than classes of frames for sorted logics), and a 
number of more general ideas for applying sorting to model more than temporal reference 
(for example, to model a richer notion of event structure), are mentioned with increasing 
frequency as the thesis progresses. 
The reader is invited to read the thesis in the following way. Firstly, it should be 
read as an exercise in pure and applied tense logic whose function it is to establish the 
logical interest of NTL (and TREF) and demonstrate their applicability. But in addition it 
should also be read as (so to speak) an existence proof. I believe that sorting is of wider 
logical and applied interest than is demonstrated in this thesis, but while I suggest why 
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this might be so, I do not establish it here. Nonetheless, I believe that the results here 
show the interest (both logical and formal semantical) of at least one sort (nominals). I 
don't claim there must be more; I do claim it is worthwhile looking further. 
The chapter by chapter plan of the thesis is as follows. The first four chapters are a 
leisurely and detailed exploration of the logical properties of NTL. In Chapter 2 ("Lan- 
guages of Nominal Tense Logic") we define the syntax and semantics of these languages, 
note some of their basic properties, and define other important concepts (such as that of 
a filtration) which will be used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 3 ("Model Theory") 
we begin the task of demonstrating the logical interest of these systems. We first note a 
number of examples of the increase in expressive power, investigate how the increase has 
affected the standard tense logical preservation results, and finally compare NTL with 
three classical languages and with D logic. In Chapter 4 ("The Minimal Logic") we 
axiomatise the NTL validities by augmenting the minimal standard tense logical axioma- 
tisation with a single schema. The resulting axiomatisation is called Knt. In fact four 
suitable schemas are considered, and minimal nominal modal logic is examined as well. 
In Chapter 5 ("Extensions of K,a") we axiomatise the nominal tense logics of various 
classes of frames of interest. Probably the most interesting result of the chapter is the 
decidability results proved for certain newly definable classes of frames. (These hinge on 
the fact that Segerberg's Theorem fails in NTL. Possession of the finite model property 
does not imply possession of the finite frame property.) 
After this survey, the concerns broaden. In Chapter 6 these wider concerns are logical, 
and in Chapter 7, formal semantical. Chapter 6 ("Interval Nominals, the Shifter, and 
Sorting Generalised") does three things. In the first two sections it adds, successively, 
interval nominals and the universal modality L, thus forming the languages of TREF. 
Their basic logical theory is developed, and the way is thus paved for the explorations of 
Chapter 7. However by this stage it will have become apparent that the sorted atomic 
sentence strategy gives rise to a number of new questions. The final section indicates 
what these new issues are, and tries to formulate a general account of sorting. (Until 
this stage of the thesis, while the word sort has been freely used, no real attempt has 
been made to pin it down.) Sorting is (tentatively) defined, and a number of possible 
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directions for further work are noted. This chapter concludes the main stream of logical 
work of the thesis. 
Chapter 7 ("Applications in Natural Language Semantics") attempts to establish the 
other claim of the thesis: that these logics are useful in natural language semantics. 
Languages of TREF are first treated as straightforward embodiments of the referential 
or Reichenbachian view of tense. Following this we add further constrained atoms to 
our languages, this time to model the effects of indexicals such as `now' and `yesterday' 
and calendar terms such as `Monday'. These additions are all syntactically uniform: 
`now', and `Monday' are treated simply as atomic symbols on a par with propositional 
variables or nominals. We show that they interact properly with our tense operators, 
and correctly treat such sentences as "John will run yesterday" as anomalous. The 
indexicals are handled semantically by a Kaplan style contextualised semantics, and the 
similarities and differences with other intensional approaches to these issues are noted. 
This is followed by a very important section. We compare our strategy with the two 
dimensional tradition initiated by Frank Vlach. We note van Benthem's criticism of 
these two dimensional systems - basically, that they amount to rather complicated 
ways of doing first order logic without admitting it - and argue that it does not apply 
to our sorted languages. For, as is shown, we are able to cope with the type of sentences 
that inspired these two dimensional additions in the language of TREF, a language that 
is one dimensional, and both intuitively and formally simple. In a final section we note 
some of the features of discourse semantics that we can handle in TREF, and discuss an 
interesting overlap of TREF with temporal DRT. 
At the conclusion of this chapter both major goals of the thesis are felt to have been 
achieved. A lengthy logical exploration has established the interest of these languages, 
and the examination of natural language semantics has demonstrated that a wide vari- 
ety of phenomenon can be treated in very simple fashion by introducing appropriately 
constrained atoms into intensional languages. However (at least) two loose ends remain. 
Although in languages of TREF we can refer to intervals, we are not doing `interval se- 
mantics' in the generally accepted sense of the word. (This is not felt to be a bad thing 
incidentally; one of the pleasant things about sorting is the number of options it opens. 
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Interval semantics need not mean intervallic evaluation.) What would sorted interval 
based languages be like? The results presented here are only preliminaries to a fuller 
investigation, nonetheless they are interesting. The section concludes with a brief dis- 
cussion of sorting in the interval based framework. Following this, the work of Prior and 
Bull on systems of logic with quantified nominals is discussed. 
When I began working on NTL I believed the idea of nominals be a new one. This 
was mistaken: both Prior and Bull had considered the idea in the 1960s. However they 
used nominals in a far more powerful way - nominals could be quantified over - and 
we defer considering their work until the end of the thesis. However there has also 
been recent work (predating mine) by a group of Bulgarian logicians - George Gargov, 
Valentin Goranko, Solomon Passy and Tinko Tinchev - who have variously co-authored 
papers on systems of both propositional dynamic logic [76] (33] [77] and modal logic with 
nominals [34] [35]. The work in dynamic logic is beyond the scope of this thesis, however 
their work on modal logic does overlap with mine. It is a little difficult to give a full 
comparison since their most comprehensive work on the topic, the recent manuscript [35], 
only reached me two weeks prior to the submission of this thesis. 1 However while there 
is some overlap, the approaches have usually been different. There is one very important 
idea they treat which I did not consider at all; the use of a certain `infinitary' rule of 
inference (called COV). I discuss COV later on, and also note the differences between 
their minimal (modal) completeness result and mine. 
Actually, the idea of nominals arose in a rather roundabout fashion in my case. The 
thesis began with an attempt to axiomatise the system IQ, an interval based system 
for natural language semantics, that employs the Kleene strong three valued semantics 
and a variety of indexed operators [87). On investigating the matter it turned out that 
the system (or at least the `core' system outlined in [88]) could be simplified down to 
Priorean tense logic `plus something else'. Trying to pin down what that something 
1Also, they do not consider tense logic, and the differences between tensed and modal languages 
with nominals can be considerable. 
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else was, and how to control it, led to the minimal NTL axiomatisation. While working 
on this I noted the increase in express power described in Chapter 3, and the link with 
contextual semantics described Chapter 7, and the thesis thereafter took a different road. 
2 
The idea of sorting - or at least the idea of constraining the interpretation of atoms 
- has also been considered before. For a start, it's the idea underlying general frames. 
Also, in interval based logics, constraining the interpretation of atoms is both natural 
and important. (Indeed I suggest in the final chapter that it's practically forced on us.) 
In addition Johan van Benthem [8] has considered the logics that arise when variables 
are constrained in their interpretations on R, and explicitY4y noted their relevance to 
inferences involving the progressive. In fact this thesis is probably only original in the 
emphasis it gives the idea: it insists that such constraints are important if we wish to 
do genuine temporal logic, and suggests that different constraints should be syntactically 
reflected by introducing different sorts, which (at least as a first option) are uniformly 
combined. 
This concludes the introduction: we are now ready to investigate nominal tense logic 
and other sorted intensional frameworks. 3 
2Space restrictions have made it impossible to include the work on IQ here; I'll merely note 
that using the NTL axiomatisations given here it is routine to induce proof theories onto core IQ. 
Those familiar with IQ need merely note that as far as the core system is concerned, parameters 
are just nominals. Full details of the analysis will be released shortly as a technical report. 
3The reader is advised to tuck a copy of van Benthem's "Logic of Time" [5] firmly under one 
arm before setting off. 
Chapter 2 
Languages of Nominal Tense Logic 
In this chapter we assemble the tools for the first task we set ourselves in the intro- 
duction: to demonstrate that sorted intensional frameworks are logically interesting by 
concentrating in detail on the properties of one such system, languages of Nominal Tense 
Logic (NTL). We define the syntax and semantics of these languages, present some of 
their elementary properties, and then adapt filtration theory to the new setting. Next 
we discuss the standard construction known as unraveling, and introduce the important 
concept of a path through a frame. We conclude the chapter by discussing a number of 
alternative and extended systems: Nominal Modal Logic (NML); multimodal logic with 
nominals; languages of weak NTL and strong NTL; and first order NTL. 
2.1 Syntax 
By a language of Nominal Tense Logic L is meant a triple (LOG, V AR, NOM) such that 
card(LOG) = 6; V AR and NOM are not both empty; and LOG, V AR, and NOM are 
pairwise disjoint. The elements of LOG are represented in the metalanguage by A, --', P, 
F, ) and (. The elements of V AR are typically represented by p, q, r, pi, q1, ri, p2, q2, r2 
..., and are called variables. The elements of NOM are typically represented by by 
i, j, k, i1, jl, kl ..., and are called nominaals. We adopt V, -p, +-+, G and H as the usual 
metalinguistic abbreviations-in particular, G =df -,F-, and H =def -'P-'. 1 and T are 
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introduced to represent arbitrary contradictions and tautologies of the object language 
under consideration. We happily blur the object/metalanguage distinction and treat 
the metalinguistic representations of the entities of the object language as those items 
themselves. In particular we frequently refer to F, P, G and H as tense operators or 
tenses: strictly speaking the entities denoted by these symbols are the tenses and tense 
operators. In this spirit we now state that G and F, and H and P, are dual pairs of 
operators. 
Given a language L, if NOM # 0 and VAR # 0 we say L is a mixed language; if 
VAR = 0 we say L is a purely nominal language; and if NOM = 0 we say L is a purely 
Priorean language. Occasionally we drop the `purely's. By a language with nominals is 
meant any purely nominal or mixed language. 
For any language L we define ATOMc = V ARC U NOME . By the cardinality of 
a language L is meant the cardinality of ATOMS; and L is said to be recursive if 
NOM and VAR are both recursive sets. In principle languages of any cardinality are 
permitted, and most results we prove go through for arbitrary languages, but by and 
large we are interested in `small' languages; so in what follows it is tacitly assumed that 
we are dealing with languages with at most a countably infinite supply of atoms. The 
`at most' proviso is important, because some interest attaches to languages with only a 
finite supply of nominals. In addition, if we say we are working with a countably infinite 
mixed language, we mean that both the stock of variables and the stock of nominals are 
countably infinite. 
Definition 2.1.1 (Well formed formulas) Given a language L, WFFc is the small- 
est set such that: 
1. ATOMc C WFFc 
2. 0, 0 E WFFe (-¢), (Fm), (P¢) and (0 A 0) E WFFe. O 
The elements of W FFc are referred to as `wffs', `sentences' or `formulas'; and some- 
times we talk of L-wffs, and so on. It is convenient to distinguish purely nominal sen- 
tences, purely Priorean sentences and mixed sentences. These are wffs whose atoms are 
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all nominals, all variables, or a mixture of the two respectively. We adopt an easy-going 
attitude towards brackets, dropping them whenever possible and adhering to the usual 
tightness of scope conventions. 
The concepts of degree, temporal depth and subformulas are our most frequently used 
syntactic tools: results are often stated or proved (typically by induction) with their 
help. The following definitions apply to any language L: 
Definition 2.1.2 (Degree) The degree of a wff 0 is given by: 
1. deg(¢) = 0, for all ¢ E ATOMc 
2. deg(-q) = deg(F¢) = deg(P¢) = 1 + deg(¢) 
S. deg(¢ A b) = 1 + deg(qS) + deg(tb) 
Definition 2.1.3 (Temporal depth) The temporal depth of a wff ¢ is given by: 
1. td(O) = 0, for all E ATOMS 
2. td(-,¢) = td(O) 
S. td(¢ n 0) = max{td(¢), td(O)} 
4. td(FO) = td(PO) =1 + td(O) 
Definition 2.1.4 (Subformulas) The set of subformulas of a wff 0 is given by: 
1. a f (¢) = {¢}, for all ¢ E ATOMc 
2. sf(FO) = sf(Pq) = af (-,0) = {0} U af (¢) 
0 
0 
S. sf(0A )={0,0}usf(0)usf(0) 0 
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The proper subformulas of 0 are the elements of a f (4)\{0}. When we say a set of L- 
wffs E is closed under subformulas we mean that for all v E E, if o' E a f (v) then o' E E; 
that is, E contains all the subformulas of all its elements. This notion is important when 
we discuss filtrations. We say that a wff 0 occurs in a wff ik iff 0 is a subformula of t A. 
The following auxiliary machinery is occasionally helpful; their inductive specification 
is left to the reader. We sometimes talk of the mirror image of a formula 0. This is the 
formula mi(0) obtained from 0 by uniformly replacing every occurrence of P in 0 by 
F, every occurrence of H by G, and vice versa. For example, mi(FP(i A p) --+ HGp) is 
the formula PF(i A p) --* GHp, and mi(i --* p) is i --+ p. Occasionally it is convenient 
to think of mi as operating on arbitrary strings of symbols of a language L, not just 
the L-wffs - for example, we want to say that mi(PGHFFP) = FHGPPF - and 
we assume that mi has been defined this way. It is useful to have a notation for tense 
iteration. By F"c is meant the formula 0 preceded by n occurrences of the F operator. 
F°0 is just 0. We assume analogous conventions for the P, G and H operators. " 
2.2 Semantics 
As in standard tense logic, the most fundamental semantic structures are frames. In- 
tuitively, frames are a very simple conception of temporal flow: points of time in some 
order. 
Definition 2.2.1 (Frames) By a frame T is meant an ordered pair (T, <) such that 
T y6 0 and < C Ts. T is the called the carrier set of the frame. The elements of a frame 
are usually referred to as points. 0 
Three frames we will frequently use are Z = (Z, <), the integers under the usual 
ordering; N = (N, <), the natural numbers in the usual order; and Q = (Q, <), the 
rationals in their usual ordering. We frequently say frames are transitive or reflexive or 
have some other relational property; by this is meant that its relation has this property. 
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Such conditions on frame orderings are discussed in detail in the next chapter. By the 
cardinality of a frame we mean the cardinality of its underlying set. 1 
As in standard tense logic, our languages are linked with frames by means of val- 
uations, functions assigning subsets of the frame to variables. The same is done in 
arbitrary languages of NTL, except that we put a constraint on the interpretation of 
nominals: nominals must denote singleton subsets of the frame. 
Definition 2.2.2 (NTL valuations) By a NTL valuation V for a language L on a frame 
T is meant a function 
V : ATOMS --) Pow(T) 
such that V(i) is a singleton subset of T, for all i E NOM1. Here, of course, T is the 
carrier set of T. The class of NTL valuations for L on T is denoted by ValC(T). 0 
This is the point: nominals are so called because they name. They refer uniquely 
to points of time. As nominals are sentences, not terms, they name by taking the value 
true at one and only one point of time in any valuation. Nominals are, if you like, 
instantaneous propositions-and the instant at which a nominal is true is the instant it 
names. 
Note that it is not required that every point be named by some nominal. For example 
if our frame was N, then the valuation which assigned every nominal {4} would be 
a perfectly acceptable NTL valuation. In this valuation only 4 is named. We later 
consider what happens if we insist that every point be named; languages obeying this 
extra constraint we call strong languages of NTL. In what follows we call NTL valuations 
simply valuations, only adding the NTL prefix if emphasis or contrast is needed. 
1 Frames will be denoted by letters in bold font - T, T', T4, S" etc. Their carrier sets will be 
referred to by the same symbol in mathematical font - T, T', T4, S" etc. If a frame, say T1, has 
been referred to in discussion, subsequent uses of T1 and <1 may safely be taken as referring to 
the carrier set of the frame and the frame's relation respectively. Similarly, if reference has been 
made to a pair (S2, <2), subsequent uses of S2 refer to this frame. 
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Valuations can be thought of as assigning truth values to atoms; this assignment 
needs to be extended to wffs of higher degree. The following definition is one of the 
standard ways of doing this. (Another - equivalent - definition of the extension that 
we will require occasionally is presented at the end of this section.) 
Definition 2.2.3 Given a language L, a frame T, and a valuation V for L on T, we 
extend V to a new function 
V°: WFFc x T -- {1, -1} by: 
1. V°(0,t) = 1 lift E V(0), where 4 E ATOMc 
2. V°(-,O, t) = -V`(o, t) 
S. Ve(On 0,t) = min{V`(q,t),V°( i,t)} 
4. V O (Fb, t) = 1 if there is a t' such that t < t' and V' (0, t') = 1 
5. V°(Pb, t) = 1 if there is a t' such that t' < t and V`(0, t') = 1 0 
In subsequent work we usually adopt the standard abuse of notation and talk of 
V (0, t) when we really mean V ̀  (S, t). We also treat Vale (T) as though it contained the 
extended valuations, not the valuations simpliciter. 
We now define our second fundamental semantic structure - models - and define 
the basic semantic notions concerning models and frames. Whereas frames are a naked 
temporal flow, models are a flow clothed in an information distribution. 
Definition 2.2.4 (Models, truth and validity) By a model M for a language L is 
meant an ordered pair (T, V) where T is a frame and V a valuation for L on T. T is 
called the frame underlying the model. For 4 E WFFC, we say that 
1. 0 is true in a model M at t ifVe(4,t) = 1. Notation: M 0[t]. 
2. 4' is true in a model M if for all t E T, M S[t]. Notation: M = 0. 
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S. 0 is valid on a frame T if for all V E V a1C (T), (T, V) q. Notation: T = q5. 
4. 0 is valid on a class of frames T if for all T E 7, T = 4. Notation: T = 4. 
5. 0 is valid iff U = 0 where U is the class of all frames. Notation: = 0. 
All these definitions have obvious analogues for sets of wff E, and classes of models or 
frames; these will often be used in what follows. If M = 4[t] we sometimes say that M 
satisfies 0, verifies 0, or is a verifying model for 0. We often talk of a model as having a 
certain relational structure, (such as being transitive), and talk of finite models, infinite 
models and so on. This means that the underlying frame has these properties. Similarly 
we often talk of the points of a model; these are simply the points of the underlying 
frame. 
Definition 2.2.5 Let T be a frame and M be a model. Then: 
Th,c (T) = {¢ E WFFc : T = ¢} 
Th,c (M) = {¢ E WFFc : M = ¢} 
That is, the theory of a frame is the set of sentences valid on that frame; and the theory 
of a model is the set of sentences true in that model. 
If two frames (models) have identical theories we say they are equivalent frames (mod- 
els). We extend the notion of theory to classes of frames (models) in the straightforward 
way. Let T be a non-empty class of frames (models). Then: 
Th,c(T) = n Thc(T) 
TET 
Both notions of Th take us from structures to syntactic entities. It is also useful to 
travel in the reverse direction, hence we define: 
Definition 2.2.6 Let E be a set of sentences of some language. Then: 
Fr(E) = {T : T [---o,, for all o E E} 
Mod(E) = {M:M=a, for alla EE} 
If E is a singleton {a}, we write Fr(a) and Mod(a) instead of Fr ({Q}) and Mod({a}). 
0 
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The two most important consequence relations encountered in modal logic are frame 
consequence and model consequence. Frame consequence for a language L of NTL is 
defined as follows: 
E=1¢ iff VTEU(VQEET = T I¢) 
for all sets of L-wffs E and L-wffs 0. 
Frame consequence is usually considered the more fundamental relation: it deals 
with validity, and hence abstracts completely away from the effects of any particular 
valuation. However since the work of Kit Fine and [27] S.K. Thomason [103] [104] in 
the early 1970s, it has been known that this consequence relation is not recursively 
enumerable for standard modal languages. This result is a fundamental one: Thomason 
later proved in [105] that modal logic is a reduction class of second-order logic and thus 
that `frame incompleteness' does not reflect some vagary or weakness of known modal 
axiomatisations, but stems from the incompleteness of second order logic. 
Now the non-axiomatisability of frame consequence for both purely Priorean and 
mixed languages follows immediately from these results. It will turn out, however, that 
frame consequence is a recursively enumerable relation for purely nominal languages: this 
is immediate by simple correspondence considerations. This is interesting, but as mixed 
languages are important, and as frame consequence is intractable for such languages, we 
will also need something like the weaker notion of model consequence: 
E= m¢iffVM(` OIEEM = QM= ¢) 
(Here M is an arbitrary model.) In Chapter 4 we define the variant of this consequence 
relation that is needed. 
To conclude this section we present the alternative method of extending valuations. 
The variant has an algebraic flavour. Note that in our previous definition V mapped 
atoms to subsets of some frame T, but V` did not do the same for arbitrary wffs - 
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rather, it invoked `truth values', 1 and -1. 4 There's nothing wrong with this, but as the 
picture of the denotation of wffs being a set of times is rather attractive, let's reformulate 
V' along these lines. Obviously for atomic wffs we just let V' agree with V. What sort 
of sets should complex wffs denote? The Boolean cases are clear: V`(4 A tk) ought to 
be V ̀ (o) fl V ̀ (tb), and V (-,4), should be T\V ̀ (4). The tense operators require a little 
more work. 
Let T = (T, <) be a frame and S C T. The future projection of S, irf(S), is defined 
by: 
irr(S)={tET:3s(sES&t<s)}; 
and the past projection of S, irp(S), is defined by: 
irp(S)=ft ET:3s(sES&s<t)}. 
Formally, both irf and irp are operators on Pow(T); they are an algebraicisation of 
the tense operators. s Informally, if we regard S as a piece of information - or a 
`proposition' if you will - the future projection of S is precisely the information that "It 
will be the case that S". Indeed, we can regard S as a wff of a propositional language, 
and treat 7rj(S) as a rather cumbersome notation for FS; and indeed irr(S) is precisely 
the points of the frame where FS is true. ! Thus we define V '(FO) = irf(V (q5)) and 
V`(PO) = irp(V (4)), and we have our new extended valuations. By and large we use 
2So our earlier statement that V' is an `extension' of V was rather loose. The usage can be 
justified by its equivalence to the version of V' about to be defined which really is an extension 
of V. 
3There doesn't seem to be a standard notation for these projections; this `ar' notation is from 
[5, page 1411. 
!This mutual translation between algebra and syntax is helpful in later work. It also proves 
useful to have at our disposal the operators dual to x f and rp, namely erg and xh defined by: 
irg(S)={tET:ds(t<s=SE S)} 
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the previous definition, but this new version will prove useful when we discuss ultrafilter 
extensions in the following chapter. 
2.3 Some basic results 
We now present four fundamental results that will be used frequently in what follows. 
The first three results are standard for intensional languages; the fourth, the Inheritance 
Lemma, is peculiar to sorted frameworks. 
Lemma 2.3.1 (Agreement Lemma) Let L be a language of NTL, T a frame, ¢ E 
W FF,c and V, V' E V alc (T) such that V (a) = V'(a), for all atoms occurring in 0. Then: 
(T, V) Oft] if (T, V') O[t] 
for all t E T. 
Proof: 
Induction on deg(S). Only the base case of the induction that involves nominals is 
new, and this is immediate. 
We next say what it is for two frames to be `structurally identical'. 
and 
rh(S)={tET :Vs(s<t=- sES)). 
Adopting the usual convention that for any S C T, T\S is written S, we have that rf(3) = iry(S), 
ry(S) = r f(S), irp(-S) = rh(S), and rh(S) = rp(S). This follows straight forwardly from 
the definitions of the projection operators, and shows that they really are dual pairs. In the 
transcription to tensed languages we see that these identities have as syntactical correlates such 
familiar facts as F = -'G, and so on. 
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Definition 2.3.1 (Isomorphisms) Let (S, <,) and (T, <t) be frames. A bijection f 
from S to T such that for all s, s' E S: 
s <, s' i$ f (s) <t f (s') 
is said to be a frame isomorphism. If there exists a frame isomorphism between S and T 
we write S - T and say the two frames are isomorphic. 
Models (S, V,) and (T, Vt) are said to be isomorphic if there is a frame isomorphism 
f between S and T, and Vt(a) = f [V,(a)], for all a E ATOM1. If two models M1 and 
M2 are isomorphic we write M1 =' M2 and call f a model isomorphism. 0 
A simple induction on deg(q5) establishes: 
Lemma 2.3.2 M1 ^_' M2 implies Th(M1) = Th(M2). 
As an immediate corollary we have that our languages cannot distinguish between 
isomorphic frames: 
Corollary 2.3.1 T1 ' T2 implies Th(T1) = Th(T2). 
Proof: 
By the previous lemma if we can falsify a formula on one frame we can transfer the 
falsifying valuation to the other by means of the isomorphism. 0 
As we shall see later, the converse result does not hold: equivalence does not imply 
isomorphism. 6 
5For the special case of finite connected frames, however, it does. (Connectedness is defined 
later in the chapter; essentially it means that starting at any point in the frame we can zig-zag 
our way to any other.) We refer the reader to [5, page 142] where the corresponding result is 
proved for Priorean languages. The addition of nominals does not affect the proof; in fact van 
Benthem's proof in effect proceeds by treating variables as (strong) nominals. 
Chapter 2. Languages of Nominal Tense Logic 19 
The next result gives each formula a `horizon' - a limit past which it cannot see. 
The result will be useful to us on a number of occasions. We first need the following 
definition: 6 
Definition 2.3.2 (n-hull) Let T = (T, <) be a frame and t E T. S (T, t), the n-hull 
around t, is defined by: 
So(T, t) = {t} 
Sn+1(T, t) = S,, (T, t) U {t' E T : 3t" E S,, (T, t) 8.t. t' < t" or t" < t'} 
0 
The following result is obvious - and surprisingly tricky to prove cleanly. We leave 
its delights to the reader. 
Lemma 2.3.3 (Horizon Lemma) For any frame T and any two valuations V, V' E 
Val(T) such that: 
V(a) n S"(T, t) = V'(a) fl S"(T, t), for all atoms a 
then 
(T, V) = O[t] iff (T, V') [-- O[t] 
for all 0 such that td(O) < n. 
The next result, is very simple, and extremely important: it shows that `nominals 
inherit standard tense logic'. If a purely Priorean formula 0 is valid on a frame T, then 
any formula on obtained from 0 by uniformly substituting distinct nominals for all the 
variables in 0 is valid on T also. This should be clear: 0 being valid on T means that 
for all valuations V on T, 0 is true at all points. But in particular this means that for 
all valuations V such that V assigns only singleton subsets of T to variables, 0 is true at 
all points - which is precisely what it means for any on to be valid on T. This result is 
worth pinning down a little more precisely: 
6This definition, and the lemma that follows are temporal versions of those given for modal 
logic by van Benthem in [6, page 29]. 
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Lemma 2.3.4 (Inheritance Lemma) Let L = (LOG, V AR, NOM) be a language of 
NTL such that V AR 54 0. Let L", the nominalisation of L, be the purely nominal language 
(LOG, 0, V AR U NOM). For any wf ¢ of L, let on denote the same set theoretic entity 
in L"; note that on is a purely nominals wf of Then for any frame T we have that: 
T ¢ implies T on. 
Proof: 
Firstly note that the claim in the statement of the above lemma that on is a purely 
nominal wff of L" is trivial by induction on deg(¢); thus the statement of the lemma 
makes sense. 
Secondly note that if V E Valc.(T) then V E Vale(T); these valuations are the same 
set-theoretic entity. So the following statement makes sense: 
(T, V) ¢[t] if (T, V) ¢"[t] 
for all purely Priorean L wffs ¢, frames T, points t E T, and valuations V on T. Moreover, 
it is also a true statement, as a simple induction on deg(¢) shows. 
Now our desired result is immediate: T ¢ means that for all V E Vale (T) we have 
that (T, V) ¢[t] for all t E T. But V al e^ (T) C Vale (T), and by the equivalence just 
noted we are through. 0 
Note that the proof of the Inheritance Lemma did not depend in any way on the fact 
that nominals are the `uniquely denoting sort'; it hinged solely on the fact that nominals 
are a `subsort' of variables. All nominal valuations are variable valuations, and this was 
all that was needed. Thus the Inheritance Lemma is a special case of a wider lemma 
applicable to sorted intensional languages: schemas valid in a sort s remain valid when 
instantiated in any subsort s' of s. We will see another example of this shortly when we 
consider weak nominals. 
The converse of the Inheritance Lemma does not hold - life would be very dull if 
it did. To take a rather boring example, the variable p is not valid on any frame at all, 
whereas its nominalisation i is valid on all and only the frames of cardinality 1. The 
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two sorts differ markedly in their properties, and indeed the next three chapters are 
essentially an exploration of these differences. 
2.4 Filtrations and clusters 
Filtrations are one of the most fundamental tools in intensional logic. Formulated orig- 
inally by E.J. Lemmon and Dana Scott [611 for modal languages, they were generalised 
by Krister Segerberg in a series of papers [95] 1961 [971 in which they were used to solve 
some difficult completeness and decidability problems in modal and tense logic. Their 
importance - and their ubiquity - has grown steadily since. They are useful in modal 
model theory, (see [6, pages 35-37] for some examples and a slightly more abstract view 
of filtrations), and have been adapted to many new types of intensional language. (For 
example, Segerberg has applied them to two dimensional modal logic [991; and a discus- 
sion of filtrations for temporal logics of concurrency and Propositional Dynamic Logic 
may be found in [401.) 
We now formulate the filtration method for languages of NTL. There are two motives 
for doing this. The first is practical: filtrations will prove as useful in NTL as they have 
elsewhere. For example, we will shortly use them to show that the set of NTL validities 
in any language is recursive. The second motive is that it provides a useful foretaste 
of the approach adopted in the next three chapters. A major concern of this thesis 
is to investigate which aspects of intensional logic are affected, and which unaffected, 
when nominals are added. To give a mixed bag of examples, we consider generated 
subframes, canonical Henkin frames, ultrafilter extensions, bulldozing, the Makinson 
construction and unravelling. The effects of the addition vary widely; sometimes there is 
no change, (generated subframes, ultrafilter extensions), sometimes the method fails, but 
can be suitably adapted (canonical Henkin models), and sometimes there is a breakdown 
(unravelling). Note, however, that all these widely differing effects are traceable to 
a single cause: the simple constraint we have placed on the interpretation of nominals. 
Time and again when faced with a new construction we will have to ask ourselves whether 
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the functions between language and frame they utilise are, in fact, valuations. If they 
are, the methods tend to transfer; if they aren't, we often face a major difficulty, namely 
that of altering the method so it does yield a valuation. Filtrations are a good starting 
point, as they are one of the pleasant cases: the work engendered by the addition of 
nominals is negligible, and basic filtration theory is unchanged. 
Filtrations are a way of starting with a large model that verifies a set of wffs, and 
turning it into a smaller model - most usefully, a finite model - verifying that same 
set. 
Definition 2.4.1 (Filtrations) Let L be a language of NTL, M = (T, V) an L-model, 
and E a set of L-wfs closed under subformulas. Define an equivalence relation - on 
T by t N t' if V (O, t) = V (0, t'), for all 0 E E and t, t' E T. Let E(t) denote the 
equivalence class of t. ' Define F = {E(t) : t E T}. Now suppose that <f is a binary 
relation on F satisfying: 
1. s < t = E(s) <, E(t) 
2. E(s) <1 E(t) = ((F4 E E & M 10[t]) = M FO[s]) 
3. E(s) <1 E(t) = ((P4 E E & M 0[s]) = M P4[t]). 
and further suppose that V1 : ATOMS --> Pow(F) is a function satisfying: 
1. E(t) E V1 (p) ift E V(p), for all p E VARe 
2. E(t) E Vj(i) ift E V(i), for all i E E n NOME 
3. Vj(i) is a singleton subset of F, for all i E NOME\E. 
Then M1 = ((F, <f), V1) is called a filtration of M through E. 
The first thing we need to establish is that we have a supply of filtrations. Given a 
model M and a subformulae closed set of sentences E, is a filtration of M through E 
71t would be more precise to subscript both E and - by E to indicate the relativisation of the 
definitions to that set of wffs; but this is far too cumbersome. Context, and explicit comment 
where necessary, will disambiguate. 
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always guaranteed to exist? Now, clearly, given any such pair we can form F and V1; the 
potential difficulty lies with <f. Is it always possible to find a relation on F satisfying the 
constraints demanded above? The following lemma due to Segerberg [95, pages 11-12] 
answers the question positively by providing two relations that will always work. These 
relations, <, and <A, give rise to the filtrations M°, and M', called the smallest and 
the largest filtration of M through E respectively. 8 
Lemma 2.4.1 (Filtration existence) Let L be a language of NTL, M = ((T, <),V) 
an L-model, and E a set of L-wffs closed under subformulas. Form F = {E(t) : t E T} 
as in the filtration definition. Define two relations, <, and <A on F as follows: 
1. E(s) <, E(t) if 3s' E E(s) 3t' E E(t)(s' < t') 
2. E(s) <A E(t) if ((Ft E E & M ¢[t]) M = F¢[s]) and 
((PO E E & M ¢[s]) = M = P¢[t]). 
Then, for any function Vj : ATOMS --* Pow(F) satisfying the constraints on functions 
of this type given in the filtration definition, we have that both M° _ ((F, <a), V1) and 
MA = ((F,<A,),Vf) are filtration of M through E. 0 
The reason for calling these filtrations `smallest' and `largest' is that given any other 
filtration Mf of M through E, <, C <f C <A. 9 Note that if C is a language with 
nominals we cannot always, strictly speaking, talk of the largest filtration and the smallest 
filtration; for if NOM1\E is non-empty and F is not a singleton we may `freely assign' 
what we like to the nominals, thus forming different filtrations. However all such variants 
share the same relational base, and we can talk of the smallest or the largest filtration 
`up to free assignment of nominals' if we want to be very precise. 
8This notation - Q for `smallest' and A for `largest' - is taken from Goldblatt [40, page 32]. 
Note that the use of o, here as shorthand for `smallest' has nothing to do with the set of sentences 
E through which we are filtrating. 
9This is not difficult to prove; further details may be found in [95, pages 11-12]. Note that it 
can happen that <,=<A. 
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So, filtrations always exist - but are they models? We know from the above discus- 
sion that (F, <j) is a well defined frame, and clearly Vf is a perfectly respectable function 
- but does Vf assign singletons to nominals? 
Lemma 2.4.2 (Filtrations are models) Let L be a language of NTL, M be an L- 
model, E a set of L-wfs closed under subformulas, and Mf a filtration of M through E. 
Then Mf is a model. 
Proof: 
We need merely check that Vf is a valuation. For any variables in the language 
it's definition is clearly unproblematic, as variables may denote any subset of F. So 
suppose L contains nominals. Suppose i E E, and that V(i) _ {t}. Clearly by the `if' 
direction of the second clause for Vf there is at least one point of F in V!(i), namely E(t). 
Equally clearly, by `only if' direction of the same clause, there is no other; as otherwise 
we would have that V(i) contained more than one element, and as V is a valuation this 
is impossible. Thus Vf handles all the nominals in E correctly; and by design V! `freely 
assigns' singletons to any nominals not in E; hence Vf is a valuation, and Mf a model. 
0 
This simple result is our admission ticket to the world of filtration theory. In particu- 
lar, we can sprinkle references to languages of NTL through the statement of the following 
well known theorem from which the utility of filtrations ultimately stems: 
Theorem 2.4.1 (Filtration theorem) Let L be a language of NTL, M = ((T, <), V) a 
L-model, E a set of L-wfs closed under subformulas, and M! = ((F, <1),V1) a filtration 
of M through E. Then: 
M = a[t] iff M! = a[E(t)] 
Proof: 
Induction on deg(a). 
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We can now show that there is an effective procedure for determining whether a 
wff ry of some language of NTL is valid. The result is a classic application of filtration 
theory; the argument is due to Lemmon and Scott (61]. 10 The result stems from two 
simple observations. The first is that if the (subformulae closed) set of sentences E 
through which we are filtrating is finite, the filtration is finite also. This shows that 
the set of wffs which aren't valid is recursively enumerable (re). 11 Now in the next 
chapter correspondence considerations will show us that the set of validities is r.e. as 
well; these two results taken together show that the validities form a recursive set. But 
in fact we don't need to appeal to correspondence theory to give us this result; a second 
observation about filtration arguments will take us the whole way. Given that the set E 
we are filtrating through is finite and of cardinality n, not only is any filtration through 
E finite, but it must have cardinality at most 2". (Briefly, this is because every point in a 
filtration consists of all the points in the original model that agree on all the information 
in E; but given that there are n items of information in E, there are only 2" possible 
ways of voting about them.) But this makes an important difference to the computability 
argument of the previous footnote: we now know that there is a bound on the search 
space. If 'y has n subformulas, we need only search through all finite models up to size 
2"; if 'y is valid on all such models, it is valid tout court. 
For many applications of filtrations it is important to be able to construct filtrations 
Mf that inherit desirable relational properties of the original model M; for example, 
it is often necessary to form a transitive filtration out of a transitive model. For some 
"There is a good discussion, with generalisations, of this type of argument in [40, pages 30-35]. 
For further discussion see [107]. 
11For suppose ry isn't valid. Then ry is falsifiable in some model M at some point t. Let r be the 
set of sentences consisting precisely of ry and all its subformulas; clearly r is finite, and thus any 
filtration of M through r is finite also. As filtrations always exist, we thus have by the Filtration 
Theorem that ry is falsified on a finite model at E(t). It is easy to describe a program which 
systematically tests every wff on every finite model; this program thus enumerates the non-valid 
wffs. 
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important relational properties inheritance is automatic. Clearly if M is a reflexive frame 
then any filtration M1 of M (through any set E of sentences closed under subformulas) 
will be reflexive also; this follows from the first relational clause in the definition of 
filtrations. Equally clearly, again by the first clause, any filtration of a trichotomous 
model M - that is, a model whose underlying frame ordering satisfies Vst(s < t V s = 
t V t < s) - is trichotomous also. In the case of transitivity, however, inheritance is 
not automatic. Nonetheless, if M is a transitive model the relation <T on F (the set of 
equivalence classes induced by the set of sentences E under consideration) defined by: 
E(s) <T E(t) if ((F¢ E E & M = ¢ V F¢[t]) = M = F¢[s] and 
((P¢ E E & M = ¢ V PO[s]) = M = P¢[t] 
gives rise to a transitive filtration. 12 Following Segerberg [95, page 314] we call these 
Prior filtrations. 
A concept that will prove vital in Chapter 5 is that of a cluster, a maximal equivalence 
relation on a frame. 
Definition 2.4.2 (Clusters) Let (T, <) be a frame. Then any C C T is called a cluster 
if < nC2 is an equivalence relation, and this is not true for any proper superset C' of 
C. A cluster is proper if it contains at least two elements, and is simple if it consists 
of a single reflexive point. p 
Concrete examples will make it clear why this is a useful concept; for the time being 
note that if we filtrate an infinite model through a finite set of sentences we have formed 
a finite model out of an infinite one. Thus a lot of identifications have taken place and 
we have probably formed clusters. 
12The proof is a straightforward modification of the proof of filtration existence, using the fact 
that FF4 - F is valid on all transitive frames. 
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2.5 Unraveling and paths 
In this section we discuss a method of model transformation that fails to transfer to 
languages with nominals; the method of unraveling. Among other things, unraveling is a 
means of turning an ordinary tense or modal logical model into an equivalent intransitive 
model. The frame transformation that underpins the method is best introduced by 
example, so I'll first display a simple modal unraveling of a frame. 
Let 2G be the frame ({0,1, 2}, {(2,O), (2, 1), (1, O)}). Now define a = (2), b = (2, 0), 
c = (2,1), d = (2, 1, 0). That is, {a, b, c, d} is the set consisting of all possible trips 
through the frame 2G that start at 2. We define an ordering < on this set by stipulating 
that given any two sequences s and s', s < s' iff len(s') = len(s) + 1, and s is an initial 
segment of s'. That is, s' must be a `next step' continuation of the trip s. Thus we 
have that a < b, a < c and c < d. We define 2u to be the frame ({a, b, c, d}, <) and 
call 2u the modal unraveling of 2G about 2. As this example makes clear, unraveling is 
essentially a method of transforming an arbitrary frame into a tree. 
Defining the temporal equivalent of unravelling is more complicated. This is because 
all the moves, both forwards and backwards in time, possible in the original frame must 
be encoded in the unraveling - tensed languages have backward looking operators, so 
this is essential. The definition now given, which uses `arrow insertion' to code this 
bidirectionality, is van Benthem's [5, page 179]. In what follows -> and 4- are just two 
convenient new symbols, and -> has nothing to do with material implication. 
Let T = (T, <t) be a frame and to E T. Define a new frame U = (U, <) where U is 
the smallest set such that (to) E U and: 
(t1, ... , tk) E U and tk <t tk+1 implies (tl, ... , tk, ->, tk+1) E U 
(t1, ... , tk) E U and tk+1 <t tk implies ( t 1 , . .. , tk, E-, tk+1) E U 
and < consists of all and only the pairs of the form 
((t1,... , tk), (tl, ... , tk, -4)tk+1)) or ((tl.... , tk, E-, tk+1), (tl, .. , tk)) 
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We call U the unraveling of T about to. Note that a necessary condition for two elements 
in the unraveled frame to be related is that they differ in length by 2. 
The importance of U is that no matter what frame T we unraveling, <u is always 
intransitive. For suppose ul <u u2 and u2 <u u3. Inspection of the definition of <u shows 
that either ul and u3 have the same length, or they differ in length by 4. Either way, 
u1 -Iu u3i and U is intransitive. 
Suppose (T, Vt) is a model for a purely Priorean language. Define a function f : 
U --f T by setting f (u) to be the last element in u, for all u E U. Define a Priorean 
valuation on U by setting u E Vu(p) if f (u) E Vt(p), for all variables p. We now have 
that for all wffs 0: 
(U, Vu) J 0[u] iff (T, Vt) I [f (u)], 
as can be shown by induction on deg(O). 13 
This equivalence, taken together with the fact that U is intransitive, shows that there 
is no purely Priorean wff valid on precisely the intransitive frames. In fact we can show 
that a wff 0 is valid on the class of intransitive frames if it is (universally) valid. The 
right to left implication is immediate. To show the other direction, assume that 0 is not 
valid. This means that in some model (T, Vt) at some point to E T, (T, Vt) 4[t,]. But 
by unravelling (T, Vt) through to we form an intransitive model that refutes q, and hence 
0 is not valid on the intransitive frames. Thus, if 0 is valid on all the intransitive frames, 
it is also valid. 
This result does not hold for languages with nominals. It is easy to check that T 
FFi -- 'Fi if T is intransitive. Languages with nominals have a grip on intransitive 
frames not possible in Priorean languages. More generally, languages with nominals `see' 
frames very differently from purely Priorean languages, and this vision does not survive 
the unraveling process. 
13This equivalence also follows from more general considerations. In the terminology to be 
introduced in the next chapter, f is a p-morphism from the model (U, Vu) to the submodel of 
(T, Vt) generated by to, which guarantees equivalence. 
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There's an obvious reason why unraveling fails: the way unraveled models were defined 
will not in general extend to languages with nominals. Suppose the function f described 
above is not injective. Then augmenting the above definition of V. by stipulating that 
u E Vu(i) iff f (u) E Vt(i), for all nominals i does not yield an NTL valuation - Vu does 
not assign singletons to nominals and so we haven't succeeded in building a model on 
the unraveled frame. 
More interestingly, considering unraveling leads naturally to an intuition that will 
play a motivational role throughout the thesis: the importance of paths for languages 
with nominals. 
Definition 2.5.1 (Paths) By a path through a frame (T, <) is meant any finite se- 
quence of points of T such that for every pair tm, tm+i in the sequence, either t,, < tm+1 
or tm+l < tm. The length of a path is the sequence length. A frame is connected if there 
exists a path between any two of its points. 0 
That is, a path through a frame is finite sequence of moves forwards and backwards in 
time. We often emphasise the bidirectionality of the concept in what follows by calling 
paths zig-zag paths. 
When we consider the minimal logic for languages of NTL in Chapter 4 we shall 
see that the axiomatisation needed is the ordinary minimal tense logical axiomatisation 
augmented by axioms that can be regarded as path equations - axioms asserting that 
certain paths must be coterminous. More generally, we shall see that languages with 
nominals are very good at expressing the existence or non-existence of certain paths 
--- the intransitivity defining wff FFi --+ -+Fi is a good example of this. Given the 
importance of paths for languages with NTL it is hardly surprising that unraveling fails: 
unraveling is a method that systematically destroys path equations. 
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2.6 Variants and extensions 
Intuitively, we make a language of nominal modal logic (NML) by taking an ordinary 
modal language and adjoining a set of new atoms called nominals. More formally, we 
define a language C of NML to be a triple (LOG, V AR, NOM) satisfying the conditions 
given in the definition of languages of NTL, with the sole difference that LOG is now a 
set of cardinality 5. We represent the elements of LOG by A, Q, ), and (. Once again, 
this definition admits two extreme cases; NOM = 0, and V AR = 0, which give rise to 
languages we call `purely Kripkean' and `purely nominal modal' respectively. The needed 
syntactic concepts - such as WFFF, degree, and subformula - are straightforwardly 
adapted from those given for NTL; essentially, we identify Q with F and forget all 
references to P. 
The semantics of languages of NML is given in terms of frames and models; again we 
insist that for a function V from atoms of C to the powerset of some frame T to be a 
valuation, that it must assign singletons of T to any C-nominals. With this stipulated, 
one can adapt all the definitions of semantic concepts - such as truth at a point, and 
validity - from those given for NTL by simply ignoring all reference to the `backward 
looking' operator P, and reading F as '. In particular, with this change made the 
definition of filtrations for languages of NML is correct, as are the results concerning 
them. 14 By a modal path through a frame (T, <) is meant a finite sequence of points 
of T such that for all pairs of points tk, tk+l in the sequence, tk < tk+1. In contrast to 
temporal paths, modal paths are unidirectional. 
In what follows we usually point out the corresponding concepts and results for lan- 
guages of NML of the temporal work that is our primary concern. By and large the 
adaptations are routine - just as we have noted in the case of filtrations - and consist 
of ignoring clauses concerning P. In some cases, however, the differences between the 
14The modal analogue of Prior filtrations are usually called Lemmon filtrations. 
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two frameworks are rather more interesting. For example, simpler axiomatisations are 
possible for minimal NTL than for minimal NML, as we prove in Chapter 4. 
By a multimodal language is meant a language of propositional calculus augmented 
by indexed one place sentence operators. If the index set of the language is A - that 
is, the one place sentence operators available are {06 : b E Al - then we extend the 
formation rules of propositional calculus by adding the clause: `If 0 is a wff, then so are 
060, for all b E A'. In short, multimodal languages look like modal languages, save that 
there are lots of dangling indices - a pattern repeated in their semantics. 
The basic semantic entity is the rnultifrarne, a set bearing multiple binary relations - 
that is, instead of one accessibility or ordering relation on points, multiframes have many. 
A good example of a multiframe is the map of the London Underground. Here, the nodes 
representing the tube stations are the points, and the different lines - the Victoria line, 
the Central line, the Bakerloo line and so on, (all conveniently in different colours) - are 
the different accessibility relations. More precisely, if L is a multimodal language with 
index set A, then by a A-multiframe is meant a pair (T, {<6}6E0) where T is a non-empty 
set, and for each b E A, <6 is a binary relation on T. Valuations, as in ordinary modal 
logic, are functions that assign arbitrary subsets of frames to propositional variables. 
The truth definition is the expected one, the key clause being: 
V (064, t) = 1 if 3t'(t <6 t' & V (., t') = 1). 
For further details of multimodal languages the reader is referred to [40, Chapter 5] and 
[97]. 
Multimodal frameworks arise naturally in a number of applications; probably the 
earliest example is Hintikka's [45] epistemic logic. Here operators Ka are introduced 
with the reading `Agent a knows that ... '. Thus A is the set of epistemic agents, 
(man, beast or machine); and the <6 relation links a state t to an agent a's epistemic 
alternatives at t. Tense logic is frequently viewed as a multimodal logic. Here we suppose 
that our index set is {p, f); thus we have two operators Op and Or, and frames have 
the form (T, {<p, <f}). To make this look like a flow of time we insist that the only 
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admissible frames are those where <p and <f are converse relations. is Finally, and 
most importantly, Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) beautifully exploits multiframes. 
The details would take us too far afield however, and we refer the reader to [78], [100], 
or [40, Chapter 10]. 
Extending the multimodal languages to multimodal languages with nominals is trivial - we merely add nominals and interpret them as singletons; we take the definition as 
read. We examine two multimodal extensions of NTL later in the thesis. 
We now consider two natural variants of NTL that will crop up from time to time in 
work that follows: weak languages of NTL, and strong languages of NTL. 
Weak languages of NTL are syntactically identical to ordinary languages of NTL. That 
is, a triple L = (LOG, V AR, NOM) may be regarded as - is, syntactically - both a 
weak language, and an ordinary language of NTL; and further, W FFF is both the set of 
weak wffs, and ordinary wffs. We export our usual syntactic definitions unchanged to 
weak languages. Some obvious variants of our usual terminology will be used without 
further comment - for example we talk of weak nominals. 
Weak languages differ from ordinary NTL, in the way they are interpreted; in partic- 
ular in weak languages nominals are true at at most one point, not exactly one. If you 
like, weak nominals are names, but names with a built in possibility of referential failure. 
More precisely: 
151 don't think that this is a particularly good way of thinking about tense logic. For example, 
the multimodal conception of tense logic leads fairly directly to the usual axiomatisation of 
minimal tense logic, presented in Chapter 4. One can do a lot better than this, as recent work by 
Humberstone shows [491, by exploiting the fact that tensed languages can look in both directions. 
If anything, the notion of a `multitensed' language seems a better generalisation than that of 
a multimodal language. Such a conception would view multimodal languages as the forward 
looking fragments of multitensed languages. 
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Definition 2.6.1 (Weak Valuations) Let L be a weak language and T a frame. By a 
weak valuation V for £ on T is meant a function 
V : ATOMS --- Pow(T) 
such that for all i E NOME, V(i) is either a singleton subset of T or 0. 0 
The relationship between weak and ordinary languages of NTL is straightforward. 
Firstly, they are identical as regards validity: 
Lemma 2.6.1 Let L a triple (LOG, V AR, NOM) of the usual type. Writing to 
indicate that ¢ is weakly valid we have that =ti ¢ if 4. 
Proof: 
To see that all weak validities are validities, simply note that all ordinary NTL val- 
uations on an arbitrary frame T are weak valuations; hence, (as with our proof of the 
Inheritance Lemma), weak validity implies validity. 
The converse, as might be expected from the fact that not all ordinary NTL valuations 
are weak valuations, is more difficult. In fact it is a corollary of the completeness proof 
for minimal NTL we give in Chapter 4. 0 
Nonetheless, the two types of language are not expressively equal, as we shall see in 
the next chapter. In particular, in languages with ordinary nominals we can write down 
a formula valid on precisely the trichotomous frames; whereas this is not possible in any 
weak language. 
In short, with weak nominals we have encountered another sort: ordinary nominals 
are a subsort of this new sort, and are more expressive. With strong languages, matters 
are more complex. 
Strong languages of NTL have already been mentioned; they are languages where not 
only do nominals name points of the frame, but every point of the frame is named 
by some nominal. Formally, we define a language L of strong NTL to be a triple 
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(LOG, V AR, NOM) of the type used to define languages of ordinary NTL, save that 
we demand that NOM 0 0. (Trivially we cannot strongly interpret a language without 
nominals on any frame.) We form W FFc as before and use the usual NTL syntactic 
definitions unchanged. 
The key semantic definition is that of a strong valuation: 
Definition 2.6.2 (Strong Valuations) Let G be a language of strong NTL, T a frame, 
and V a valuation of L on T. We say that V is a strong valuation of L on T iff 
UiENOM,e V W = T; and in such a case we say that V covers T. 
Clearly we cannot strongly interpret an arbitrary language on an arbitrary frame; 
in order for a strong valuation of L on T to exist we must have that card(T) < 
card(NOM,c). When (and only when) this condition obtains we say that L covers T. 
The usual semantic definitions go through virtually unchanged, with references to 'valu- 
ations' being replaced by references to `strong valuations'. Only in defining the notion of 
validity do we need a little care; here we need to say that a wff 0 of some strong language 
L is valid if 0 is true at all points t on all frames T such that L covers T, for all strong 
valuations V. 
Are there more strong validities than validities, and are strong languages more expres- 
sive than ordinary languages of NTL? The answer depends on the number of nominals 
that L contains. If L is what is traditionally regarded as a `reasonable language', that 
is, a language in which we have at our disposal as many atomic symbols (in this case 
nominals) as we require, the answer is `no'. Strong languages aren't more expressive 
than ordinary languages and give rise to no new validities: 
Lemma 2.6.2 Let L be a strong language with a countably infinite collection of nominals 
and T a frame that is coverable by Z. Writing T =, ¢ to indicate that ¢ is strongly valid 
on T, we have that T H, ¢ if T F ¢. 
Proof: 
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That T J ¢ implies T 1, ¢ is clear by an argument analogous to those used in 
proving the Inheritance Lemma, and that weak validity implies validity, namely: as all 
strong valuations of L on T are ordinary NTL valuations of L on T, if 0 is ordinary NTL 
valid on T it must be strongly valid on T as well. 
To see the converse, argue by contrapositive. Suppose T K ¢, that is, for some 
valuation V on T and some t E T, (T, V) K O[t]. Now there are a countable infinity of 
L-nominals that don't occur in 0, and T contains at most a countable infinity of points, 
so we can find a valuation V that agrees with V on all atoms occurring in 0 but that 
covers T. By the Agreement Lemma, (T, V') 0[t], and V' is a strong valuation. 
However there's clearly a potential problem for languages with a finite number of 
nominals in constructing an analog of the second part of the previous proof. How could 
we form the strong valuation V' if 0 contained all the L nominals? And, indeed, there is 
a problem here. For example, if L is a language of strong NTL with exactly two nominals, 
then -+ A j) A (i V j) is valid on precisely the frames of cardinality 2. In the following 
chapter we will see in no language of ordinary NTL, not just the finite ones, is there a 
formula valid on precisely the frames of cardinality two; thus finite languages of strong 
NTL are more expressive their ordinary counterparts - at least as regards coverable 
frames. 
The preceding observation isn't particularly important in itself -- we aren't very 
interested in languages of finite cardinality, nor in finite frames - but it does help to 
indicate that there is something rather odd about the strong interpretation. Two phrases 
should make the source of the strangeness plain: in strong languages we have effectively 
insisted that our language is larger than our world, and secondly, we have placed a global 
restriction on the interpretation of certain atoms that is really quite unusual. 
Clearly `language is bigger than world' for strong languages, and this is rather strange - it certainly accounts for the odd results for languages with a finite number of strong 
nominals. Whether such a state of affairs is undesirable is another matter. Certainly 
as far as natural language semantics is concerned it seems peculiar; there we are used 
to thinking of human languages as small, and the universe as big. However for other 
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applications, such as reasoning about program behaviour, it may be quite natural. In 
such applications the universe of discourse is itself a construct, and inherently `small'; 
and the boundary between constructs, and representations of constructs, not so clearly 
drawn - or at least, traditional notions of where to draw the boundary may be irrelevant 
or unhelpful. In such cases it is probably natural to insist on a far tighter link between 
language and model than is traditional. 
More than mere sorting is involved in strong valuations. Certainly there is sorting in 
such languages - strong nominals obey their usual constraint - but in addition there 
is the global covering demand. This demand is rather odd, if only because the individual 
nominals clearly don't interact syntactically amongst themselves in any interesting way. 
By way of comparison, consider the first order language of arithmetic, interpreted on the 
standard model. Now here we have names for every element: 0, s(0), s(s(0))..., and so 
on; the standard model is `covered'. But there is a structure on these terms, a structure 
that mirrors the additive structure of the natural numbers. The connection between 
terms is part of the logic: s(O) + s(s(O)) really is s(s(s(0))). All this is missing in the 
case of strong nominals; they must cover their frame, but they do so blindly. Nothing 
in the syntax reflects this, and no structure of the frame is being seen save cardinality. 
Nonetheless the idea of global constraints - as opposed to the local sortal constraints 
- is an interesting one, though it is not pursued in this thesis. We won't discuss strong 
languages any more, though in Chapter 5 we shall see that strong valuations can be 
highly desirable for technical reasons. 
Apart from being used occasionally in Chapter 7 to represent natural language sen- 
tences, first order languages of NTL are hardly considered in this thesis. I briefly introduce 
them now largely in order to draw a distinction between referential sorts and information 
bearing sorts. 
By a language of first order NTL is meant a purely nominal language to which some 
first order language has been adjoined. The wffs are made in the obvious way, and we 
could summarise what has happened by saying that the resultant language is like a mixed 
language of NTL save that all the variables have been replaced by first order formulas. 
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As to their semantics, for the sake of simplicity I'll assume that a constant domain of 
quantification is being used and that constants are rigid designators. The advantages of 
this assumption is that it leads to very simple logics: in particular, we can axiomatise the 
first order extensions of the logics described in Chapters 4 and 5 simply by adjoining the 
Q1 axioms and rules as described in James Garson's survey of first order modal logic [36, 
page 255 - 256]. The disadvantages of this semantics is that it is (allegedly) unintuitive 
as it forces us to admit the Barcan formula, VxG¢ -* GVxo. This may be so, but the 
alternatives, which often make use of free logic, can hardly be described as simple: the 
reader is referred to Garson's article for a thorough discussion of the options. 
The interesting point is that we only replaced the variables by first order expressions. 
That is, we tacitly accepted that variables were an `information bearing sort' whose 
ultimate fate was to be replaced by the wffs of a more expressive language, whereas 
nominals conveyed a different type of information - purely referential information - 
and should not so be replaced. This is an important distinction. When we discuss natural 
language semantics in Chapter 7, the only use we will make of sorting will be to use such 
propositional referential sorts to model some aspects of tenses and their interaction with 
temporally referring expressions. Nonetheless, there is no reason whatsoever why we 
should think of variables as a undifferentiated collection of placeholders, or that sorting 
is only useful to achieve reference. Indeed I argue in later chapters that we should attempt 
to subsort our variables to mirror the distinctions natural language draws between event 
types, and that imposing plausible constraints on information distributions (valuations) 
is just as important a part of temporal modeling as choosing a reasonable class of frames. 
This concludes our preparatory work. We now are ready to investigate why sorted 




The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the gains in expressive power that result when 
nominals are added to tensed languages. In the first section we display many examples of 
this new expressive power; in the second section we discuss validity and truth preserving 
transformations; and in the third section we examine correspondences between languages 
of NTL and other temporal languages. We conclude the chapter by discussing a possible 
direction for further work. 
3.1 Definability in NTL 
Frames are our most basic semantic entities, and a fundamental question to ask is what 
constraints our languages can impose on them. How precisely can our languages pin 
down the classes of frames we find interesting, and can we pick out more interesting 
classes of frames using nominals than we can without? The technical concept underlying 
these questions is definability: 
Definition 3.1.1 (Definability) Let T be a class of frames. Let 0 be a formula of a 
language of NTL (or NML). We say 0 defines T if. T 0 i$ T E T. 
Some standard examples, together with their traditional names, will be useful. The 
class of transitive frames is defined by FFp -- Fp (4); the class of reflexive frames by 
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p -+ Fp (T); and the class of symmetric frames by FGp -+ p (B). The class of Church- 
Rosser frames is defined by FGp -+ GFp (.2); the class of dense frames by Fp -+ FFp 
(A); and the class of frames such that every point has a successor - the right unbounded 
frames - by FT (D,). The class of right unbounded frames is mirrored by the class of 
left unbounded frames, consisting of those frames in which every point has a predecessor. 
This is defined by PT (DI). 
A simple lemma allows us to create new definable classes out of old: 
Lemma 3.1.1 (Intersective Closure Lemma) Let ¢ and & be wfs of some language 
of NTL, and T and T' classes of frames such that 0 defines T and -0 defines V. Then 
0 A 0 defines T n T' 
The lemma follows simply from the definition of validity. As an example of its use, the 
class of all unbounded frames - those frames in which every point has both a successor 
and a predecessor - is defined by PT A FT (D). 
It will prove useful to have at our disposal a certain first-order language, Lo. This 
language has only a single non-logical symbol - a binary predicate <. We assume the 
equality predicate = as a logical symbol. ' Note that any frame T = (T, <t) is a first 
order structure for Lo - T is the domain of quantification and <t the extension of the 
< predicate - thus we can talk of a formula of Lo being valid on a frame. Here validity 
means ordinary first order validity. We say that a class of frames T is an Lo expressible 
class iff for some wff 0 in Lo, 0 is valid on precisely the frames in T. For example, the 
class of right unbounded frames is an Lo expressible class, for this is precisely the class 
of frames on which Vx3y(x < y) is valid. We often say that a wff of Lo expresses a first 
order condition on frames, or even, is a (first order) condition on frames; and when we 
say that a sentence ¢ of NTL (or NML) defines a certain condition 0, where 0 is a wff 
'There is scope for confusion here: = is already being used for set theoretic equality in our 
semi-formal metalanguage; and in this language < is standardly used for the relation on frames. 
We take care to ensure that context will disambiguate. 
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of Lo, we simply mean that the NTL wff and the Lo wff are valid on exactly the same 
frames. For example, FT defines the condition Vx3y(x < y). 
It is important to note that not all classes of frames definable in standard tensed 
languages are Lo expressible. For example, the class of frames which have a transitive 
and well-founded ordering relation can be defined by Lob's axiom, H(Hp -+ p) -+ Hp, 
and the usual appeal to the compactness theorem shows that no wff of Lo expresses 
this condition. Ordinary tense logic is intrinsically higher order, and corresponds to a 
fragment of a certain second order language L2. On the other hand, as we will see later 
in the chapter, purely nominal sentences can define only Lo expressible classes of frames. 
3.1.1 Six Simple Conditions 
Consider the following six conditions on frames: 2 
Irreflexivity Vx(x yC z) 
Asymmetry Vxy(x < y --> y yc z) 
Antisymmetry Vxy(x < y A y < x -+ x = y) 
Trichotomy Vxy(x < y V X= Y V y< z) 
Right Directedness Vxy3z(x < z A y < z) 
Right Discreteness Vxy(x < y - 3z(x < z A -i3w(x < w < z))) 
None of these conditions is definable in a purely Priorean language; all of these 
conditions are definable in any language with nominals, as follows: 
2The definitions are those of [5]; the single change is that the condition here called trichotomy 
is there called linearity. Corresponding to right directedness and discreteness are left directedness 
and discreteness, defined in the obvious way. By directedness (discreteness) is meant the condition 
expressed by the conjunction of left and right directedness (discreteness). 
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i--,Fi (I) 
i - -,FFi (Ass) 
i -+ G(Fi --+ i) (Anti) 
Pi v i v Fi (Tr) 
FPi (RDir) 
i -+ (FT -+ FHH-'i) (RDisc) 
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Left directedness and discreteness are defined by the mirror images of RDir and RDisc 
respectively. By Dir is meant the conjunction of RDir with its mirror image, and by Disc 
the conjunction of RDisc with its mirror image; by the Intersective Closure Lemma, these 
define the classes of directed and discrete frames respectively. The method of defining 
right discreteness given above is due to Inge Bethke. 3 
All six conditions are potentially useful constraints to impose when modeling temporal 
precedence. Some seem almost indispensable: for example it is arguable that the strictly 
parf ly ordered frames (sPos) embody our minimal assumptions about temporal flow 
- in the `time as river' metaphor, transitivity ensures the river flows, and irreflexivity 
ensures there are no whirlpools; the present, or any other time, does not precede itself. 
The gain of irreflexivity is an important one. 
Equally interesting is the gain of discreteness. The choice between dense and discrete 
time is a fundamental branch point in temporal modeling. For many applications density, 
or even continuity, is a natural choice; but for others - such as modeling the execution 
of a computer program, or `calendar semantics' for natural language --- discrete time is 
appropriate. Indeed for some applications one might want both: for natural language 
semantics we might want a discrete calendar structure sitting on top of a dense time flow. 
The important point is that it's useful to have both options definable in our languages, 
and with the aid of nominals both are. 
3Previously I used i -- (-iFi n (F-+i -- F(-+i A HH-,i))), which works, but is clumsy. 
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Note that we can also define the partial orders (POs), total orders (Tos) or strict total 
orders (STOs) using nominals; for example, the class of STOs is definable by I A 4 A Tr. 
None of these classes are definable in purely Priorean languages. 
The proofs that the NTL wffs given define the stated condition are straightforward. 
We conclude this section with an example. 
Lemma 3.1.2 T is right discrete ii T = i -+ (FT -+ FHH-,i) 
Proof: 
To show that T is right discrete implies T = RDisc, assume that V (i, t) = 1 and 
V (FT, t) = 1. Then there exists a t' > t such that V (T, t') = 1. Now as t has a successor 
t' it has an immediate successor s. But V (HH-,i, s) = 1. For suppose V (HH-,i, s) _ -1, 
that is, V (PPi, s) = 1. Then there is a u such that u < s and V (Pi, u) = 1. But this 
means that t < u as i is true uniquely at t. Hence t < u < s contradicting the choice 
of s as an immediate successor of t. So V (HH--ii, s) = 1 and thus V (FHH-'i, t) = 1, 
verifying RDisc. 
To show the converse, suppose T = i -+ (FT -+ FHHi). Let V be an arbitrary 
valuation on T such that V(i) = {t}. If t has no successors there is nothing to prove, so 
suppose there is a t' such that t < t'. Thus we have V (i, t) = 1 and V (FT, t) = 1 and 
hence, as RDisc is valid on T, V (FHH-,i, t) = 1. Hence there is a point s > t such that 
V (HH-'i, s) = 1. Let u be an arbitrary point in T. If t < u < s then V (H-'i, u) = -1 
and thus V (HH-,i, s) = -1; contradiction. Hence s is an immediate successor of t and 
thus T is right discrete. 
3.1.2 Special Structures and counting 
In this section we examine the class of strict total orders and some of its interesting 
subclasses, and consider some of the things we can count with nominals. First note that 
the class of STOs is definable by a purely nominal sentence. A quick check reveals that 
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FFi --> Fi defines transitivity; 4 so we define qT to be (FFi - Fi) A I A Tr. By the 
Intersective Closure Lemma this purely nominal sentence defines the class of STOs. We 
now show that some important subclasses of the STOs can be defined. 
Let OT* be the sentence: qT A (FT) A (PT). This defines the class of unbounded 
STOs. Here we regard T as being i V -,i, hence this class of frames is definable by a 
purely nominal sentence. Now define 
gTrd to be qT" A Disc; clearly this purely nominal 
sentence defines the class of unbounded discrete STOs. 5 
Now Z is in the class of unbounded discrete total orders, but so are other (non- 
isomorphic) structures - for example, the frame consisting of two copies of Z lying end 
to end with the obvious ordering. It is possible, using a mixed sentence, to eliminate 
such `pathologies' and define Z up to isomorphism. Define: 
0Z = OT" A (H(Hp p) --, (PHp - Hp)) A (G(Gp --, p) --, (FGp -- Gp)) 
We then have: 
Theorem 3.1.1 T = Oz if T!--- Z. 
This result is an immediate corollary of van Benthem's THEOREM 11.2.2.8 [5, page 
631. This theorem, a `best possible' result concerning the definability of Z in a Priorean 
"Previously we only knew that FFp -- Fp defined transitivity. In this case the uniform 
substitution of nominals for variables gives rise to a formula defining the same class, but this 
by no means always occurs as we know from the previous chapter. For example, p defines the 
empty class of frames, whereas i defines the class of frames of cardinality 1. Another example is 
provided by p -- -,Fp. This defines the class of frames satisfying the condition Vxy(x It y), the 
totally disconnected frames. Replacing p uniformly with i gives a formula defining irreflexivity. 
Note, in keeping with the discussion of the Inheritance Lemma in the previous chapter, that the 
totally disconnected frames are a (proper) subclass of the irreflexive frames. In what follows we 
also refer to FFi -+ Fi as 4. 
5As all discrete frames are irreflexive we don't need to include I in the defining conjunction. 
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language, states that Z is tense-logically definable on the class of connected strict partial 
orders. This means that if we restrict ourselves to considering the class of connected 
strict partial orders, then we can define Z (up to isomorphism) in a Priorean language. 
van Benthem proves this by observing that if we conjoin the modified Lob axioms, the 
unboundedness axioms and: 
Pp --> H(Fp V p V Pp), and Fp --+ G(Pp V p V Fp), 
we narrow down the class of suitable frames to precisely Z. Now the effect of the un- 
boundedness axioms is clear, and the joint effect of the two modified Lob axioms on 
transitive frames is to demand that only a finite number of points can lie between any 
two points t and t' of the frame. What the last two axioms - known as the McTaggart 
axioms - secure is the condition `local linearity to the left' (to the right): 
Vzyz(y<zAz<z--> (z<yVz=yVy<z)). 
That is, the McTaggart axioms do not define real trichotomy - nothing can in a Priorean 
language - just this local version. van Benthem's result says that if we restrict our 
attention to the class of connected SPOs, there is only one frame on which these axioms 
can all be valid together, namely Z. We need merely observe that using nominals we can 
restrict ourselves appropriately. The inclusion of I and TRAN among the conjuncts of Oz 
restricts us to the class of SPOs; the inclusion of the TR conjunct then ensures that we 
are restricted to a class of frames that is both connected and linear - namely the STOs 
- and the STOs are precisely the SPOs that are connected and validate the McTaggart 
axioms. Note, in passing, that as a result of this argument we can see that Disc is not 
needed as a conjunct of 0Z. 
It is similarly straightforward to show that we can define N up to isomorphism. Define 
ON to be the conjunction of the following formulas: Pi V i V Fi, FT, H(Hp --> p) --> Hp, 
and G(Gp --> p) -+ (FGp --> Gp). Then we have: 
Theorem 3.1.2 T ON if T N 
Once again this result is a simple corollary of a result of van Benthem's [7, page 2241 
which states that the wff obtained from ON by replacing Tr in ON by the conjunction 
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of the McTaggart axioms defines N on connected frames. Once again, in languages 
with nominals by using Tr instead of the McTaggart axioms we can force the desired 
trichotomy. 
It is important to note that both 4Z and ON are mixed sentences. By appealing to the 
later result that only Lo expressible classes of frames are definable using purely nominal 
sentences, we know that no purely nominal sentence can uniquely define these structures; 
and further, van Benthem's results concerning the definability of these structures in 
Priorean languages are, in a precise sense that will become clear when we have discussed 
preservation results, `best possible' results. The mixture of nominals and variables is 
thus necessary. 
Having uniquely defined N, it is natural to ask whether all initial segments of this 
structure are similarly definable; once again, this can't be done in a purely Priorean 
language. They all are, and only nominals are needed. The proof of the following lemma 
is left to the reader. 
Lemma 3.1.3 Let n E N such that n > 1. Let qT° _ q5T A G"1 A (F' IT V PF"''T). 
Then T q5T ° if T is a STO of length exactly n. 
Although we have an an absolute grip on the sizes of these frames, this is very much 
a grip on ordinality, not cardinality. (In fact, as we shall shortly see, the only class of 
frames of a given cardinality that can be defined is the class of frames of cardinality 1.) 
That we can count from 1 through to w on the STOs depends crucially on the simple and 
regular nature of these frames' orderings; that is, the grip we have on these numbers is 
a structured grip. 
In fact we can count other things using nominals, for example branches, that cannot 
be counted using only variables. That is, with the aid of nominals we can demand that 
any point in a frame has exactly n successors. We break the task of defining this condition 
into two subtasks: demanding that every point has at most n successors, which variables 
can do; and demanding that every point has at least n successors, for which nominals 
are required. 
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Firstly, in any language at all we can stipulate that any point has at most n successors, 
as the following encoding of the Pigeonhole Principle show: 
Lemma 3.1.4 Let n > 1. In any language of NTL the class of frames such that every 
point has at most n successors is defined by: 
A Faa -> V F(aa A ap), 
1<a<n+1 1<a<n; 2<0<n+l; a<0 
where the as are distinct atoms. 
However although the class of all frames with at least one successor - the right 
unbounded frames - can be defined in languages with nominals by either FT or Gi -> 
Fi, and in Priorean languages by either FT or Gp -> Fp, we cannot demand at least n 
branches for any n bigger than 1 in purely Priorean languages. With nominals we can. 
The condition that there be at least two successors is defined by: 
FT A (Fi -> F-4); 
the condition that there be at least three successors is defined by: 
FT A(FiAFj -> F(-,iA-ij)); 
and in general we can define the condition that there be at least n successors by choosing 
n - 1 distinct nominals i1, ... , in_1 and writing: 
FT A ((Fi1 A ... A Fin-1) -> F(-,i1 A ... A -,in-1)), 
In effect we have chosen primitive names for n - 1 of the successors (the is are these 
names), and then manufactured a new quasi-name, -i1 A . A -min-1. Due to the unique 
denoting property of nominals, if this new entity `names' any points at all, it must name 
points distinct from the denotations of the ia. The schema then works by insisting that 
if the other names denote, this strange new one does too. Note that if variables are 
uniformly substituted for nominals in this schema we don't define `at least n successors'; 
variables don't work like names. Indeed it is not just the purely Priorean formulas 
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obtainable from this schema that fail to define `at least n successors'; as we shall see when 
we discuss p-morphisms, we cannot write down any purely Priorean sentence defining 
this class of frames. We can demand at least one successor in Priorean languages, but 
that is the limit. 
As a simple corollary of the discussion so far, in any language with nominals we can 
define, for any choice of n E N, the frames of cardinality n whose relation is universal - simply conjoin 4,T,B and the formula demanding exactly n successors. Again this 
special subclass is not Priorean definable. 
This discussion of branching and counting could be generalised and extended in all 
sorts of directions; for example it should be clear that in languages with nominals we can 
control not only the number of successors of a given point, but the number of successors 
the successors of that point have, and so on. We won't pursue this line however, but will 
content ourselves with observing that the following pretty classes of frames are definable: 
for any n we can define the class of oriented n-sided polygons. 
Definition 3.1.2 For all n > 3 define the oriented n-gon to be the frame whose under- 
lying set is {O, ... , n - 1}, and whose relation is given by m <,sy m' if m + 1 = m', where 
the addition is performed mod n. We say that a frame T is an oriented n sided polygon 
if T - n-gon, for some n > 3. 0 
Now for any n > 3 we can define the n-sided polygons. Consider the case of squares. 
To define this we conjoin formulas defining irreflexivity, exactly one predecessor, exactly 
one successor, i V Fi V FFi and i -- FFFi. The general case is left to the reader. The 
polygon example, the definability of finite universal relations, and the definability of the 
initial segments of N all show that it is possible to get an absolute grip on some finite 
frames because of their regular path structure. 
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3.2 Preservation Results 
Given that a formula 0 is valid on some frame T, are there general results guaranteeing 
the validity of 0 on frames not isomorphic to T? There are four classic results of this 
kind for standard tense and modal logic: validity is preserved under the formation of 
generated subframes, disjoint unions, and p-morphic images; and anti-preserved under 
the formation of ultrafilter extensions. In this section we examine how the introduction 
of nominals affects these results. 
Before examining these results in detail, let's consider the sort of information such 
preservation results give us. Firstly note that they can be construed as closure conditions 
on definable classes of frames: for example, the p-morphism result for Priorean languages 
expresses the fact that Priorean definable classes of frames are closed under the formation 
of p-morphic images. Secondly, and more importantly, such results are negative results 
concerning the expressive power of our languages. For example, the p-morphism result 
says that no formula 0 can tell the difference between a frame T and any p-morphic 
image of that frame, at least as far as validity is concerned: preservation results are the 
codification of methods that succeed in fooling formulas as to which frame they're being 
evaluated on. This shows itself in the typical applications of such theorems: they are 
commonly used to show that some condition is not definable. 
Given that preservation results are negative results on expressive power, and given 
that mixed languages are more expressive than purely Priorean ones, we might expect 
that some of the earlier mentioned preservation theorems will be lost for languages with 
nominals. This does, in fact, occur. Only the generated subframe and ultrafilter exten- 
sion results remain; the p-morphism and disjoint union results fail. 
In this section we also gain two important model equivalence results; generated sub- 
models: the latter result is rather interesting in view of the failure of the associated 
validity preservation result. Both equivalences are essential for later work. 
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By a (temporal) generated subframe S = (S, <,) of a frame T = (T, <t) is meant a 
subframe S of T such that: 
Vs E S Vt E T((s <t t V t <t s) --+ t E S) 
That is, a generated subframe of T is a subframe S of T whose underlying set S is 
closed under both the successor and predecessor relations of the original frame; that is, 
S is <>-closed. If S is an arbitrary subset of T by the subframe of T generated by S 
is meant the smallest generated subframe of T to contain S. This generated subframe 
must always exist as T will suffice as the smallest containing frame even if nothing else 
will. Note that if S is a singleton {t}, the subframe generated by S is connected - this 
is easily shown by induction and is crucial for the completeness results of the next two 
chapters. 
For purely Priorean languages we have that if S is a generated subframe of T, then 
T implies S = ¢ - no formula can tell the difference between a frame and any 
island of that frame. The result is usually proved by using the notion of a generated 
submodel: 
Definition 3.2.1 (S, V') is said to be a generated submodel of (T, V) ifS is a generated 
subframe of T, and for all atoms a, V'(a) = V (a) n S. 0 
Now for Priorean languages it is obvious that given a model (T, V) and a generated 
subframe S, the function V' defined by V' (a) = V (a) n S for all atoms a, is in Vat(S) 
and hence (S, V') is a generated submodel of (T, V) - we call it the generated submodel 
induced by (T, V) and S. A simple induction shows that for all s E S: 
(T, V) = ¢[s] if (S, V') = ¢[s]. 
This is the Generated Submodel Theorem for Priorean languages: the desired frame 
preservation result is an immediate corollary of this model equivalence result. 
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What about languages containing nominals? It should be intuitively clear that an 
analogous frame preservation result holds for them as well, and it seems sensible to derive 
it from a generated submodel equivalence result for languages with nominals. But note 
that for languages with nominals we cannot simply adopt the definition of generated 
submodels given above: given a model (T, V) and a generated subframe S of T, the 
function V" defined by V ° (a) = V (a) n S need not be a valuation on S: for if V(i) ¢ S 
then V°(i) = 0 and hence V° Val(S). The moral is: (S, V°) is not guaranteed to be a 
generated submodel of (T, V) - we must exercise more care in inducing submodels for 
languages with nominals. The following definitions pin down what is required. 
Definition 3.2.2 Let (T, <) be a frame and S C T. A valuation V E Val(T) is said to 
be in S 1ff for all i E NOM, V(i) c S. 0 
Definition 3.2.3 Let S be a generated subframe of T. Let (T, V) be any model such 
that V is in S. Let VJ,S be the function: 
VJ,s: ATOM ---> Pow(S) 
defined by VJ.s (a) = V (a)nS. Then the pair (S, VJ,s) is said to be the generated submodel 
in S induced by (T, V). As it should always be clear from context which subframe we are 
interested in, we normally suppress the subscript and just write VJ,. 0 
The definition is satisfactory: the stipulation that V is in S means that all nominals 
are assigned singleton subsets of S, hence VJ, is an NTL valuation in S, and thus the in- 
duced submodel is a model. Also note that this definition of induced generated submodel 
coincides with the usual one for purely Priorean languages. 
Definition 3.2.4 Let T be a frame and S be a generated subframe of T. Define: 




VJ, if V is in S I 
t otherwise 
0 
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Note that t Im(Ins) if T = S if Ins is injective. Also note that for all V' E 
Val(S), Ins1[V'] 0 0 - which simply means that any NTL valuation on S can be 
extended to an NTL valuation on T. 
We can now state the Generated Submodel Theorem for an arbitrary language of 
NTL. (Note that the statement of this theorem includes the result for Priorean languages 
as a special case.) The proof is by induction on deg(q5). 
Theorem 3.2.1 (Generated Submodel Theorem) Let S be a generated subframe of 
T and V' E Val(S). Then for all wff8 0, all s E S, and all V E Ins1[V'], V(0,s) _ 
V'(q5, s) 
Corollary 3.2.1 If S is a generated sub, 
Proof: 
rame o T then T implies S q5. 
Suppose 0 is falsifiable on S. That is, there is some V' E Val(S) and some t E S 
such that V'(q5, t) _ -1. But then by the previous theorem, for any V E Ins1(V'), we 
have V (0,t) _ -1. As Ins1(V) is not empty we have T 
As a first application of this theorem. we note that following simple condition is not 
definable: 3x(x < x). Suppose there was an NTL wff 0 that defined this condition. 
Consider any frame that contains only two points t1 and t2, such that t1 t2, t2 
t1i t1 < t1, and t2 t2. Then 0 is valid on this frame because of t1. But by the 
previous theorem 0 must remain valid on the generated subframe consisting of only the. 
single irreflexive point t2 - clearly impossible. Note also that the same frame and same 
argument also shows that the stronger condition: 
3x((x < x) AVy(y 0 x -- x -/, y n y je, x)) 
is not definable. That is, we cannot express the existence of an isolated reflexive point. 
This example will be useful to us when we discuss D logic. 
As a second example we will prove the assertion made in the previous section that 
for any cardinal number Ic > 1, the class of frames of cardinality is is undefinable. This 
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is virtually immediate. For any Ic > 1 consider any frame of cardinality is whose relation 
is empty - that is, any totally disconnected frame of cardinality ic. Any totally discon- 
nected frame of lower cardinality is (isomorphic to) a generated subframe of this frame, 
and thus shares the same NTL theory as the larger frame. Hence no wff 0 distinguishing 
the larger cardinality can be found. 
As a third application, let us consider connected frames and disconnected frames. The 
first result is easy: the class of disconnected frames is not NTL definable. For suppose 
0 is a wff that defines this condition, and let T be a disconnected frame. Let t be any 
member of T, and let S be the smallest generated subframe of T containing t. By the 
generated subframe preservation result, S = 0. As S is connected there can be no such 
The next result is more interesting: the class of connected frames is not definable 
either. As we shall see in the next section, this result is a virtual triviality for purely 
Priorean languages: but for languages with nominals things are slightly more tricky. 
Actually, by appealing to the result that the only conditions a purely nominal language 
can define are Lo expressible, we have that no pure language can define the class. But 
couldn't some suitable mixed sentence accomplish the task? The answer is no: and we 
deduce this result as a corollary of the following frame comparisons between Ns = (N, S) 
and Ns J Ns. The former frame is the natural numbers under the successor relation - 
that is, (n, m) E S if m = n + 1. The latter frame is the disjoint union of the first 
frame with itself. (A general definition of the disjoint union of frames is given in the 
next section. For present purposes it suffices that the latter frame contains precisely 
two generated subframes, each of which is isomorphic to (N, S), and that this frame is 
disconnected. In particular, no point in one generated subframe is related to any point 
in the other.) 
Theorem 3.2.2 Th(Ns) = Th(Ns WNs) 
"Johan van Benthem suggested this frame comparison. 
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Proof: 
One inclusion is immediate: suppose 0 E Th(N5 UNS). As Ns is (isomorphic to) 
a generated subframe of Ns U Ns, by the generated subframe preservation result, ¢ E 
Th(Ns). 
The other direction is pretty. Suppose 0 Th(Ns J Ns). Let V be any valuation on 
this frame that falsifies 0 at t. If we knew V was in the generated subframe of Ns U Ns 
that t is in, we could use the generated submodel result to transfer this falsifying valuation 
to the smaller frame, Ns. Now we have no guarantee that V is in this generated subframe 
- but using the Horizon Lemma we can construct a V' falsifying 0 that is in the generated 
subframe containing t. Proceed as follows. Suppose td(q5) = n. Then as the relation on 
Ns U Ns is intransitive, t 14 t + n + 1. So simply let V' be the valuation obtained from 
V by letting all the nominals that V sends to other generated subframe denote t + n + 1; 
other than this, V' = V. By design, this new valuation is in the subframe of interest. 
And by design V' and V satisfy the requirements of the Horizon Lemma, and hence V' 
falsifies 0 at t. Transfer V' to the smaller frame and we are through. 
Thus there can be no 0 valid on precisely the connected frames: Ns is connected and 
Ns W Ns is disconnected and their NTL theories are identical. This example also shows 
that Th(T) = Th(T') does not imply T T. 
Analogous results hold for languages of NML. In fact the only change that needs 
to be made is in the definition of generated subframe: for modal languages we do not 
require that the set underlying a generated subframe be closed under both successor and 
predecessor, only that it be closed under successor. This reflects the fact that in tense 
logics we can look both forwards along < (using F), and back (using P); whereas in 
modal logics we can only look forwards (using Q). With this single change made, all the 
above definitions are suitable, and all the results hold, for languages of NML. 
We can use the fact that the validity of modal formulas is preserved under the for- 
mation of modal generated subframes to show that any language of NTL can define a 
condition that no language of NML can. (To put the matter slightly inaccurately: lan- 
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guages of tense logic are more expressive than those of modal logic. 7 ) Consider the 
condition: Vx3y(y < x). This can be defined by either p --+ PFp or i -- PFi. But no 
formula of a modal language can define this condition. Suppose there was such a ¢. 
Then Z ¢. But N is a modal generated subframe of Z, and ¢ must be false on this 
frame at 0, contradicting the modal generated subframe preservation result. The general 
question of which conditions are definable in NML and which require NTL - especially 
with regard to purely nominal formulas - is an interesting one, and will arise naturally 
when we consider interval based languages in the final chapter. I briefly mention some 
matters that bear on this issue at the end of this chapter. 
3.2.2 Disjoint Unions 
Let {T, : m E M} be a non-empty family of frames. For all m E M we define Tm to be 
(T;,, <;,,,) where: 
Tm={(m,t):tET,,,} 
and 
<= {((m,ti),(m,t2)) : (tl,t2) E<, }. 
By the disjoint union W {T,,, : m E M} is meant the frame 
(U{TL:mEM},U{<L:mEM}). 
As for all m E M T,,, - T,,,, in what follows we usually ignore the distinction and just 
talk of T,,,,. 
For Priorean languages we have the following preservation result: 
7The inaccuracy is that it hasn't been stated what sort of atoms these languages contain: 
a modal language containing nominals can express conditions that a purely Priorean language 
cannot and vice-versa. What we can say is that given a language of NML and a language of 
NTL each of which has the same number of each sort of atom, then the modal language is less 
expressive than the tensed language. 
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Theorem 3.2.3 If for all m E M Tm 0, then W Tm 0. 
That is, if a formula is valid on each frame in some collection of frames, it remains valid 
on the frame created by considering that collection as a single entity. This follows as 
a result of the generated submodel result for Priorean languages; see (5, page 147] for 
details. 
An immediate consequence of this result is that Priorean languages cannot define the 
universal relation Vxy(x < y). Suppose some wff 0 of a Priorean language does define 
this condition. Take any two frames T1 and T2 whose relation is universal; 0 is valid on 
each. By the above result, 0 must remain valid on T1 U T2 - but this frame's relation 
is not universal. 
Note that it also yields a proof of the non-definability of connectedness by Priorean 
languages that is virtually immediate. The disjoint union preservation result can be 
paraphrased as: any Priorean definable class of frames is closed under the formation 
of disjoint unions. But the class of connected frames is clearly not so closed: a dis- 
joint union of frames produces a frame consisting of separated islands - precisely what 
it's designed to do! Note that this paraphrase of the preservation result actually gives 
us something stronger: no non-empty Priorean definable class of frames contains only 
connected frames. 
The situation changes for languages containing nominals; the preservation theorem no 
longer holds. An immediate counterexample is given by the class of trichotomous frames, 
defined by Pi V i V Fi. Take any two members of this class. The defining formula is valid 
on each. But the defining formula fails on the disjoint union of the two members, as the 
disjoint union consists of two separated `parallel lines', and hence is not trichotomous. 8 
81t should now be clear why van Benthem's result on the definability of N in Priorean languages 
is `best possible'. His result shows that N can be defined up to isomorphism to `within one 
preservation result'. That is, only the fact that the validity of Priorean sentences is preserved 
under the formation of disjoint unions prevents its exact definition. As will shortly become clear, 
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Another counterexample is provided by the class of directed frames. Consider the two 
islands in the disjoint union of two directed frames. No two points from distinct islands 
are directed, hence the disjoint union is not directed. Yet another counterexample is 
provided by the universal relation; this condition is definable using nominals, by Fi. Note 
something common to these counterexamples: each member of these definable classes is 
a connected frame. This is important: in languages with nominals, some non-empty 
classes of frames consisting solely of connected frames, are definable. 
We now turn to a rather pretty result. Reflection shows that disjoint union preserva- 
tion only just fails for languages containing nominals. Suppose we have two frames T1 
and T2 on each of which 0 is valid. To keep things simple suppose 0 contains occurrences 
of only one nominal, say i. We know that we cannot conclude that T1 U T2 = 0, but 
why not? The reason is that in any valuation on T1 U T2, on one of the components, say 
T1, i will be false everywhere. This is a situation that the validity of 0 on the component 
frames simply gives us no information about: in any valuation on either frame i is true 
somewhere. 
But suppose we knew something more: namely that not only was 0 valid on each 
frame, but 0[1/i] was also. Then, intuitively, we would have the information needed 
to guarantee validity on the disjoint union: the validity of the new formula blocks the 
possibility that i being false everywhere in a component will cause trouble. We will 
shortly demonstrate that this is the case. Indeed we show something stronger: not only 
is the condition sufficient, it is also necessary as long as the disjoint union is not trivial 
- that is, as long as at least two frames are stuck together. 
To state and prove the theorem in full generality we need to extend the above in- 
tuitions to the case where 0 contains many different nominals. Essentially all we need 
to do is account for all the different ways the nominals can be `dealt out' - like cards 
his result concerning the definability of Z shows that this structure can be uniquely defined 
to `within two preservation results.' Here the formation of both disjoint unions and p-morphic 
images prevents an exact definition. 
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from a pack - to the `players' - the components of the disjoint union.9 That is, we 
must take into account all possible uniform substitutions of I for nominals in 0. This is 
simple, and motivates the following definitions: 
Definition 3.2.5 Let a be an arbitrary atom. We define a function: 
Sub1 : Pow(ATOM) x WFF ---) WFF 
by: 
1 ifaEX 
Sub1(X, a) _ 





Sub1(X, 4)A 6) = Sub1( X, 4)) A Sub1(X, 6) 
Sub1(X, FqS) = F(Sub 1(X, 4))) 
Sub' (X, P4)) = P(Sub 1(X, qS)) 
Definition 3.2.6 For any non-empty family of frames {T,,, : m E M} we define: 
Out : {T,,, : m E M} x Val(U T,,,) ---4 Pow(NOM) 
by: 
Out(T,, V) = {i E NOM : V (i) T} 
0 
0 
Although this last definition looks rather cumbersome, Out actually does something 
rather simple: it takes a component of a disjoint union and a valuation and returns all 
the nominals which denote a point outside that component. The next lemma gives the 
reason for introducing Sub' and Out. In essence it says that nominals whose denotation 
lies outside the component containing the point of evaluation, behave like I. 
9A particular deal, of course, is just a valuation. 
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Lemma 3.2.1 Let some non-empty family of frames {T,,, : m E M} be given, and let T 
be an arbitrary member of this family. Then for all 0 E WFF, for all V E Val(U Tm) 
and for all t E T. we have: 
(U T,, V) ¢[t] s$ (U Tm, V) Sub1(Out (TV ), O) [t] 
Proof: 
By induction on deg(s). Suppose 0 is a nominal, say i. Then if i Out(T,,,V), 
Sub1(Out (T,,, V), i) = i and the above equivalence holds trivially. (Note that this argu- 
ment immediately gives us the base case involving variables as well: no variable is ever in 
any set in the image of Out.) So suppose i E Out (T,,, V). Then Sub1(Out (T,,, V), i) 
1. Obviously for all t E T,,, (U Tm, V) [ 1[t]. But i E Out (T,,, V) means V (i) ¢ T,,, 
hence for any t E T we also have (U T m, V) [ i [t]. 
The inductive cases are straightforward, following immediately from the definition of 
Sub1. 0 
Definition 3.2.7 Let Nom(0) = {i E NOM : i occurs in 4'}. Then for any wff 0, we 
define S1(0) to be: {Sub1(X, 0) : X C Nom (0)}. 
Note that S1(¢) is never empty, as for all wffs 0, 0 C Nom(c), hence we have 
Sub-L(0, 0) = 0, and thus 0 is always in S1(¢). Note also that S1(0) is always a finite 
set of wffs. For any wff ¢ we define ¢1 to be the conjunction of all wffs in S1(¢) if this 
set is not a singleton; and 0 otherwise. For example, let 0 be the formula Fi --+ Pj. 
Then S1(¢) is the set: 
{Fi-+Pj,F±-+Pj,Fi-+P1,F1 -+P1} 
and ¢1 is the formula: 
(Fi --+ Pj) A (F± --' Pj) A (Fi -+ P1) A (Fl -+ P±) 
Clearly S1(0) and ¢T encode `deals' in the required fashion. We can now state and prove 
the theorem. 
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Theorem 3.2.4 Let {Tm : m E M} be a family of frames such that card(M) >_ 2. Then 
for all wffs ¢ we have: 
U Tm H O i$ `dm E M Tm H S- L(0) 
Proof: 
(=). We show the contrapositive. Suppose for some n E M, Tn falsifies Sl(b). That 
is, for some t E T., V E V al (T ), and a E Sl (O) we have: 
(T., V) a[t] 
By the Generated Submodel Theorem we can extend V to a valuation V' E V al (U Tm) 
such that 
(U T.n, VI) a[t] 
(To use the terminology of the proof of the Generated Submodel Theorem, simply let V' 
be any member of In-n [V]. Note, in passing, that Out(T,,,V') = 0.) 
Obviously Nom(a) C Nom(q). Now if Nom(0) = Nom(a) then 0 = a and we are 
through. So suppose Nom(0)\Nom(a) 54 0. Choose an arbitrary t' IZ T,,: that such a t' 
exists is guaranteed by our assumption that card(M) > 2, and obviously t t'. Define 
V n by: 
{t'} if i E Nom(¢)\Nom(a) 
V'(i) otherwise 
V"(p) = V(p) for all p E VAR 
As V" and V agree on all atoms in a, by the Agreement Lemma we have: 
But as: 
we have: 
(U Tm, V") K 0[t) 
Out(T,,,V") = {i : i E Nom(0)\Nom(a)} 
Subl (Out (T,,, V"), ¢) = a 
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and thus by the previous lemma: 
(U Tm, Vn) 
V- ¢[t] 
and we have established the contrapositive of the desired result. 
(G). Again we argue by contrapositive. Suppose there is a point t E U Tm and a 
valuation V on that frame such that: 
(U Tm, V) Olt] 
for some n E M and t E T n. Let = Subl (Out (T n, V), 0). Then by the previous lemma 
we have: 
(UTm,V) t/(t] 
We now construct a new valuation Vn. The essential point to note about this function 
is that it is in T. 
V n(i) 
V n(p) = V 
V(i) 
{t} 
(p) for a 
if i E Nom(t)b) 
otherwise 
ll p E V AR 
As Vn and V agree on all atoms in t/& we have that: 
(U Tm, V n) K tb[t] 
But as V n is in Tn by our generated submodel result we have: 
(Tn, V71) V-- ON 
It only remains to verify that 0 is a wff in Sl(¢). But this is indeed the case for t& 
by definition is Subl (Out(Tn, V), 0), and inspection of the inductive definition of Subl 
reveals that: 
Subl(Out (Tn,V),0) = Subl(Out (Tn,V) n Nom(qS),0) 
and this last sentence must be in Sl(0) as Out(Tn,V) n Nom(qS) C Nom(qS). Hence we 
have shown the contrapositive of the required result. 0 
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It is immediate from the definition of 01 and the previous theorem that if {T,,, : 
M E M} is a family of frames such that card(M) > 2, then for all wffs 0 we have that 
UT,,,= 0iffVmEMT,,,I . 
Note that weak nominal validity is preserved under the formation of disjoint unions. 
3.2.3 P-morphisms 
In this section we examine truth and validity preserving maps between structures. The 
fundamental concept needed is that of a (temporal) p-morphism between frames: 
Definition 3.2.8 (Frame p-morphisms) Let S = (S, <,) and T = (T, <t) be frames 
and f : S --- T be such that: 
1. s <, s' implies f (s) <t f (s') 
2. f (s) <t t implies there is an s' E S such that s <, s' and f (s') = t 
3. t <t f (s) implies there is an s' E S such that s' <, s and f (s') = t. 
Then f is a p-morphism from S to T. Given two frames S and T, if there exists a 
p-morphism from S onto T we say that the frame T is a p-morphic image of the frame 
S. 
Note that p-morphisms preserve more structure than ordinary order homomorphisms 
(these demand only clause 1 and thus don't back preserve <t), and less than strong 
homomorphisms (which demand that clause 1 be a biconditional and thus totally back 
preserve <t). We sometimes say that p-morphisms partially back preserve <t. Modal 
p-morphisms are defined by dropping clause 3. 
Surjective p-morphisms preserve validity for Priorean languages; they do not do so 
for languages with nominals, and counterexamples abound. The unique function from 
Z to the singleton reflexive frame (0, J(0, 0) }) is a surjective p-morphism. For Priorean 
languages this yields an immediate proof that neither irreflexivity not asymmetry is 
definable: the source frame Z has both characteristics, the target frame has neither, 
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and Priorean validity is transmitted via p-morphisms. For languages with nominals 
on the other hand, this example shows that p-morphisms don't preserve validity: both 
i --> -,Fi and i --> -,FFi are valid on Z and invalid on the singleton reflexive loop. 
Another counterexample follows from the fact that with nominals we can define the 
class of universal relations of any fixed finite cardinality n. The unique contraction 
down to the singleton reflexive loop is a surjective p-morphism - indeed, a surjective 
strong homomorphism - showing that even surjective strong homomorphisms don't 
preserve nominal validity. A pretty p-morphism is constructed in [5, pages 160-161]. The 
source frame is discrete, the target frame indiscrete, thus demonstrating that discreteness 
is not Priorean definable. As discreteness is definable with nominals, van Benthem's 
construction is yet another counterexample. Finally, consider n branching trees of depth 
w. All points in such trees have precisely n-successors, and we know that for all n E 
N we can write an expression in nominals valid on all frames with branch factor n. 
But the mapping from n branching trees of depth w to the natural numbers under 
the successor relation, Ns, which associates with each node its depth is a surjective 
p-morphism, and thus for all n > 2 we have an example of the non-transmission of 
nominal validity. The loss of this preservation result in such thorough going fashion 
is the most dramatic evidence we have of how differently languages with nominals and 
purely Priorean languages encode relational conditions. 
We now examine p-morphisms between our other type of semantic structure: models. 
Definition 3.2.9 (Model p-morphisms) Let S and T be frames, f be a p-morphism 
from S to T, and V, and Vt be valuations on S and T respectively such that for all atoms 
a: 
s E V. (a) if f (s) E Vt(a). 
Then f is a p-morphism from the model (S, V.) to the model (T, Vt). Given two models 
M. and Mt, if there exists a p-morphism from M, to Mt then we say that Mt is a 
p-morphic image of M,; or simply that M, and Mt are a p-morphic pair of models. 0 
Even for languages with nominals, p-morphic pairs of models are equivalent. More 
precisely, just as for Priorean languages we can prove the following lemma by induction. 
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As usual, only the base case involving nominals is new and this follows immediately from 
the definition of model p-morphisms. 10 
Lemma 3.2.2 Let f be a p-morphism from M, = (S, V,) to Mt = (T, Vt). Then for all 
s E S and all wffs 0, M, O[s] iff Mt O[f (s) ]. 
While this result is extremely useful (the completeness results in Chapter 5 hinge 
on it), upon reflection it is not particularly surprising. Establishing a p-morphic link 
between two models involves establishing two quite distinct things. Firstly, it must be 
shown that the two underlying frames are in the correct structural relation: one must 
be a p-morphic image of the other. Secondly, it must be shown that the valuations on 
the source and target frames `mesh' correctly with the p-morphism. Now when working 
with Priorean languages, given two p-morphic frames it is very easy when presented with 
a model based on the target frame to construct a p-morphic model on the source: we 
just suck the target frame valuation back through the p-morphism to create a correctly 
meshing valuation on the source frame. (This is why surjective p-morphisms preserve 
Priorean validity: given a falsifying valuation on the target frame we can always form a 
falsifying valuation on the source frame by this method.) Ultimately our ability to do 
this stems from the fact that there are no constraints on the denotations of variables; 
we can assign any subsets we please and still have a valuation. Matters are not so 
straightforward with nominals: the existence of a frame p-morphism does not guarantee 
the existence of any p-morphic models at all. Two frames may be correctly structurally 
linked without it being possible to correctly mesh any pair of source and target frame 
valuations: the constraint that nominals be assigned singletons may prevent this. Thus 
a real difficulty is involved; what the above lemma tells us is that once this difficulty has 
10The following lemma can be strengthened in a standard way. Following van Benthem [9, 
page 12] we can define the relational link between models known as a zigzag connection, and it 
is straightforward to show by induction that if two models M1 and M2 are zigzag related by R 
then Ml O[t1] iff M2 ¢[t2] for all wffs 0 and all points tl, t2 such that t1Rt2. 
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been resolved and two p-morphic models have been found, things work as with Priorean 
languages. Two put the matter another way; both nominals and variables see p-morphic 
pairs of models the same way; it's just that there are fewer p-morphic pairs of models for 
languages with nominals. 
This p-morphic model result is totally general: p-morphic models must be equivalent 
no matter what sorts we use. For example, in Chapter 6 interval nominals are introduced. 
It doesn't matter for present purposes what constraints this sort obeys; but given two p- 
node 5 
morphicnwhich obey these constraints (whatever these may be), the models are equivalent. 
The hard part is making p-morphic models in the first place. 
Reverting to validity, the notion of a validity preserving function between frames is 
an important one, but neither p-morphisms nor strong homomorphisms suffice. Is there 
anything we can say about the situation? It is at least possible to state a sufficient 
condition on p-morphisms which guarantees they preserve the validity of certain wffs 0. 
First we need the following definition: 
Definition 3.2.10 Let f be a p-morphism from S to T, and n > 0 E N. We say that 
f is n-separating if for all s, s' E S, ifs 0 s' and f (s) = f (s') then there is no path 
between s and s' of length less than or equal to n. 0 
Lemma 3.2.3 Let 0 be a wff such that td(b) = n > 1, and f a 2n + 1-separating 
surjective p-morphism from S to T. Then S 0 implies T = 0. 
Proof: 
Suppose T K 0. Then for some valuation V E V al (T) and t E T, ',t) = -1. 
Let V, be the function with domain ATOMS and range Pow(s) defined by V,(a) = 
if-' (Vt (a))], for all atoms a. If f is an isomorphism we are through; so suppose f is not 
injective. Then V. need not be a L valuation; nonetheless it is a L' valuation where L' 
is the purely Priorean language whose variables are VARC U NOME. (In short, we're 
temporarily pretending that nominals are variables.) Let s be some fixed member of 
[f -'1(t)]. Then using the the proof of the p-morphism Lemma we see that V. (0, a) = -1, 
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where 0 is now regarded as a L' wff. We now use the fact that f is 2n + 1-separating 
and the Horizon Lemma to construct a L valuation that falsifies 0 on S at s. 
As f is not injective there exist distinct points 81, s2 E S such that f (sl) = f (s2). 
However there cannot be two such points in Kern(s), for then there is a path of length 
2n between s and s ' contradicting the assumption that f is 2n + 1 separating. So there is 
at least one point of S that lies outside Kern(s); call this point s'. Define a new function 
V, from ATOMS to Pow(S) by: 
V, (p) = V, (p) for all variables p 
V; Y) 
{s'} if V,(i) fl Kern(s) = 0 
V,(i) n Kern(s) otherwise 
Clearly V; is a L' valuation, and by the Horizon Lemma: V,'(, s) = -1 = V,(0,'8). But 
it is easy to show that if V (s) fl Kern(S) is not empty, it is a singleton. For suppose it 
contains distinct points sl and 82. Then by definition of V f maps both points to the 
singleton Vt(i); but as both sl and 82 are in Kern($) there is a path between them of 
length at most 2n, contradicting the fact that f is 2n + 1 separating. Thus V' is an NTL 
valuation for L and we are through. 0 
Apart from this observation however, matters are unclear to me. Nonetheless, because 
the notion of maps between frames that preserve some aspects of structure and transmit 
validity - or even just the validity of certain special subclasses of wffs - is such a 
fundamental one, I am investigating a number of ideas that may give 
further insight. Some of these are noted later. 
3.2.4 Ultrafilter extensions 
The last of the four classic preservation results is the antipreservation of validity under 
the formation of ultrafilter extensions, an algebraically motivated construction. The 
addition of nominals does not affect this result. Because the part of the proof specific to 
nominals is virtually immediate - essentially it boils down to the fact that singletons of 
frames give rise to principal ultrafilters - and as the details of the non-nominal parts 
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are available elsewhere, (for example, [6, pages 32-341 and [38, pages 57-611), only proof 
sketches are given. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with filters and ultrafilters, 
and their basic properties; Chang and Keisler contains everything required [18, pages 
164-1671. The definition given in Chapter 2 of `algebraic valuation' is used here. 
Definition 3.2.11 (Ultrafilter extensions of frames) Let T = (T, <) be a frame. 
By ue(T), the ultrafilter extension of T, is meant the frame (T,,, <u), where T is the set 
of all ultrafilters on T, and < is defined by: 
U<U' if VS CT(SEU'=irf(S) EU), 
for all U, U' E T. 
Note that < is defined purely in terms of future projections; however this ordering 
gives us everything we desire, as the following equivalences testify: 
Lemma 3.2.4 (Algebraic Order Equivalence Lemma) For all U, U' E T,,, U < 
U' is equivalent to any of the following conditions: 
1. VS C T (S E U => 7rp (S) E U') 
2. VSCT(7r9(S)EU=:> SEU') 
3. VS CT(7rh(S)EU'=SEU). 
Proof: 
Mimic the proof of the Order Equivalence Lemma given in the next chapter, which is 
essentially the transcription of the above result into tense logical syntax. At certain points 
in that proof two theorems of minimal tense logic are appealed to, namely FH¢ -+ ¢ 
and PGq -+ ¢. Their algebraic counterparts are 7rf(7rh(S)) C S and xp(7r9(S)) C S. 
Establishing that these containments hold merely involves checking the definitions. With 
this noted, everything proceeds mechanically. 
Definition 3.2.12 (Ultrafilter extensions of models) Let M = (T, V) be a model. 
By ue(M), the ultrafilter extension of M, is meant the model (ue(T), ue(V)) where ue(V) 
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is the valuation defined by: 
ue(V) (a) = {U E ue(T) : V (a) E U} 
for all atoms a. 
Of course it needs to be checked that this definition makes sense for nominals -- 
but this is immediate. Any singleton subset {t} of T is contained in precisely one 
ultrafilter on T, namely the principal ultrafilter generated by {t}. (There clearly is at 
least one ultrafilter containing {t}, as trivially {t} has the finite intersection property. 
The assumption that there are two distinct ultrafilters containing {t} leads to immediate 
contradiction.) Thus ue(V) really is a valuation on ue(T) and thus ue(M) is a model. 
We now have: 
Lemma 3.2.5 Let M = (T, V) be any model. Then for all wffs ¢: 
ue(M) ¢[U] if V(0) E U. 
Proof: 
van Benthem [6, page 33] gives a proof by induction on deg(¢) for languages of modal 
logic with taken as primitive. By appealing to the Algebraic Order Equivalence 
Lemma, both to move from his universal primitive to our existential F and P prim- 
itives, and to add the backward looking clause for P to the induction, we see that his 
proof works for tensed languages as well. 
Corollary 3.2.2 For any frame T and any wff 0, ue(T) 0 implies T 0. 
Proof: 
Suppose that for some valuation V on T and some t E T, that (T, V) K- 41[t]. Then, 
using the algebraic notion of valuation, t ¢ V(41). Let U be the principal ultrafilter 
generated by {t}. Clearly V (O) V U, and so by the previous lemma, (ue(T), ue(V)) 
4[U]. 
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For further discussion of ultrafilter extensions we refer the reader to [10, pages 20- 
26]. Here we will be content to give an example of something not definable in any 
language of NTL because this preservation result holds. The example, from [6, page 33], 
is Vt3t'(t < t' A t' < t'). This is not definable in any language of NTL because it is valid on 
ue(N), but invalid on N. With the remark that all the above definitions and results go 
through essentially unchanged for languages of NML, we close our discussion of ultrafilter 
extensions. 
3.3 Some correspondences 
In this section we compare languages of NTL with other languages for talking about 
frames. Firstly we compare them with three classical languages, Lo, L1 and L2; then we 
compare them with standard languages of tense logic augmented by the D operator. 
3.3.1 Lo, L1 and L2 
a 
We have already met Lo. L1 ifirst order extension of Lo, and L2 a second order extension 
of Lo - in fact it is essentially L1 viewed as a second order language. Their relevance 
to standard tensed languages is as follows: as far as truth in a model is concerned, 
standard tense logical wffs correspond to certain Ll wffs; whereas as far as validity on a 
frame is concerned, standard tense logical wffs correspond to L2 wffs - though in certain 
interesting cases, as we already know, standard tense logical validity may correspond to 
the validity of Lo wffs. 
Let's be more specific. Suppose L is a purely Priorean language. Let Ll be Lo 
augmented by a distinct new one place predicate P for every every p E VARC. (Or, 
regard each p E V ARC as a one place predicate symbol of L1, and when it is being 
so regarded write p as P.) Ll has a countably infinite supply of individual variables. 
Pick one of these and call it to; this reserved variable will play the role of the point of 
evaluation. Following [5, page 151] we now define the standard translation of L wffs into 
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Ll wffs: 
ST(p) = Pto 
ST(-i¢) = -,ST(O) 
ST (¢ A +1) = ST (¢) A ST (t i) 
ST(FO) = 3x(to < x A [x/to]ST(¢)) 
ST (P¢) _ 3x(x < to A [x/to] ST (¢)) 
In the last two clauses [x/to]ST(¢) is the result of substituting some individual variable 
x that hasn't yet occurred into the standard translation of ¢. 
The point of the translation is this: a model (T, <t, V) for C can also be regarded as 
a structure for L1. The relation <t is the extension of the Ll binary symbol <, and V 
assigns each unary predicate P of Ll a subset of T, just as required. Moreover we have 
that: 
(T, <t, V) ¢[t] if (T, <t, V) ST (¢) [t], 
for all C wffs ¢. The occurrence of on the right hand side means, of course, the 
ordinary first order satisfaction relation; and the right hand side [t] is the usual first 
order notation for describing the assignments of values to (relevant) variables. In this 
case it means that to has been assigned t. 
That the equivalence holds could hardly be more immediate. We could, if we wanted, 
prove it by induction on deg(¢); but as van Benthem observes, in effect all we have done 
is construe the truth definition of C rather more prosaically usual: as a translation, not 
as a `semantics'. Prosaic but fruitful: it immediately tells us that tense logical validity 
must be an re notion. Admittedly we already knew this (and more) from the filtration 
argument of Chapter 2, but the result can simply be `read off', the correspondence. 
It also tells us that as far as truth in a model is concerned, Lowenheim Skolem and 
Compactness theorems must hold. But while truth in a model is interesting, in order to 
really understand what is involved in standard tense logic we must look at validity on a 
frame, and considering this leads us from Ll to L2. 
Suppose we feed an C wff ¢ through the standard translation to produce ST(¢). 
Now, when we say that T ¢ we mean that for all t E T and all valuations V on T, 
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(T, V) = qS[t]. Can we capture the tense logical validity of an arbitrary L wffs 0 by 
judiciously tinkering with ST (O)? Obviously to do so we need to universally quantify 
over to to make the point of evaluation irrelevant, which produces Vt0ST(0) - but 
now we are stuck. In order to express that the particular valuation in force on T is 
irrelevant we need o to universally quantify over the entities that `embody valuations' 
in L1, namely predicates. In short, we need second order quantification. So, on the spur 
of the moment we invent L2: we regard every predicate in L1 as a predicate variable, and 
treat the standard translation as a translation into this new language. Note that models 
(T, <t, V) are not structures for L2; just as with Lo it is the underlying frame that is the 
structure, and models are L2 structures coupled with an assignment of values to the L2 
predicate variables, V. It is thus clear that: 
T 0 if T = VP1... \P.VtoST(q), 
where the P1,.. . , P are all and only the L2 predicate variables in ST (4). We have 
completely abstracted away from the effects of particular valuations, and the choice of 
point of evaluation, and thus it is clear that the validity of standard tense logical wffs 
corresponds to the validity of certain Iii wffs of L2. The realisation that this second 
order perspective on standard tense logic existed was the starting point for much of the 
worK 
important in intensional logic of the 1970s. For further discussion of these matters we 
refer the reader to [5], [13] and references therein. For a detailed examination of the 
theory this correspondence gives rise to the reader should consult [7] or [6]. 
Let us now consider what happens when L is a language with nominals. In fact 
matters could hardly be simpler: we can treat nominals as corresponding to ordinary 
Lo (or L1, or Lo, depending on which target language we are aiming for) individual 
variables. To see this, let's first impose a little more order on the individual variables 
of our classical languages. We already have a special designated variable to. Divide 
the remaining countable infinity of individual variables into two countably infinite sets. 
One set, whose elements we will write as x, y, z and so on, will be used solely as the 
`bookkeeping' binding variables in the translation clauses for wffs of the form Fq and 
P4. The other set, whose elements we will write as i, j, k and so on, will be used solely 
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to represent the nominals. Given this convention, to translate a language with nominals 
into our classical languages we need merely add the clause: 
ST(i) = (i =to), 
for all nominals i. Note that when we translate an L wff ¢ containing m nominals we 
obtain a classical formula with m + 1 free individual variables: to, and a free variable for 
each nominal. 
The needed equivalence still holds - once more we are merely treating our truth 
definition prosaically. If we are translating into L2 we can still write the equivalence as: 
(T, <t, V) Oft] if (T, <t, V) = ST (¢) [t] 
without too much obscurity. Note that the V on the right hand side is an assignment 
of values to both predicate variables and those individual variables that correspond to 
nominals. (Strictly, first order assignments of values to individual variables assign ele- 
ments of the domain of quantification, not singleton sets of such elements as V does - 
but the intent is clear.) On the other hand, if we are translating into L1 this notation 
is rather sloppy as V now embodies two types of information kept distinct in classical 
languages: the denotations of the predicate constants, which are part of the structure; 
and the assignment of values to variables, which are not. In this it is better to split 
the information in V into two functions. Let V be written as VP U VN, where the first 
component contains all the assignments to variables, and the second all assignments to 
nominals. 11 We can then write our equivalence more naturally as 
(T,<t,V) I-- O[t] if (T,<t,VP) I-- ST(0)[t,t1,...,t,,,.], 
where t1 E V N(il), ... , tm E V(im), and the il,... , im are all and only the nominals 
occurring in 0. 
11That is, VP = V\{(i,S) : i E NOM,C and S C T) and VN = V\{(p,S) : p E 
V AR,C and S C- T}. 
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Once again, from the translation into L1 we can derive all sorts of information con- 
cerning truth in an NTL model; but the main interest comes from considering validity. 
Firstly note that if 0 is a purely nominal wff then ST (0) is an Lo wff: it contains no 
unary predicates or predicate variables, simply occurrences of <, _, individual variables 
and logical connectives. Now, to abstract away from the point of evaluation we univer- 
sally quantify over to as before; and to abstract away from the effects of any particular 
fhaI 
valuation we need to universally quantify over the entities embody valuations in ST (0) 
- but these are now simply the individual variables that correspond to O's nominals. 
That is we can express the fact that 0 is valid by means of first order quantification of 
ST(cb): for all frames T and all purely nominal wffs 0 we have: 
T 0 iff T = dil - di,,,VtoST(c6), 
where the il, ... , i,,,, are all and only the nominals in 0. 
This immediately gives us an interesting crop of results concerning frames for purely 
nominal languages L, or for sets of purely nominal sentences drawn from mixed lan- 
guages. Firstly, purely nominal frame consequence is an re notion, for by the previous 
correspondence: 
E =r 0 iff ST (E) = ST (O), 
where the = on the right hand side is the ordinary first order consequence relation and 
ST (E) = {ST (Q) : Q E E}. As the first order consequence relation is re, so = j must be 
also. In similar fashion we gain Lowenheim-Skolem and Compactness results on frames 
for purely nominal sets of sentences. Validity on frames is a much simpler notion for 
nominals than it is for variables; the addition of nominals has filled a useful expressive 
gap, but it hasn't plunged us into baroque new realms of complexity. 
Before going any further, some examples. Fi defines the universal relation, and indeed 
ST(Fi) is VsVto3x(to < x A x = i), or more simply, VsVto (to < i), universality. We know 
that i -+ -'Fi defines irreflexivity, and if we evaluate ST(i -+ -,Fi) we obtain 
VsVto(i =to -, -'3x(to <xAi = x)), 
which simplifies to dt0V4(t0 = x -+ to x), a somewhat eccentric way of expressing 
irreflexivity in L0. More interestingly, consider Lob's formula, G(Gp -+ p) -+ Gp. This 
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does not express an Lo condition, nonetheless its nominalisation G(Gi --+ i) --+ Gi must. 
Writing out the standard translation we obtain: 
VNto(Vx(to<x-->(Vy(z<y-ri=y)-'i=x)--+ Vz(to<z--+ z=:)). 
What happens if L is a mixed language of NTL? If 0 is a wff of such a language then 
it is clear by what has gone before that 
T 0 if T VPi ... bP Vii ... Vi,nVtoST(O). 
That is validity of mixed wffs, like the validity of purely Priorean wffs, corresponds to 
the validity of certain lli wffs of L2. 
The existence of the standard translation for languages of NTL raises a number of 
interesting questions. Let's first consider mixed language. Can we define any L2 condi- 
tions in mixed languages that are not definable in purely Priorean languages? We already 
know the answer to be yes - 0Z defines the integers and ON the natural numbers, and 
neither frame is definable in purely Priorean languages. Beyond this simple observation 
matters are unclear. One pressing and difficult question is the following: precisely what 
are the Lo expressible classes of frames definable in mixed languages? The obvious way 
to attack this problem would be to adapt the algebraic methods of Goldblatt and Thoma- 
son [37]; however there is a difficulty. As NTL validity is not preserved under disjoint 
unions, this has the algebraic effect of blocking steps involving products of algebras. The 
necessary and sufficient condition we have for NTL validity to be so preserved may allow 
some results to be obtained, but in general I think that answering this question by any 
method is going to be hard. 
Let's turn to purely nominal languages. We know that these can only define Lo 
conditions, and we also know that some of these conditions - such as irreflexivity - are 
not definable in any purely Priorean language. Now, Priorean languages, because they 
can define higher order conditions, can define conditions no purely nominal language can - but can they define any first order conditions that purely nominal languages cannot? 
So far we have seen no counterexamples; could it be that as far as Lo conditions are 
concerned, purely nominal languages are stronger than purely Priorean ones? The 
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answer is no, but some work is required to see this. Both the counterexample that follows 
and the idea underlying the proof are due to Johan van Benthem. 
The counterexample is `transitivity plus atomicity'. An atomic frame is one in which 
every point x precedes an `atom' y that is its own only successor: 
Vx3y(x<yAVz(y<z--x=y)); 
and the class of all frames that are both transitive and atomic are definable in purely 
Priorean languages by the conjunction of 4 with GFp -+ FGp, McKinsey's axiom. 12 
However no purely nominal wff can define this condition. The essence of the argument 
that follows is this: any such formula 0 which putatively defines this condition can be 
falsified on N, as N contains no atoms. Because of a certain `stability property' we will 
demonstrate, it is possible to by means of filtration to turn this falsifying model into a 
transitive and atomic falsifying model, showing that no such wff can define the desired 
class. 
First the `stability lemma'. Its intuitive content is this: given any purely nominal wff 
and a valuation on N, by moving sufficiently far to the right along N we reach a point 
where the truth values of 0 and all its subformulas settle down to some fixed values. This 
is because eventually we reach a point where all nominals in 0 denote points in the past - we've overshot their denotations. The only tricky part in establishing this is driving 
through the clause for formulas of the form P4), as such formulas can look back at points 
before things settled down; this motivates use of the td measure in the following lemma: 
Lemma 3.3.1 Let E be a set of sentences closed under subformulas such that the only 
atoms in E are a finite collection of nominals. Let V be a valuation on N, and let l --1 
12The proof that this suffices requires use of the axiom of choice. In passing, McKinsey's axiom 
does not define atomicity - it only defines it on the transitive frames - and in fact does not 
correspond to any Lo condition. For further details the reader should consult [7, 203] or [6, page 
1111. 
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be the largest natural number that V assigns to some nominal in E. That is, I - 1 = 
max U+EE V(i). Then for all wfs a E E, for all n > I + td(o), V (o, n) = V (Q, l + td(a)). 
Proof: 
Induction on td(a). Suppose td(a) = 0. Then as a is a purely nominal sentence it 
is either a nominal or a boolean combination of nominals, all of which are in E. As all 
nominals in E are false from 1 onwards, the result is clear by induction on deg(a). 
Assume the result holds for all o' E E such that td(a') < m, where m > 0. Suppose 
td(a) = m. We want to show that for all n > 1 + m, V (Q, n) = V (a, l + m). 
Suppose a has the form PO. Clearly V (Ptb, I + m) = 1 implies V (Ptb, n) = 1 for 
all n > 1 + m. So suppose that V (PO, I + m) = -1. Then for all h < 1 + m we 
have that V (tb, h) = -1, which in particular means that V (Ptb, l + (m - 1)) = -1. As 
td(O) = m - 1, by the inductive hypothesis we have that for all V (0, n) = -1 for all 
n > 1 + m, which means that t/i is false everywhere on N. Thus trivially V (Ptb, n) = -1 
for all n > 1 + m, as required. Alternatively, if we assume that a has the form Ftb a 
similarly styled argument also gives the required result. 
The only other possibility is that a is a boolean combination of elements o'1, ... , ak 
of E such that td(o,') < m or td(a;) = m and a; has the form PO or F. But our 
work so far tells us that for all such a; (1 < j < k), V (o;, n) = V (ail, I + td(o; )), for 
all n > 1 + td(ail), and as or is a boolean combination of such forms an easy inductive 
argument shows that V (Q, I + m) = V (a, n) for all n > I + m. 0 
Lemma 3.3.2 If a purely nominal wff is falsifiable on N, then is falsifiable in a 
(finite) transitive and atomic model. 
Proof: 
Let 0 be a purely nominal wff such that for some valuation V' and point k E N, 
(N, V') cS[k]. Let E- be the smallest set of sentences containing that is closed under 
subformulas, and let I - 1 be the largest natural number that V' assigns to any nominal 
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in E. Let td(O) = c. As for all a E E- td(o) < c we know by the previous lemma that 
for all n > I + c the truth values in (N, V') are stable. 
Let & be any nominal not occurring in E-, and V be the valuation that is just like 
V' save possibly that V (I = {(I + c) - 1). As V and V' agree on the values of all 
atoms in E', by the Agreement Lemma we have that for all a E E-, for all n > I + c, 
V (a, n) = V (a, l + c), and moreover (N, V) also falsifies 0 at k. Let E = E- U {F_e, J , 
Clearly for all a E E, for all n > I + c, V (Q, n) = V (Q, l + c). Note that E is a finite 
set of sentences closed under subformulas. 
Prior ,',,,,filtrate (N, V) through E to form M1. Mf falsifies at E(k) by the Filtra- 
tion Theorem; Mf is transitive because we took a Priorean filtration; and Mf is finite 
because E was finite. If we can show that Mf is atomic we are through. 
We know that in the model (N, V), the truth values of all wffs a E E are stable from 
l + c onwards, but this means that all n > I + c are in the same equivalence class. Call 
the element of Mf of which they are all a member E(1 + c). We now show that E(1 + c) 
is an atom that all other elements of Mf precede. 
In any filtration whatsoever, if t < t' in the original model then E(t) <f E(t') in 
the filtration. Hence any other element E (t) E Mf must precede E (I + c). Moreover it 
follows from the definition of <f coupled with the stability of the truth values of the wffs 
in E that E (I + c) <f E(1 + c). Thus the only thing that could prevent E (I + c) from 
being the desired atom would be if E(1 + c) preceded some distinct E(t) E Mf . We now 
show that this is impossible. 
Suppose E(t) 54 E(1 + c) and E(l + c) <f E(t). We need merely note that no h E N 
such that h < 1 #C can be in E(t). For if h <(f-(-)-)then (N, V) Fi[h], and if h =(h-L)- I 
then (N, V) = i[h], and as both Fi and i are in E we have by the Filtration Theorem 
that Mf = Fi[E(t)] or M1 = i[E(t)], which by the definition of <f would mean that 
Mf = Fi[E(l + c)]. But another appeal to the Filtration Theorem shows that this in 
turn would mean that (N, V) = Fi[l + c], which is impossible as V (i) =(o c)_r }. In short, 
any such E(t) would be empty, so E(1 + c) precedes no point save itself, is the required 
atom, and we are through. 
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Thus transitivity plus atomicity is a first order condition definable in a purely Priorean 
language that is not purely nominal definable: as far as expressing Lo conditions is 
concerned the two sorts overlap. 
What Lo conditions can be defined using purely nominal wffs? At present I don't 
know, but am investigating the question by looking at the forms of the Lo wffs produced 
by the standard translation; this question promises to be easier to answer than the anal- 
ogous question for mixed languages. Finally, we know the class of first order conditions 
that are purely nominal definable are re; are they also recursive? With this open question 
I'll conclude the discussion of the first order defining power of nominals; clearly much 
interesting work remains to be done. 
3.3.2 D Logic 
The D operator is a relatively new addition to intensional languages. Ron Koymans 
invented it in the course of investigating applications of temporal logics in computer 
science, and used it to help specify message passing systems [57]. Independent work by 
Valentin Goranko [42] at around the same time also considered the operator, and more 
recently Maarten de Rijke [89] has extensively investigated its logical properties. 
Like F and P, the D operator is a unary propositional operator, and D¢ reads `0 
is true at a different point'. Let us now consider what happens when the D operator is 
added to standard languages of tense logic. Given a purely Priorean language 1 add a 
distinct new symbol D; augment the definition of the well formed formulas by stipulating 
that if 0 is a wff, Do is also; and interpret these new wffs in any model M via the new 
semantic clause: 
M D¢[t] if 3t' # t such that M ¢[t']. 
As Koymans notes [57, Chapter 4], the expressive power of the D augmented language 
greatly outstrips that of the purely Priorean original. 
Firstly, a variety of powerful new operators are definable in terms of D. The most 
obvious is D's dual, D. D¢ has the reading `At no different point does ,0 hold', or 
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more simply, `0 is true everywhere else'. Defining EO to be 0 V Do yields an operator 
reading `there exists a point at which 0 is true'; and defining A4, to be 0 A 770 we obtain 
a universal (S5) operator - A4, reads `0 holds at all points'. Finally we can define a 
uniqueness operator U by defining U4, to be E(4, A -,Do) - 0 is true at exactly one 
point. As we will see, this operator allows D logic to simulate nominals. 
Secondly, new classes of frames not definable in the purely Priorean base language 
become definable with the aid of D. The irrefl.exive frames can be defined by F4, _.., DO, 
the trichotomous frames by DO - (P4, V F4,), and the discrete frames by 
(P(p A -'Dp) -+ E(Pp A -'PPp)) A (F(p A -'Dp) -' E(Fp A -,FFp)) 
In fact a little experience working with D logic makes it clear that the difference operator 
is a very powerful tool. This is testified to by the fact that not only is D validity not 
preserved under either the formation of p-morphic images or disjoint unions - this 
much is clear already by the definability of irreflexivity and trichotomy - but, as we will 
shortly see, D validity is not even transmitted to generated subframes. In fact, of the 
four preservation results already discussed, only the result for ultrafilter extensions still 
obtains in D logic; this was shown by Maarten de Rijke [89, pages 5-7]. Given this, it 
is natural to suspect that our D augmented language is more expressive than any mixed 
language of NTL. This is so and may be seen as follows. 
Firstly, using D we can define conditions not definable in any language with nominals. 
We have already noted that because NTL validity is inherited by generated subframes we 
cannot define the class of frames containing an isolated rreflexive point. But this class 
is definable with the help of D, by E(H1 A GI); an example which also shows that D 
validity is not transmitted to generated subframes. As a second example, we know that 
the only cardinality definable in NTL is 1 - recall that this was also due to the generated 
subframe result for NTL. However, as Ron Koymans proved, given any finite number n, 
the class of all frames of cardinality n is definable in D logic. For further details see [57, 
page 501. 
The converse does not hold: there are no conditions definable in mixed languages of 
NTL which D logic cannot define, as the following translation of NTL into D logic noted 
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by Yde Venema makes clear. Let be any wff of a mixed language of NTL, 
where the i,n (1 < m < n) are all and only the nominals in 0. Let pii, ... , pig. be n 
distinct variables not occurring in 0. Then for any frame T we have that: 
T 4)(t', ... , in) if T Up,1 A ... A Upi. -+ [Pii /51, .. , Pi. /inI0I 
as a straightforward argument shows. Because of the U operator, D logic in effect already 
contains nominals. 
This correspondence gives us an upper bound on the expressive power of NTL. In fact 
the `D umbrella' will stay in place even when we introduce interval nominals in Chapter 
6. 
3.4 Further directions 
Some useful things have been achieved in this chapter. Firstly, we have seen that lan- 
guages with nominals can talk about important classes of frames that purely Priorean 
languages cannot. Secondly, our examination of the four classic tense logical preservation 
results has given us some insight into how the functioning of nominals differs from that 
of variables; and in addition, we have gained two important model equivalence results - 
the generated submodel and p-morphic model results -- that will play a crucial role in 
establishing the completeness theorems of later chapters. Thirdly, we have established 
the basic correspondences between NTL, three classical languages, and D logic. But 
though we have the beginnings of a useful model theory, much important work remains 
to be done. The matters concerning correspondence that should be investigated have 
already been mentioned, and I will not discuss them further here; rather, I will close 
this chapter by considering another important topic that should be examined: isolating 
purely nominal preservation results. 
Our examination of preservation results so far has been one way. We have two 
preservation results which hold for both nominals and variables, and two preservation 
results which hold for variables only. What is missing are preservation results which 
Chapter 3. Model Theory 80 
hold for nominals and fail for variables. I will now sketch some ideas involving paths 
that seem to hold some promise of leading to such results. 
In the previous chapter I stated that paths and `path equations' were an important 
guiding intuition when working with nominals. 13 Actually that remark was rather 
circumspect; I believe they may hold the key to the sort of preservation results we require, 
and that we should examine what operations on paths are permitted - in particular, 
when can we identify points on paths, and when can we pull points apart. To make 
matters concrete, let's consider the class of Church Rosser frames, that is, the class of 
all frames such that 
dt(t<t'At<t"-3c(t'<cAt"<c)). 
The Church Rosser frames can be defined by the purely Priorean formula FGp --+ 
GFp. Note how this works: the p in the antecedent `labels' a set of points, namely 
all the successors of some successor of the point of evaluation. The consequent then 
asserts that from any successor of the point of evaluation some such labelled point can 
be reached. So, speaking rather loosely, we could say that purely Priorean languages 
define this condition by `referring to' the potential points of convergence - and the only 
class of frames in which this reference is bound to succeed are the Church Rosser frames. 
Note that the defining wff uses only forward looking operators. 
13Some readers may find this a truism. Surely we can think of any constraint on frame orderings 
as a sort of path equation; and do not purely Priorean languages define path equations as well? 
After all, FFp -- Fp and FFi -+ Fi both define the same class of frames - why should we think 
of the latter and not the former as a path equation? All of this is perfectly true; but the point 
is that the two sorts differ in their defining capacities although there is some overlap, and for 
a number of reasons the way the unique labelling capacity of nominals interacts with the tense 
operators often seems appropriately described as a path equation. However the terminology is not 
important: what is at stake is the substantive difference between the sorts. This path equation 
metaphor, if you will, is simply a way of thinking about a number of difficulties that at present I 
find helpful. 
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The nominalisation FGi -+ GFi of this wff does not define the Church Rosser frames. 
14 A counterexample is provided by the frame I call the V naturals, Vee(N). This 
consists of two copies of N with the two zeroes identified. (That is, it is a V shaped 
frame consisting of two N-alikes springing disjointly from a common source.) Clearly 
FGi --> GFi is valid on Vee(N) as its antecedent must always be false; however Vee(N) 
is not Church Rosser because of the common zero. 
A little experimentation will rapidly persuade the reader that the Church Rosser 
frames cannot be defined by a purely nominal wff if only forward looking operators are 
used. This intuition is correct, as a simple variant of the filtration argument used to 
show that transitivity plus atomicity was not purely nominal definable shows. First we 
need a stability lemma for the V naturals: 
Lemma 3.4.1 Let E be a set of sentences closed under subformulas such that the only 
atoms in E are a finite collection of nominals, and such that no wff or E E contains 
occurrences of P or H. Let V be any valuation on Vee(N), and let 1 - 1 denote the 
largest number on either branch of the frame that V assigns to any nominal in E. Then, 
on both branches of the frame, we have that for all n > 1, V (a, n) = V (a, 1), for all a E E. 
Proof: 
Essentially the same as the proof of the earlier stability lemma, but simpler: because 
there are no wffs containing P or H an induction on deg(a) is all that is required. 0 
We now show using filtrations that any forward looking purely nominal formula fal- 
sifiable on the V naturals is falsifiable on a Church Rosser frame. 
Lemma 3.4.2 If a purely nominal wf 0 containing no occurrences of P or H operators 
is falsifiable on Vee(N), then 0 is falsiflable on a (finite transitive) Church Rosser model. 
14FGi -+ GFi defines the condition VIYtobxby(to < x n to < y A Vz(x < z -+ z y < 
as the standard translation shows. 
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Proof: 
Given such a wff 0 and a falsifying valuation V for it on Vee(N), let E be the small- 
est subformulae closed set of sentences containing 0, and Priorean filtrate (Vee(N), V) 
through E forming the finite transitive model W. This model also falsifies 0 by the 
Filtration Theorem. 
In fact Mf is also Church Rosser. By the previous lemma we have that all points 
n > I in N are identified in Mf. Call this point E(1). We then have that E(t) 54 E(1) 
implies E(t) <f E(1). This follows from the morphic property of filtrations: for any 
filtration, t < t' in the original model implies E(t) <f E(t') in the filtration. Clearly any 
point in an equivalence class distinct from E(1) must precede some point in E(1), and 
this is all we need. It is also easy to show, using the stability lemma and the definition 
of <f, that E(1) <f E(1). But this means that E(1) succeeds every point in Mf, thus it 
will serve as a convergence point for any two points in the frame, and thus Mf is Church 
Rosser. 0 
Note that this also a proof that right directedness is not purely nominal definable in 
NML: the V naturals are not right directed, but the filtration is as E(1) (being maximal) 
right directs the entire frame. 
By making use of both forward and backward looking operators we can define the 
Church Rosser frames: Fi A Fj -- F(i A FPj) achieves this. Note that neither the i 
nor the j refers to the convergence point; rather they refer to the two successors of the 
point of evaluation, and the convergence point is implicitly picked out by the FPj in the 
consequent which `curls around' it. Essentially the formula works by labelling the start 
}he+ 
and finish points and asserting that an appropriate path between jexists, which is very 
different from the way that FGp -- GFp worked. 
Obviously the filtration plus stability argument used here and in the discussion of 
transitivity plus atomicity is rather specific, but I think some suggestive ideas can be ab- 
stracted from it. Firstly, going from Vee(N) to Mf (or from N to Mf) we have collapsed 
paths. Looking at the process in reverse we see a way of expanding or `unwinding' paths. 
Now this was the sort of thing we were looking for, but given that the method of collapse 
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was merely filtration, and, as we will become plain in Chapter 5, that the expansion 
involved was essentially a form of bulldozing, this may seem rather unexciting. What 
I think is interesting is the way that the transformations were `local', or `structurally 
specific'. For example, looking at the transformation from the big models to Mf we see 
that path collapsing was permitted because the underlying frame geometry - in this 
case, essentially, the fact that they were right unbounded SPOs - enabled us always to 
find regions where nominals were distributed in a fashion that was amenable to analysis. 
This suggests to me that it may be fruitful to look for such local, structurally dependent 
preservation results. Further ideas that bear on this issue are mentioned in Chapter 6. 
This concludes our examination of the model theory of NTL; now we consider how to 
control nominals proof theoretically. 
Chapter 4 
The Minimal Logic 
In this chapter we axiomatise the minimal logic in languages of NTL. The first section 
outlines the background ideas needed, and after this we present an axiomatisation which 
consists of the usual axiomatisation Kt of minimal tense logic augmented by a single 
infinite schema called NOM. We first show a negative result: we can't use the usual 
canonical Henkin model argument unmodified to establish completeness, and then prove 
completeness by adapting a method due to David Makinson. An examination of the 
proof shows that it worked because the construction yielded a connected frame; in the 
course of this discussion we uncover three more axiomatic bases for the minimal tense 
logic - the schema SWEEP, and two weakened schema, NOMw and SWEEPw -- and 
present a shorter completeness proof using generated subframes of the canonical frame. 
After discussing the minimal tense logic we turn to the minimal nominal modal logic. 
That either the modal versions of the NOM or the SWEEP schema can be used to 
axiomatise this logic is apparent, but we show that neither of the weakened schema will 
suffice, and briefly discuss the impact the addition of nominals has on the Henkin frame 
of the minimal modal logic. We conclude the chapter by examining the axiomatisation 
of minimal nominal modal logic due to Gargov, Passy and Tinchev [34]. 
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4.1 Notions and notations 
Let L be a language of NTL. By PC is meant the set of all L-instances of tautologies 
of propositional calculus. If 0 E PCc then 0 is called an L-tautology. If L C WFFC 
then we say that L is an L-logic if PCB C L and L is closed under modus ponens. 
For the sake of simplicity we usually assume L has been fixed and talk simply of L 
being a logic. PCC and WFFc are both logics and for any logic L (in language L), 
PCZ C L C WFFC. A tense logic in language L is a logic that contains all L-instances 
of G(O -+ 0) --+ (GO -+ GO), H(O -+ 0) --+ (HO HO), 0 -+ GPO, and 0 - HFO. and 
is closed under temporal generalisation; that is, 4 E L implies Go and HO E L. Note 
that if M is a class of models and T a class of frames then both Th(M) and Th(T) are 
tense logics. 
If L is an L-logic and E C WFFc and 0 E WFFC, then we say that 0 is L-derivable 
from assumptions E, written E F-L 0, if there are al, ... , a,a E E such that al A ... A an -+ 
0 E L. While E may be infinite, if E F- 0 then there exists a finite E' C E such that 
E' F-L 0, namely the set consisting of precisely al, ... , a,,. In the special case where E = 0 
we mean that 0 FL 0 iff 0 E L - in which case we say that 0 is L-derivable and write 
FL qS. If 0 is not L-derivable from assumptions E we write E YL 0. Note that for any 
logic L both the deduction theorem and its converse hold. That is, E U {0} F-L 0 if 
E FL 0 -+ 0. E C W FFL is L-inconsistent if for some 0 E W FFL both 0 and -,0 are 
L-derivable from assumptions E. E is L-consistent if E is not L-inconsistent. E is L 
maximal consistent - an L-MCS - iff E is L-consistent, and for all L-wffs 0 either 0 or 
-0 E E. Note that this can hold if E is not contained in any other consistent V. The 
following properties hold of any L-MCS E: 0, 0 E E iff 0 A 0 E E; 0 E E if --0 It E; 
0, 0 ---> ' E E implies 0 E E; and F-L 0 implies 0 E E. The proofs are straightforward. 
More importantly, we can make all the L-MCS we require, as Lindenbaum's Lemma 
holds. 
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Lemma 4.1.1 (Lindenbaum's Lemma) Every L-consistent set of sentences E can be 
extended to an L-MCS E°°. 
Proof: 
As usual. Index W FFc by some ordinal a. Define Eo to be E. For all successor 
ordinals P:5 a define Ep+1 to be Ep U {4p} if Ep FL 00, otherwise set Ep = Ep. For all 
limit ordinals A < a let EA be U7<a E. It is easy to show, using facts of propositional 
calculus, that L-consistency is upward preserved from E to Ea. But E. is clearly an 
L-MCS, and E C Ea. 
Note that once an enumeration of the wffs of L has been fixed, the above construction 
yields a unique maximal consistent extension of any E. We assume that each language 
L comes equipped with a standard enumeration of its wffs, and from now on given an 
L-consistent set of sentences E in language t, by EO0 is meant the L-MCS formed by the 
the above construction with respect to the standard enumeration for L. 
Definition 4.1.1 (Soundness and Weak Completeness) Let T be a class of frames 
and L a logic. L is sound with respect to T if for all wffs 0, FL 0 implies T = 0; and L 
is weakly complete with respect to T if for all wffs 0, T 0 implies FL 4'. If L is both 
sound and weakly complete with respect to T then L is characterised by T. 
Modal completeness theory has many examples of logics L characterised by more 
than one class of frames. A simple example is provided by S4. The classic result is that 
S4 is complete with respect to the preorders; but as Segerberg noted [95], this can be 
sharpened to a result stating that S4 is complete with respect to the partial orders. A 
subtheme of the next chapter is the way that certain of these classic `sharpening' results 
are lost in languages with nominals. 
The previous definition linked the semantical concept of T-validity with the syntac- 
tical notion of L-derivability, and under one conception of what logic is - logic as the 
study of valid sentences - our task is precisely to prove such characterisation results. 
But logic is also the study of valid patterns of inference, or correct reasoning. What could 
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be meant by `correct temporal reasoning' - or at least, correct temporal reasoning for 
native NTL speakers? 
One sensible attempt to provide such a concept is provided by the notion of local 
model consequence defined in Chapter 1 by E Hm 0 if M = E[t] implies M 0[t], for 
all models M, and all points t of M. This relation tells us how `facts of the matter' are 
mutually constrained; it takes us from states of affairs to their concomitants. However 
in general we only wish to reason within models constructed on a small subclass of the 
possible frames, namely those frames that reflect our views of temporal ontology. We 
should parameterise the definition of model consequence by classes of frames, as follows: 
Definition 4.1.2 (Local T-based model consequence) Let T be a class of frames, 
E a set of wffs and 0 a wff. Then E -m 0 iff (T, V) E[t] implies (T, V) 1 0[t] for all 
T E T, V E Val(T) and t E T. 0 
That is, E HT 0 if any model constructed on a frame in T making E true at t, makes 
true at t also. Note that the previous notion of local model consequence is the special 
case of T-model consequence with T = Ll, the class of all frames. That is, E m iff 
Definition 4.1.3 (Strong Completeness) Let T be a class of frames and L a logic. 
Then L is said to be strongly complete with respect to T iff`' E m implies E I-L 0. for 
all sets of wi E, and all wff8 (. 0 
In short, a logic L is strongly complete with respect to a class of frames T if the 
syntactic notion of L-derivability from assumptions captures the semantic notion of local 
T-based model consequence. If a logic L is strongly complete with respect to T then 
it is weakly complete with respect to T as well, however the converse does not hold as 
certain logics are not compact. (An example is provided by N; although any finite subset 
of {FG-p, Fp, Fsp, Fsp, ..., } is satisfiable on N, the entire set is not.) The following 
lemma is standard: 
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Lemma 4.1.2 (Strong Completeness Lemma) Let L be a logic and T a class of 
frames. L is strongly complete with respect to T if for every L-consistent set of sentences 
E there is a model (T, V) such that T E 7, V is a valuation on T and (T, V) = E. 
(That is, L is strongly complete with respect to T 1ff any L-consistent set of sentences is 
satisfiable in a T -based model.) 0 
By an axiomatisation in a language f is meant the following. We indicate that a 
certain subset A of WFFc are axioms. If f is a recursive language, A will always be a 
recursive subset of WFF1. Among our axioms will always be all L instances of: 
PC1 4, - (i --> 0) 
PC2 ( --' (+ - 9)) e)) 
PC3 (-1 & - -14,) - (4, -' ;) 
TL1 G(4 --> 0) --> (Go --> GO) 
TL2 H(4 --> 0) --> (HO --> HO) 
TL3 0 --> GP4, 
TL4 0 --> HF4, 
The following three functions, called rules of inference, will always be available: 
MPc {(4,, 0 --> ,b, ib) : 0,,b E WFFj} 
HGen,c {(4',H4') : 0 E W FFc } 
GGen,c {(4',G4) : 0 E W FFC} 
and are referred to as the rules of Modus Ponens, H-Generalisation and G-Generalisation 
in C respectively. The last two rules are referred to collectively as the rules of temporal 
generalisation in Z. The collection of axioms A and the three rules of inference in any 
language C will be called an axiomatisation. The axiomatisation consisting of precisely 
PC1-PC3, TL1-TL4, modus ponens and temporal generalisation is traditionally called 
K=; it yields all and only the validities of standard tense logic. 
Let A be an axiomatisation. An A-proof is a finite sequence of C-wffs such that each 
wff 0 in the sequence is either an axiom, the result of applying MPG to two earlier items 
in the sequence, or the result of applying one of the rules of temporal generalisation to 
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an earlier item in the sequence. An L-wff is a theorem of A if there is an A-proof 
with & as the final item. 
Let E be a set of L-wffs. By an A-proof from assumptions E is meant a finite sequence 
such that every wff 4 in the sequence is either an axiom, an element of E, the result of 
an application of MPG to two earlier items, or the result of applying one of the rules of 
temporal generalisation to an A-theorem. This last restriction is crucial: it is what allows 
a deduction theorem to be maintained and prevents such atrocities as the deduction of 
Gp from p. 
Let LA be the set of all A-theorems. As all .C instances of PC1-PC3 and TL1-TL4 
are axioms and MPG, HGenc and GGen,j are rules of inference, we have that LA is a 
tense logic. It is easy to see that 4 E LA iff 4 is a theorem of A; that is, LA-derivability 
and A-theoremhood coincide. We are thus entitled to a bit of notational abuse and write 
F-A to indicate that is an A-theorem. In a similar vein it is easy to see that E F-LA iff 
there is an A-proof of from assumptions E, so again we usually write E F-A to indicate 
the existence of this proof. Finally, let L be a tense logic and A an axiomatisation, both 
in language C. Then A is an axiomatisation of L if L = LA. In this chapter and the 
next we will be interested in axiomatising certain interesting logics, such as the logic 
consisting of all NTL validities, Th(U), or the logic of SPOs, n{Th(T) : T is a SPO}. In 
what follows, whenever it is convenient we conflate the `logic perspective' talk and the 
`axiomatic perspective' talk. For example we often talk of an axiomatisation A being 
sound and complete with respect to some class of frames T - by this we mean that LA 
has these properties. 
Modal logics must contain all instances of (¢ -- ti) -- ( ¢ -- 0), and modal ax- 
iomatisations have all instances as axioms. Similarly, if L is a modal logic and 0 E L, then 
O 0 E L; and modal axiomatisations have available NECK 0) : E W FFc }, the 
rule of necessitation. 
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4.2 The Axiomatisation Knt 
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Our first goal is to axiomatise the minimal logic, Th(U). We already have some informa- 
tion about this logic: from the correspondence considerations of the previous chapter we 
know that Th(U) is recursively enumerable, and from the filtration argument of Chapter 
1 we know that it is recursive as well - so the fact that it is axiomatisable will come as 
no surprise. What is pleasant is the neat way this can be done: the minimal logic can 
be axiomatized by the addition of a single schema to Kt, the usual axiomatisation of the 
minimal Priorean tense logic. The requisite schema is called the NOM schema, and to 
present it we need a new piece of notation. For any language C let an existential tense 
be any unbroken sequence of Ps and Fs. The sequence may contain both Ps and Fs, 
and we regard the null sequence as an existential tense. Thus FPPFP, F and PPP 
are existential tenses; PFFGPP isn't because it contains a universal operator, G. We 
normally use E, E', and so on as metavariables across existential tenses. By the length 
of an existential tense we mean the sequence length. We will later use universal tenses. 
By this is meant any unbroken, possibly mixed, sequence of Gs and Hs, including the 
null sequence. A, A', A"... are used as metavariables over universal tenses, and again by 
the length of such a tense we mean the sequence length. 
We now present the axiomatisation Km. Suppose we are working in a fixed language 
C. Let 0, 0 and 0 be metavariables over the wffs of C, E and E' be metavariables over 
the existential tenses of C, and n be a metavariable over the nominals of C. (Of course 
if C is a purely Priorean language, n ranges over the empty set.) Then by K t in the 
language C is meant Kt augmented by all C instances of the following schema: 
NOM E(n A 0) A E'(n A t&) -+ E(n A 0 A t/&) 
The rules are those of modus ponens and temporal generalisation. Note that if C is a 
purely Priorean language NOM has no instances, and we are left with just instances in 
variables of PC1-PC3, and TL1-TL4; that is, K t collapses into Kt. 
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NOM is thus the only new item needed to control the nominals and their interaction 
with other wffs. What does the NOM schema say? Let's instantiate it in i and consider: 
E(i A ) A E'(i A &) -+ E(1 A A &). 
Think of the points of a model as boxes holding items of information. Suppose we are 
standing at a point t in some frame T and we know that both E(i A 0) and E'(i A tf&) are 
true. This means we know that if we follow a certain zig-zag path from t, (the one coded 
up by E), we can get to a box marked i and containing the information ¢; and that if 
we follow another possibly different path from t, (the one coded up by E') we get to 
another box, also marked i, and containing the information 0. But there is only one box 
marked i. Hence this single box contains the both the information ¢ and the information 
t&, and the paths coded for by E and E' lead to the same point. This is precisely what 
the consequent of NOM gives us. In a nutshell, the NOM schema consists of all the path 
equations that must be satisfied in any model. 
Theorem 4.2.1 (Soundness) I-K., ¢ implies ¢ 
Proof: 
There is nothing new to prove concerning the components from Kt. The only work 
lies with NOM, and it is straightforward to turn the `box and path' thought experiment 
into a proof of the soundness of this schema. 0 
4.3 Completeness of Knt 
We wish to prove that Knt is strongly complete with respect to U, hence it suffices to show 
that every consistent 1 set of sentences has a model. How can this be done? The first idea 
'For the remainder of this section `K t' qualifications on terminology will be dropped wher- 
ever possible: consistency, derivability and MCS for example, will mean K t-consistency, Kt- 
derivability and Kt-MCS respectively; and we write f- instead of -K.,. 
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that springs to mind is to use the canonical Henkin model method, familiar from standard 
modal and tense logic. In this approach one defines the total Henkin frame H = (X, <h), 
where H is the set of all MCS and <h is the usual ordering on Henkin frames, defined by 
h <h h' if for all wffs 0, GO E h implies 0 E h'. One then forms the model C - (H, V), 
where V is the natural valuation on H. That is V (p) = {h E H : p E h}, for all variables 
p. It is now routine to verify by induction that for any wff 0 and any h E H, C 0[h] 
iff 0 E h, a result sometimes called the Fundamental Theorem of normal modal logics. 
This immediately shows that any consistent set of sentences has a model. For let E be 
any such set. Form E°°. As E°° is an MCS it is an element of H, and by the previous 
remark C [-- a[E°°],for all a E E°°; or simply C = Thus all the sentences in 
E are true in C at E°° as E C E°°. This construction thus solves the model existence 
problem for the minimal logics - and, indeed, for most commonly encountered logics 
- in standard tense and modal languages. Note, moreover that it demonstrates model 
existence in very efficient fashion - C has the property of canonicality: 
Definition 4.3.1 Let L be a logic. A model M is L-canonical if for every L-consistent 
set of wffs E there is a point tin M such that M = E[t]. 0 
That C is canonical is obvious: canonicality is engineered into its construction. 
As soon as we try to extend this construction to languages with nominals we run into 
a problem. Forming H is unproblematic - the total Henkin frame is a perfectly good 
frame, even when dealing with languages with nominals - but the natural mapping 
V : ATOM --> Pow(H) defined by V (a) = {h E H : a E h} is not a valuation. The 
problem, of course, lies with the clause that nominals must be assigned singleton subsets 
of H: V does not/this. This can be seen as a corollary of the proof of the following 
general result: 
Theorem 4.3.1 (Non-existence of Canonical Models) If L is a language contain- 
ing at least one nominal i then there are no K,-canonical models. 
Proof: 
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Neither -,(i A Fi) nor -,(i A -,Fi) is valid, hence by soundness neither is K t-derivable. 
Thus both i A Fi and i A -+Fi are consistent. But in any model M, i is true at exactly 
one point, so it is impossible to have both wffs true in M. Thus no model is canonical. 
In terms of the canonical Henkin model construction this shows that i will be con- 
tained in many distinct MCS: thus V is not a valuation and the outlined method of 
proving a model existence lemma vanishes. The crux of the matter is simply that H is 
far too big: it contains too many MCS. We need to be a little more delicate if we wish 
to use Henkin methods to build our models. We now present two Henkin completeness 
proofs. The first is a step by step Henkin construction process that yields countable 
models; the second is a more powerful method that generally gives uncountable models. 
4.3.1 First Proof: Inductive construction of a Henkin frame 
The heart of the first proof method is due to David Makinson [62], and was one of the 
first means by which Henkin techniques were applied in modal logic. The method was 
later used in Robert McArthur's textbook on tense logic [63]. Makinson's method is best 
approached by considering Henkin proofs for propositional languages. Such complete- 
ness proofs are extremely simple: given E, form E°°; define the natural (propositional) 
valuation - and immediately we have that V (O) = 1 if 0 E E. Note the intuition: 
E°O is a `time slice', and a sentence is true iff this time supports the fact 0. A Henkin 
proof for propositional calculus is essentially a natural way of building a single verifying 
time. Now suppose that our language is a standard tense logical language. Our initial 
E°0 may well contain sentences of the form F¢ or P4. Such sentences place a constraint 
on other times; they demand the existence of a future or past time in which,0 holds. In 
Henkin terms this means that for each sentence F4 we must make an MCS that verifies 
q and which is later or earlier than E°° in some appropriate ordering on MCS. Makin- 
son's solution was to form kernel futures, the `seeds' from which such future worlds can 
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grow. 2 If Fq5 E E00 then the future kernel containing 0, K4, is the set of sentences 
consisting of 0 together with all formula 0 such that Gtb E E. We then extend K* 
to K400, and by construction we have a new world verifying 0. Note that we don't add 
all the MCS extending K#, just the single MCS K1. If we added all extending MCS, 
a countable model could not be guaranteed, even for countable languages. Further note 
that everything that was always going to be the case at E°°, actually is the case in K000, 
and so intuitively E°° precedes KOO. This process is then iterated - we extend all future 
kernels of all the MCSs - then all the MCSs thus produced are collected together to 
form the points of the Makinson frame, the points are ordered as usual, and the natural 
valuation is defined, giving a model. What is of interest for our purposes is that even 
when languages with nominals are used, the natural mapping is a weak valuation: every 
nominal occurs in at most one MCS. 
Intuitions given, let's begin. I'll first note without proof that the rule of Replacement 
of Equivalents is a derived rule in Kg. That is, if I- 0 and I- 0 H 0, then I- 
where this formula is the result of replacing the nth occurrence of 0 in 0 by 0. Further, 
for any existential tense E and any wffs 0 and t& we have that I- -'E(q5 A -0), and 
I- E(q5 A t&) --+ (Eq5 A EO). Proof of the following lemma may be found in [63] or [461: 
Lemma 4.3.1 (Operator Additivity Lemma) Let E be a set of sentences. Let E0+ = 
{GO : 0 E E} and EA+ _ {HO : 0 E E}. Then E 1- 0 implies EO+ I- GO and EA+ I- HO. 
0 
We now define the entities used in the construction and note some of their properties. 
Let E be an MCS. Define EG- to be {q5 : GO E E}, and EH- to be {O : HO E E}. Then 
for each Fq5 E E we call the set EG U {q5} a kernel future of E; and for any Pq5 E E we 
call the set EH U {q5} a kernel past of E. If E' is a kernel future (past) of E we write 
E'KerFE, (E'KerPE). 
2Makinson does not use this terminology. The present presentation, is loosely based around 
McArther's, though this particular piece of terminology is my own. 
Chapter 4. The Minimal Logic 95 
Lemma 4.3.2 (Kernel Consistency Lemma) If E is an MCS then any kernel past 
or future of E is consistent. 
Proof: 
Consider the case for kernel futures. Suppose E is an MCS and F¢ E E. We wish to 
show that Eo U {¢} is consistent, so suppose for the sake of contradiction that it isn't. 
Then Eo- U {¢} I- I, and thus Eo I- -,0. But as proofs are of finite length we can find 
{t/)1, ... , t,i, } C Eo- such that 01,. - ., t,b,a} I- -,¢; but then by the Operator Additivity 
Lemma we have that {Gt/i1, ... GO} I- G-'¢. Hence E I- G-,¢ as {Gt/i1, ... GO} C E. 
But G-'¢ is just -'F¢, and as E I- F¢ we have a contradiction. 
Kernel pasts and futures are related as we would hope: if EKerFE' then H¢ E E°° 
implies ¢ E E'; and if EKerPE' then G¢ E E°° implies ¢ E V. The proofs are analogous 
to that of the Order Equivalence Lemma, given below. 
We are now ready for the construction. Given a consistent set of sentences E, proceed 
as follows. Define: 
To = {E°°} 
T+i = Tn 
U{ f' : fKerFt and t E T} 
U{p0O pKerPt and t E T} 
T = U,.<, Tn 
We denote {E°°} by to. Now define a relation <t on T in the manner usual for tense 
logic Henkin constructions: t <t t' if for all wffs ¢, G¢ E t implies ¢ E t'. Thus we have 
a Henkin frame T = (T, <t). 
Lemma 4.3.3 (Order Equivalence Lemma) For all t, t' E T, t <t t' is equivalent to 
any of the three following conditions: H¢ E t' implies ¢ E t; ¢ E t' implies F¢ E t; or 
¢ E t implies P¢ E t', for all wfs ¢. 
Proof: 
We prove the first case. 
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(=). Suppose Ht/ E t' implies 0 E t. We need to show G¢ E t implies ¢ E t'. 
So suppose 0 §t t'. Therefore -0 E t' as t' is an MCS. Therefore HF-t¢ E e, by TL4. 
Therefore F-'¢ E t by our initial assumption. But then -,F-,¢ ¢ t as t is also an MCS. 
That is, G¢ §t t and so we have shown the contrapositive of the desired result. 
(=:>.). So now suppose that t <t t', that is, GO E t implies 0 E t'. Suppose 0 §t t. 
Therefore -0 E t. Therefore GP-0 E t by TL3. So by by our initial assumption, 
P-0 E t'. Therefore -,P--'¢ §t t'-that is H¢ V t'-and again we have shown the 
contrapositive. 
It follows from this that pKerPt' implies p°D <t t'. That jKerFt' implies t' <t j°° is 
immediate from the definition of <t. 
If we were dealing with a purely Priorean language we would be through at this 
stage: we could simply define the natural valuation V and the usual induction would 
show that for all t E T, ((T, <t), V) O[t] if 0 E t and thus that E C to was satisfied 
at to. For languages with nominals, however, we must do a little more work: we need 
to demonstrate the existence of a natural mapping that assigns singletons to nominals. 
This process falls into two stages. Firstly we demonstrate that the natural mapping V 
on the frame (T, <t) almost works, for using the NOM schema we can demonstrate that 
every nominal is contained in at most one t E T. However, as we shall see, we can't rule 
out the possibility that some nominal i is contained in no element of t. To cater for such 
nominals we are going to have to extend our frame; we turn to this matter later. 
In order to prove the existence of a weak valuation we need to take a closer look 
at the structure of the Makinson frame. The following machinery will prove useful: we 
define a rank function R : T --- N by: 
R(to) = 0 
R(t) = n>0 if t; to and tET and t¢T_1. 
and a relation IC C T2 by t'ICt if R(t') = R(t) + 1 and there is an v C t' such that 
vKerFt or vKerPt and t' = v°O. If t'ICt we say t' is immediately conjoined to t. Note 
that IC is irreflexive; that R(t) = 0 if t = to; and that R(t) > 0 implies there is a t' E T 
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such that tICt' and R(t') = n - 1. We can now prove the following lemma by induction 
on R(t): 
Lemma 4.3.4 (Path Lemma) If t E T, and R(t) = n > 0 then there exists a sequence 
(tz)o<z<" such that to = to, t" = t, and tz+lICtz. (Furthermore, R(tz) = x.) 
This result need not hold for n = 0 as to may have no kernel past or futures. Note 
that the Path Lemma shows that T is connected: given two distinct points points in the 
frame we can always find a zig-zag path from one to the other, for by the last lemma we 
can always zig-zag back to to from any other point, so, given two distinct points in the 
frame, we can zig-zag from one to the other via to. There may be other shorter paths, 
but at least there is always this route. 
Lemma 4.3.5 (Existential Tense Lemma) For all t E T, and all ¢ E t, there exists 
an existential tense E such that E¢ E to. (Furthermore, len(E) = R(t).) 
Proof: 
Induction on R(t). The base case is trivial: if R(t) = 0 then t = to, and all elements 
0 E to are preceded by the null tense. So suppose the result holds for all t' such that 
0 < R(t') < n. That is, 0 E t' implies Et E to, for some existential tense E, (and 
len(E) = R(t')). Suppose R(t) = n. By the second property we noted for R, there exists 
t" such that R(t") = n -1 and tICt". Now suppose 0 E t. Then by TL3 and TL4, HF¢ 
and GPO E t. But as tICt", by previous lemmas we have t < t" or t" < t, and so either 
by the definition of <t or the Order Equivalence Lemma we have that P¢ or F¢ E t". 
But then by the inductive hypothesis, EP¢ or EF¢ E to, (and len(E) = R(t") = n - 1). 
But both EP and EF are existential tenses of length n. 
We can now use the NOM schema together with the Existential Tense Lemma to 
prove the crucial lemma. First some notation: if E is a set of sentences, we define 
Nom(E) to be {i E NOMc : i E E}. Then we have: 
Lemma 4.3.6 (Unique Occurrence Lemma) For all t, t' E T, t # t' implies Nom(t)fl 
Nom(t') = 0 
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Proof: 
As t and t' are distinct MCS there exists ¢ E t such that --¢ E t'. Assume they 
share a nominal in common, say i. Then by the existential tense lemma there are 
existential tenses E and E' such that E(i A ¢) E to and E'(i A -0) E to. Hence by NOM, 
E(i A ¢ A -0) E to, and thus E(¢ A -,0) E to. But we also know that f- -,E(¢ A -,0) for 
any existential tense E, and hence -,E(¢ A -,0) E to-contradicting to's consistency. 0 
So the `at most one' clause for our proposed natural valuation is established; the 
natural mapping on the Makinson frame is a weak valuation. 
There still remains a minor problem with the `at least one' part: it can very easily 
happen that some nominal, say i, is not in any MCS in T. For example, consider the 
(consistent) set of sentences {-,Ei : E E ET}, where i is some nominal. If this was our 
original set of sentences E, then it is clear that Makinson's construction will force -'i 
into every t E T, and thus for all t E T, i T. Worse still, consider the set of sentences 
{-,En : n E NOM and E E ET}. This has the effect of `forcing out' all the nominals: 
only negated nominals occur at any point in T! Because of such possibilities we cannot 
guarantee that the weak valuation is also a valuation. 
But the remedy is clear: we enlarge (T, <t) by adjoining to it another frame (U, <,,) to 
form a new composite frame (S, <,). We do this is such a way that the two subframes, T 
and U of S, are disconnected. We can then safely assign all `unused' nominals singleton 
subsets of U. This will complete our natural valuation, and because the two subframes 
are disconnected, the assignments we make in U won't affect what is going on in T: E 
will still be satisfied at to. 
There are several ways we could extend T. Simplest of all is to adjoin to T a frame 
U consisting of a singleton irreflexive point t_1 unrelated to any point in T - a 'point at 
infinity' - and assign all unused nominals {t_1}. Another option is to form the disjoint 
union of T with itself, identify T with (say) the left projection of T U T, and assign all 
unused nominals the point to in the right projection of compound frame. Either of these 
methods immediately yields a suitable model, our desired strong completeness theorem 
and thus concludes the proof. However let's pause and examine a more elegant third 
Chapter 4. The Minimal Logic 99 
method: to carefully choose some new consistent set of sentences E. and generate a new 
frame U by the Makinson method. 
The intuition is simple. We are worried about nominals not assigned points in T: 
so simply choose a set of sentences E. consisting of all such unassigned nominals and 
sentences which will explicitly `force out' all the nominals that do occur in some t E T 
from the new inductively generated frame. Note that we know how to `force out' nomi- 
nals: the sets of sentences we noted above as giving rise to the possibility of.unassigned 
nominals perform the task wonderfully: such sets of sentences caused the problem in the 
first place and now will be used to fix it! So let Nom(T) = UtET Nom(t). Define: 
Eu = NOMc\Nom(T) U {-,Ei : i E Nom(T) and E E ET}. 
Eu is consistent as it has a model. s So we can form E° and form a Makinson frame 
U = (U, <u), with Eu as the initial point uo. As U is a Makinson frame, results 
analogous to those proved for T hold for U also: most importantly this includes the 
Unique Occurrence Lemma. 
We leave the simple proof that T fl u = 0 to the reader. Let S = T U U and 
<,=<t U <u. Then the frame S = (S, <,) is a countable Henkin frame consisting of two 
generated subframes as required. Furthermore, as any nominal occurring in T occurs 
only once there and does not occur in U, and as any nominal not occurring in T occurs 
precisely once in U (at uo), the natural mapping V on S is a valuation and we are 
through. 4 Thus we have by the Strong Completeness Lemma that: 
3For example, if P is the frame ({1, 21, 0) and Vp is any valuation on P satisfying V (i) _ {1}, 
for all i E NOMc\Nom(T) and V(i) = {2} otherwise, then (P,Vp) k Eu[1]. 
4The standard induction that shows that (S,V) suffices runs as follows. The atomic case is 
automatic as S is a Henkin frame, and the boolean cases are straightforward. So suppose that 
4 = F+'. Then V (F+/,, s) = 1 implies 3s' > 8 V (10, 8') = 1, which implies 10 E 8' by the inductive 
Hypothesis, which in turn implies that HF10 E 8'. But then by the Order Equivalence Lemma, 
as8<8',F0E8. 
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Theorem 4.3.2 (Strong Completeness) E implies E F- 0. O 
This in turn gives a weak completeness theorem and shows that Knt is characterised by 
the class of all frames; or, to put it another way, that our axiomatisation yields all and 
only the NTL validities. 
The above proof also yields a strong completeness theorem for languages of weak NTL - we merely make immediate use of the weak valuation guaranteed to exist at the end 
of the first construction stage; that is, we don't augment our Henkin frame - hence K t 
axiomatises the set of validities for such languages. As a corollary we have that NTL L 
and its corresponding weak language, Lw, have the same set of validities. Although L is 
more expressive than Lw, as we know from our discussion of disjoint unions, this does 
not show on U. 
Note further that K t also yields all the validities of strong languages of NTL with 
at least countably many nominals; this is immediate as we know from Chapter 1 that 
the set of ordinary and strong NTL validities coincide for such languages. Note, however, 
that we only get a weak completeness theorem by this argument; nothing in the above 
construction guarantees that every point of S contains a nominal. 
4.3.2 Second proof: Generated subframes of H 
As any Makinson frame is a subframe of the canonical Henkin frame H, it is natural to 
enquire what it is about Makinson frames that guarantees that the unique occurrence 
property holds for them while it fails for H as a whole. An examination of the sequence of 
lemmas leading to the proof of the Unique Occurrence Lemma makes it apparent that the 
crucial fact is that Makinson frames are connected: the NOM schema can appropriately 
Conversely, suppose F0 E a. Let E, = {,0} U sc-. Then EoKerFs, and by the construction 
of S, E00 E S. As 0 E E0 00, by the induction hypothesis V(0,E0OO) = 1. But s <, E° by 
10 
construction, hence V (Fti, s) = 1. The case for Pti is analogous. 
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regulate the occurrence of nominals in subsets of H, but its ability to do so depends on 
the existence of a path between any two points. Once this has been seen, a very simple 
completeness proof becomes possible: we can use subframes of H generated from points 
to make our model. 
We now present such a proof. Instead of directly using NOM we will use the fact that 
we have all instances of the following schema at our disposal: 
SWEEP, n A --> A(n --> 0). 
Here A is a metavariable over universal tenses, n a metavariable over nominals, and 0 a 
metavariable over wffs; thus typical instances of SWEEPW are i A 0 --> HHGH(i --> 0), 
and iA0 --> (i --> 0). As all instances of SWEEPW are valid, by the previous completeness 
theorem all instances of SWEEPW must be theorems of Kt - and later in the chapter 
we show how to construct syntactic proofs - but the proof of the lemma given below 
shows that the SWEEPW schema could replace NOM in our axiomatisation of Th(U): 
that is, we have found a second minimal axiomatic basis. We proceed straight to the 
crucial lemma: 1 
Lemma 4.3.7 (Unique Occurrence Lemma) Let E be an MCS, and S be the sub- 
frame of H generated by E. Then for all s, s' E S, if some nominal i is in both s and s' 
then s = s'. 
Proof: 
Suppose two pointss and s' in S contain the same nominal i. As S is generated from 
a single point E it is connected, and thus there is a path between s and s'. Let n be the 
length of this path, and let A("-'") be the universal tense that corresponds to the path as 
seen from s. (That is, starting at s we traverse the path until we reach s', writing down 
a G for every move forward in time, and H for every move backwards.) As all instances 
of SWEEPW occur in s, then in particular we have that 
i A 0 --> A("-'")(i --> 0) E s. 
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But as i E s, then for all 0 E s we have by modus ponens that A(8-,') (i --+ 0) E S. 
But then by n applications of the definition of <h and the Order Equivalence Lemma we 
have that i --> 0 E s', and as i E s' we have by modus ponens that 4 E s'. As s and s' 
are MCS this means that s = s'. O 
As the Unique Occurrence Lemma holds for every point-generated subframe of H, 
we can `double generate' a verifying model for any consistent set of sentences E. That 
is, given such a set E, form E°°, and define Eu as we did in the Makinson proof. But 
then taking as our frame the subframe of H generated from the doubleton {E°°, Eu } 
yields our verifying model: the definition of Eu guarantees that this frame will consist of 
two disconnected islands, the Unique Occurrence Lemma holds for each island, and by 
design every nominal occurs in precisely one MCS in one of the islands and we have our 
completeness result. This double generation technique will be assumed in later chapters 
as our basic model building technique. 
Note that there is a subtle difference between the two proofs we have given of the 
Unique Occurrence Lemmas. In the Makinson proof we used a `three point argument', 
whereas the proof above uses a `two point argument'. The argument as presented in the 
Makinson proof was presented from the viewpoint of an observer standing at to. The 
argument took the form, `Suppose, on looking out from to, we see that there are two 
distinct points t and t' out in the frame sharing some nominal i...'; and went on from 
there to show what impact this would have on the privileged viewing point to. In the 
above argument, on the other hand, no use is made of the privileged point from which 
the frame was generated: the argument merely appeals to the fact that a path must exist 
between t and t'. Now clearly we could have used a two point argument in the Makinson 
proof; and a little thought will reveal that if we had used such a proof we wouldn't 
have needed all instances of NOM, but merely all instances of the following weak NOM 
schema: 
NOMW nAE(nA¢) -> ¢. 
Similarly, we could have used a `three point argument' on the subframe of H generated 
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by EOO, with EO0 as the privileged point, and then the following schema is a natural basis: 
SWEEP E A ) --+ A --> 0). 
The main interest lies in the the fact that in proving completeness for modal languages we 
cannot use two point .arguments - we have to make use of three point arguments. As we 
shall see later, modal languages require analogs of NOM or SWEEP; using merely NOMw 
or SWEEPw does not axiomatise the minimal logic; this is yet another manifestation 
of the fact that with modal languages we can only look forwards, not back. In the 
meantime it should be clear that as far as tensed languages with nominals are concerned, 
we now have four schema which can be added to Kt to axiomatise Th(U): NOM, NOMw, 
SWEEP and SWEEPw. 
4.4 Some Knt-theorems 
In this section we examine some theorems of the minimal logic and give condensed 
syntactical proofs of them. Proofs are set out in four columns in a fashion that mimics 
linear natural deduction systems such as those of Lemmon [59] or Copi [21]. The first 
column simply contains a number, identifying the step of the proof; the second contains 
the actual wff corresponding to that step; the third contains the justification of the step; 
and the fourth is a (possibly empty) list of numbers, recording the assumptions on which 
that step depends. The justification column contains an annotation and (possibly) some 
numbers. If no numbers are present the line is either an assumption, a theorem, or an 
axiom. If the annotation on such a line says `assumption', that's exactly what the wff 
in column 2 is; if it says something else (such as NOM), the line is an instance of the 
named theorem or axiom. The numbers (if present) state which earlier line(s) that line 
was deduced from, and the annotation tells us what the inference step was. At its most 
unhelpful such an annotation will merely say PC or TL; that is, it just indicates whether 
the inference was propositional or tense logical. This is only used when the inference is 
very simple; usually the annotations are more specific. MP means modus ponens. Inst 
(for instantiation) annotates such tense logical moves as the deduction of F(,o A 0) from 
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earlier occurrences of G4 and F. TMP stands for temporal modus ponens, and records 
an application of modus ponens under the scope of a block of universal or existential 
tenses. For example, the deduction of Eii from E(q5 - 1) and f- 4' is annotated as TMP. 
A good place to start looking for validities is in the way nominals interact with 
universal tenses. If Gi is true at some point t there are only three possibilities: t has no 
successors at all, t is its own unique successor, or t has a unique successor t' and t' 0 t. 
In short, nominals `strongly interact' with universal tenses: such expressions can be true 
only in a very limited set of circumstances - and, conversely, when such circumstances 
do occur, we know a lot about the way the truth of other wffs is locally distributed. I 
call theorems expressing such information end effects. An example is i A Gi A F4' - 4', 
which can be proved as follows: 
1. IA Gi A F4' 
2. F(i A q5) 
Assumption 
1; Inst 1 
3. iAF(iA4') 1,2; PC 1 
4. i A F(i A 4') - 4' NOMw 1 
5. 4' 3,4; MP 1 
6. i A Gi A Fq - 4' 1, 5; Discharge 
Note that NOMw was used. Indeed one of our Unique Occurrence schemas had to 
be used: if a proof was possible without their use then by substituting new variables for 
uniformly throughout the derivation we would have a Kt proof of p A Gp A F0 -- 0, 
where 1' (and hence the whole formula) is purely Priorean. But this schema is not valid 
and hence not a theorem of Kt. 
Next consider the following theorems and nontheorems of minimal Priorean tense 
logic. All six forward looking schemas expressing merges between universal and existen- 
tially quantified information are listed: 
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1. I-K, Go A GO G(O ^ 0) 
2. I-K, Go A FO F(O A 0) 
3. VK, Go A FO G(q A 0) 
4. VK,FcAFOF(OA0) 
5. VK, Go A Go F(f A 0) 
6. VK, FSAFO -' G(OA0) 
What happens when nominals are substituted for 0 or 0 or both? Clearly the two valid 
schemas remain valid, and equally clearly schemas 5 and 6 are irredeemable. Schema 4 
has valid subschemas, but we already know about these: they're instances of NOM. But 
3, however, does yield something new: Gn A FO --+ G(n A 0). This subschema is another 
end effect: under `end conditions' we can turn existentially quantified information (here, 
0), into universally quantified information. Again NOM must be used to prove it: 
1. -,(Gi A FO -' G(i A 0)) Assumption 
2. Gi A FO A -,G(i A t') 1;PC 1 
3. GiAFO 2;PC 1 
4. F(i A t') 3; Inst 1 
5. F,(iA0) 2; PC, G = -,F-, 1 
6. GiAF-(iA 2,5; PC 1 
7. F(iA-i(iA0)) 6; Inst 1 
8. F(i A ) A F(i n -'(i A t')) 4,7; PC 1 
9. F(iA0A- iA t')) 8; NOM, MP 1 
10. F1 9;PC 1 
11. -'F1 Theorem 1 
12. 1 




14. GiAFO -9G(iA t) 13; PC 
There are many other more or less obvious end effects, and all have simple gener- 
alisations to arbitrary existential and universal tenses; such investigations we leave to 
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the reader, and turn to another intuition: path exploration. This idea gives rise to two 
rather pretty schemas. 
The idea behind the first schema is very simple. Suppose we are standing at some 
point t, and by following some path P we find ourselves back at t again. Then a reverse 
journey exists: we could traverse P back to front and still get to t. To make the notion of 
a reverse journey precise we need the notion of the transposition of an existential tense. 
Definition 4.4.1 The transposition of an existential tense E, ET, is defined by letting 
the null tense be its own transpose, FT = p, pT = F, (FE)T = ET P, and (PE)T = 
ET F. That is, to transpose an existential tense we reverse the sequence and take its 
mirror image. 
Intuitively, if an existential tense E codes a path between points t and t' as seen by 
an observer at t, then E' codes the same path as viewed by an observer at t'. Note that k 
(EIE2)T = El ET. Tense transposition allows ustransform between two observational 
viewpoints t and t', as the following schema shows: 
(0 A E&) -+ E(& A ETO). 
The schema states at t what t looks like to an observer at t'. That, at least, is the semantic 
intuition; as we'll be using the schema in the next two proofs it's important to note what 
it gives us proof theoretically. In these terms it's useful because it removes the block 
of tenses stuck on to the i and gives them wide scope, thus baring ci. When i is some 
nominal i, the consequent of the formula is thus in the form required of antecedents of 
NOM. This move is crucial in the next two proofs. I call this schema Tense Transposition, 
or TT for short. Note that it is not peculiar to languages with nominals; all instances 
are standard validities and must therefore be theorems of ordinary tense logic. In fact it 
is easy to give an inductive specification of how to construct a Km proof of any desired 
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instance; this we relegate to a footnote. " The schema asserting the existence of reverse 
journeys can now be given: 
nAEn->ETn. 
This is dubbed the Reverse Trip Schema. Note that its validity does hinge on the unique 
referring ability of nominals: instantiating n in variable p yields p A Ep --> ET p, which 
is invalid. We need to know where to return to, thus the starting point of the journey 
must be labelled, and this requires a nominal. 
"Clearly we can display proofs for all instances where len(E) = 0, for such instances have the 
form 0 A 0 - 0 A ¢. So suppose we can construct proofs of any instance where len(E) = m. Now 
all existential tenses of length m +1 have the form PE or FE. Suppose E" is an existential tense 
of length m + 1 of the form PE. To construct a proof of (¢ A PEO) -+ E(O A (PE)T ¢) proceed 
as follows: 
1. ¢ n PEA, Assumption 
2. ¢ - HF¢ TL4 1 
3. HF¢ 1, 2; MP 1 
4. HF¢nPE+b 1, 3; PC 1 
5. P(F¢ A Etr) 4; Inst 1 
6. (F¢ A Etr) - E(O A ET F¢) Theorem by Ind. Hyp. 1 
7. P(E(O A ET F¢)) 5, 6; TMP 1 
8. PE(b A (PE)T ¢) 7; Definition of T 1 
9. (¢ A PEI,) - PE(b A (PE)T ¢) 1, 7; Discharge 
By inserting the proof of (F¢ A Eli) --+ E(O A ET F¢), which by hypothesis we know how to 
construct, in place of line 6 in the above proof-scheme, we obtain a proof of the desired instance. 
The inductive proof-scheme for deriving all instances of (4APEO) - E(OA(PE)T ¢) is analogous 
to that above, and thus we have an inductive specification of the proof construction. 
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1. iAEi Assumption 
2. iAEi--+E(iAETi) Tense Transposition 1 
3. E(iAETi) 1, 2; MP 1 
4. iAE(iAETi) 1, 3; PC 1 
5. ET i 4; NOMw, MP 1 
6. iAEi--+ETi 1, 5; Discharge 
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This schema can be extended in a way that will prove useful in the next chapter. 
Suppose we are in a point labelled i and by following path PI we can reach a box 
containing information 0. Moreover, suppose that on leaving this box we can follow 
another path, P2 back to point i. Then as usual the reverse journey exists: but this time 
we can say something about the scenery encountered along the way. We can travel from 
i backwards along P2; record the fact that 0 holds; and then travel backwards along PI 
to is we have a second way of accessing 0 and returning with it. The schema expressing 
this is 
iAEl(1iAE2i) --+EZ(AEii), 
and is called the Stopover Schema. 
1. iAEI(1iAE2i) 
2. E1((1iAE2i)AEli) 
3. EI(E2i A (tp A ETi)) 
4. EIE2(iAET (O AETi)) 
5. iAElE2(iAEZ (1iAEli)) 
6. Ez(O AEii) 
7. iAEl(1'AE2i) -- Es (0AEii) 
Assumption 
1; Tense Transposition, MP 1 
2; PC 1 
3; Tense Transposition, MP 1 
1, 4; PC 1 
1, 5; NOMw, MP 1 
1, 6; Discharge 
Note the way the two applications of TT at lines 2 and 4 bare the i for subsequent 
feeding to NOM. The Stopover Schema will prove useful to us when we consider the logic 
of partial orders in the next chapter. 
We conclude this section by considering the interderivability of the four different 
axiomatic bases we have for the minimal logic. In the following proofs we will often need 
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to form the mirror image of a universal or existential tense: the following notation will 
help keep things readable. Let E be an existential tense; mi(E) will be denoted by E - 
which of course is a universal tense. Similarly A denotes the existential tense obtained 
by taking the mirror image of A. With the observation that A = -A-, and E = _IE-11 
we are ready to derive all instances of SWEEPw in K,: 
1. -((iA0)-'A(i-'cb)) 
2. (iA )A-A(i 
3. A(iA-¢) 
4. (iA0)AA(iA 
5. (1 A A -0) 
6. 1 
7. (iA )-3 A(i-'¢) 
Assumption 
1; PC 1 
2; -,A = A,, PC 1 
2,3; PC 1 
4; NOM, MP 1 
5;PC 
1, 6; Discharge, PC 
We next show how to derive all instances of SWEEP from SWEEPw: 
1. -,(E(i A 0) - A(i - 4)) 
2. E(iA )A-,A(i- 
3. E(i A A ET-,A(i -' qS) 
4. E(i A A -,ETA(: 
5. (in4)) -'EA(i-') 
6. E((i A 4)) -' A(i 








2; Tense Transposition, MP 1 
3; ET -, = iET 1 
SWEEPw 1 








Note that TT was used at line three. As we shall see in our discussion of the minimal 
modal logic, this is not accidental; TT, or some equivalent tense logical schema must be 
appealed to if the strong schemas are to be derived from their weaker cousins. 
The derivations of NOM from SWEEP, and SWEEPw from NOMw are both similarly 
straightforward. 
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4.5 Modal and multimodal languages 
In this section we axiomatise the minimal logics for languages of NML, and multimodal 
languages with nominals; and examine the effect the addition of nominals has on the 
Henkin frame of the minimal modal logic. 
Given what we already know, axiomatising Th(U) for modal languages with nom- 
inals is easy. The modal analog of an existential tense is an existential modality, an 
unbroken sequence of Qs; while the analog of a universal tense is a universal modality, 
an unbroken sequence of s. With E and A now taken as ranging over such (possibly 
empty) sequences, the minimal logic in languages of NML (or weak or strong NML) can be 
axiomatised by adding as axioms all instances of the modalised version of either NOM 
or SWEEP to the minimal modal axiomatisation K. 6 We assume some choice has been 
made and call the result K,,,,,. Completeness follows by either the Makinson argument - using `kernel possibilities' - or the appeal to (modal) generated subframes of H. 
This should be clear; for suppose we are standing at the `privileged point' in the frame 
produced by either of these methods, that is, the point that is our original MCS EO°. In 
both constructions the privileged point to has the following property: given any other t 
in the frame there is a modal path from to to t. Thus any point in either of the frames 
can be `accessed' from to by a sequence of Qs. But then the three point unique occur- 
rence argument goes through: suppose that two distinct points t and t' have a nominal 
i in common. Then both <>"(i A ) and Qm(i A -,) are in to for some n and m length 
sequences of Q. Appealing to either NOM or SWEEP gives a contradiction. 
However, if we only had NOMw or SWEEPW to appeal to we couldn't prove the 
unique occurrence property. To see what could go wrong, imagine that both points t and 
t' as above are distinct from to, and that there is no modal path from t to t' and vice-versa. 
6K has as axioms the usual propositional base PC1 - PC3, all instances of (¢ - ) - 
(D # --+ 0), and the rules: I- 0 *1- 0 0, and modus ponens. 
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Suppose i A 0 occurs at t: then there simply is nothing in our axioms to block i A -,q6 
from occurring at t'. Because of the missing instances we can't look forward from to and 
make the three point argument; and because of the inherent unidirectionality of modal 
languages we cannot `look back' from t to to and then `round the corner' to t' - there 
are no tense transpositions in modal languages. In a nutshell: we lack the axioms for 
the three point argument, and two point arguments can't be made in modal languages. 
That, at any rate is the intuition; and it is easy to turn this intuition into a proof that 
neither of the axiomatic bases K + NOMN. nor K + SWEEPw suffice to axiomatise the 
minimal nominal modal logic. We do this by showing that neither base can derive either 
the full NOM or SWEEP schemas. As is usual with such proofs, we proceed by finding a 
semantical property which distinguishes the derivable from the non-derivable wffs. This 
motivates the following: 
Definition 4.5.1 Let T be a frame and t and t' be distinct elements of T. We say t and 
t' are a separated pair i$ there is no modal path from t to t', and no modal path from t' 
to t. A frame is said to separated if it contains at least one separated pair. 
Note that this definition talks of modal paths, not zig-zag paths. We now change 
the interpretation of modal languages with nominals. Let L be any language of nom- 
inal modal logic. In the separated interpretation for L we define separated valuations 
on separated frames; in each separated valuation every nominal denotes exactly two 
distinct points, t and t', where t and t' are a separated pair. Everything else is as 
usual: variables denote arbitrary subsets of such frames and the non-atomic sentences 
are evaluated as usual. We say that an L-wff q6 is s-valid if it is valid in any separated 
interpretation on any separated frame. Clearly both K + NOMN. and K + SWEEPw 
are sound with respect to this interpretation; everything provable from either basis is 
s-valid. However it is easy to falsify instances of both the NOM and SWEEP schemas. 
Let T be the frame Clearly -1 and 1 are a separated 
pair. Let V be any valuation that assigns {-1, 1} to i, and {1} to p. Then both an 
instance of NOM, 0(i A P) A 0(i A -,p) --+ Q(i A p A -,p), and an instance of SWEEP, 
Q(i A p) ---' (i -- p), are false at 0 and thus cannot be derived from the weakened basis. 
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There are some simple observations we can make about the impact the addition of 
nominals has on the Henkin frame of the minimal normal modal logic. Suppose f is 
a standard language of modal logic; that is, C has a countably infinite set of variables 
and no nominals. Let K be the minimal normal logic in C and HK its canonical frame. 
The following facts about HK are well known: HK is left directed, point generated, and 
indeed strongly generated. By this last is meant that there exists an h E HK such that for 
all h' E HK, h <h h'; from h we can get to any other point in one step. These properties 
follow from the the fact that K admits the Law of Disjunction (LOD): 
Definition 4.5.2 A modal logic L admits the Law of Disjunction (LOD) if 
FL 01 V ... V ¢ implies F qSm, for some m such that 1 < m < n. 
0 
We briefly sketch why modal logics admitting LOD have the above properties. 
Lemmon and Scott [61, Chapter 1, Section 31 showed that HL is left directed if L 
admits LOD as follows. Assume L admits LOD, and let h, h' E HK. Let 
E={pO:0Eh}U{QO:0Eh'}. 
E is consistent; for if not: FL Q¢1 A ... A Q¢ - 1, for some (finite) collection of wffs 
0m, (1 < m < n]). But this means FL -¢1 V ... V '' , and as L admits LOD, we 
must have that FL -,¢m for some m (1 < m < n). As ¢,n is in one of the MCS h or h', 
we have a contradiction. So E is consistent, and we can form E°°; but by the (modal) 
Order Equivalence Lemma, E°O precedes both h and h' in the usual ordering on Henkin 
frames, which establishes left directedness. 
Hughes and Cresswell [46, pages 96 -1001 showed that if L admits LOD, HL is strongly 
generated as follows. Define E = {, ' :VL ¢}. As in the Lemmon-Scott argument, E 
must be L-consistent on pain of contradiction, so again we can form EOO. But it is easy 
to see that for all h' E HL, E°° <h h'; for if ¢ E E°°, then by the construction of E, 
FL ¢, and L-theorems are in every L-MCS. This shows that HK is strongly generated, 
and hence point generated also. 
Matters are different for languages with nominals. 
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Lemma 4.5.1 Let L' be any extension of L with at least one nominal, i. Then the 
minimal modal logic in L' does not admit LOD. 
Proof: 
Clearly any L'-instance of Q (i A A Q (i A 0) is K,,,,,-inconsistent. But such instances 
have the form (i A 0) A (i A -0) and from the Hughes and Cresswell proof 
sketched above we know that if X. admits LOD then all sets {-,00 :'/ K.,,. 0} are 
consistent. As neither i A 0 nor i A -0 is a K"m theorem, K"m cannot admit LOD. 
In fact everything tumbles to ground: HK^- cannot be left directed as no MCS h can 
precede both {i A 0}O0 and {i A -,O}O0; and as an immediate corollary of this we have that 
HKnm cannot be strongly generated. In fact, it can't even be generated: for arbitrary 
existential modalities Q" and Q"(i A 0) A <>'"(i A -,0) is inconsistent, and thus no 
MCS h can precede both {i A }0D and {i A no matter how many steps intervene. 
The only obvious thing we can say about the structure of HK^m derives from the 
following observation: the following special case of LOD is unaffected by the addition of 
nominals: I-Knm 0 if I-Kn,a 0. The `only if' direction is immediate by necessitation; the 
less trivial `if' direction follows because given a falsifying NTL model for 0, we can `root' 
the model by adjoining a new point that precedes all the other points in the model, but 
that is not itself preceded by any of the others. Given that 0 is falsifiable in the original 
model, evaluating 0 at this new point yields -1, and we have shown the contrapositive 
of the desired result. As a corollary we have that HK^" is left unbounded, for this 
`rooting' argument shows that for all h E HK, ,1, {oqS : 0 E h} is consistent, and thus 
we can always find a predecessor of any point in the Henkin frame. So some asymmetry 
remains, but it is hard to say anything more about the structure of HK^-; it is not even 
clear whether it is connected. 
Axiomatising the minimal logic for multimodal languages is straightforward. Suppose 
A is the modality index for some multimodal language Lo. Then by an Lo existential 
modality is meant the smallest set ETo containing: the null sequence; Os, for all 6 E A; 
and Os E, if E E ETo, for all 6 E A. Universal modalities are defined analogously. 
Chapter 4. The Minimal Logic 114 
Again with E and A read in this way, either NOM or SWEEP can be added to the usual 
axiomatisation of the minimal multimodal logic ' to yield a complete axiomatisation 
of the C validities. 8 To show this using the double generation technique we generate 
simultaneously an all the relations <g. That is, at each stage we take the smallest subset 
of the Henkin multiframe that is closed under all the relations. 
4.6 The GPT axiomatisation 
Let us now consider the Gargov, Passy and Tinchev axiomatisation of the minimal modal 
logic for languages with nominals. They first define necessity and possibility forms: 
Definition 4.6.1 Let C be a language of NTL, $ be a new entity distinct from any C wff 
or symbol, and 0 be a wff of C. Then the necessity forms of C, are the elements of the 
smallest set -form such that: 
$ E -form 
L E13 -form implies 0 --> L E form 
L E -form implies L E -form; 
and the possibility forms of C, are the elements of the smallest set 0-form such that: 
$ E O-form 
L E <>-form implies 0 A L E <>-form 
L E <>-form implies QL E 0-form. 
Simply `K with indices'. That is, for all 6 E A, we have the axiom schema: s(¢ -- 0) - 
(O so -- O SO), and the rules: h ¢ =*h a¢. (As usual we have the PC axiom schema and 
modus ponens.) 
"The orderings needed for the Co Henkin multiframe are defined by h <s h' if sO E h 
implies ¢ E h', for all wffs ¢. Thus the the Co Henkin multiframe is just (H, {<a}aEO), where 
H is the set of all MCS in language Co. 
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If 0 is any w$ of .C, and L and M are -forms and 0 -forms respectively, then by L(t,i) 
and M(+,b) are meant the £-wfs obtained by replacing the (unique) occurrence of $ in L 
and M respectively by 0. 
They then axiomatise the minimal logic for languages of weak NML by adding to the 
usual axioms of the minimal modal logic K all instances of the following schema: 
AXN M(n A ¢) -+ L(n -+ ¢), 
where L and M are metavariables over -forms and 0-forms respectively. They prove 
completeness by a three point argument on generated subframes of the HK,,-. 
The form of the AxN schema is superficially reminiscent of that of SWEEP, but the 
M and the L don't range over universal and existential modalities but over the more 
complex - and Q- forms. Thus for fixed i and 0 the consequents of AxN include all 
entries in the following infinite matrix: 
(i - 4') (i - 4') (i -3 0) 
0 -' (0 -+ (i -' 4)) (0 -' (0 -' (i -' 4'))) (0 -+ (0 -+ (i -' O))) .. . 
¢ -4 (i -+ 0) (0 -+ (i -+ ¢)) (¢ -+ (i -+ ¢)) 
The antecedents of AXN, again for fixed i and 0, consist of all entries in the matrix 
obtained from that above by replacing by Q and -+ by A. Note that for fixed i and ¢ 
the SWEEP schema consists merely of conditionals formed from the first row of each of 
the above matrices. The simpler SWEEPw schema that suffices for tense logic essentially 
consists, for fixed i and 0, of only the single wff occurring in the top left entry of the 
second matrix - i A ¢ - as antecedent; and as consequents just the wffs in the first row 
of the above matrix. Thinking in terms of paths and path equations is a simpler way of 
adding nominals to modal (and especially tensed) languages. 
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The authors then note that AXN suffices to axiomatise ordinary and strong languages 
a 
as well: for the former they suggest adding/single point to `totalise' the model. 9 They 
prove the axiomatisation is complete for strong languages by the filtration argument we 
used in Chapter 1. Actually they do more: they also augment the logic by an infinitary 
rule of inference, COV, and show that adding COV as a rule yields a completeness 
result for strong languages; the filtration argument is then used to show that COV is 
eliminable. But, as they comment, COV need not be eliminable in all extensions of Knm 
The COV rule is very interesting and we discuss it at the end of the next chapter. 
9See my `point at infinity' comment near the end of the Makinson proof. 
Chapter 5 
Extensions of Knt 
In this chapter we axiomatise the logics of some interesting classes of frames and establish 
their decidability. 
Languages of NTL inherit a number of completeness results straightforwardly from 
Priorean tense logic. The following table lists some useful schemata together with the 
effect their inclusion as axioms has on Henkin frames: 1 
4 FF4, --> 0 Transitivity 
T 0 -- FqS Reflexivity 
DR FT Right unboundedness 
DL PT Left unboundedness 
D PT A FT Unboundedness 
Thus the nominal tense logic of transitive frames is axiomatised by adding to K,d all 
instances of the schema 4 - which we would write as Kw + 4 or Kt4 - and the 
nominal tense logic of unbounded frames is axiomatised by K tD. Proving this is simple: 
first we doubly generate a model from the relevant Henkin frame in the usual way. As 
before, the NOMiy schema included as part of our base logic K,d guarantees that the 
Unique Occurrence Lemma holds. Further, the additional structural axioms force the 
1The results for the D variants are immediate. That 4 and T have the desired effect is clear 
if their dual forms G¢ -- GG4 and G4 - are considered. 
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whole Henkin frame, and thus our generated subframes, to have the relational property 
in question. Hence, by the Strong Completeness Lemma, we have completeness. Note 
that the above results are additive: for example, Km4T is complete with respect to the 
class of preorders. 
This is useful, but unsurprising. Moreover these completeness theorems deal only 
with classes of frames already definable in Priorean languages. How do we axiomatise 
the newly definable classes, and can the defining formulas be used as axioms? They can, 
but not in so straightforward a fashion as for the examples listed above. In particular, 
although any instance of n -- -"Fn defines irreflexivity, the inclusion of all instances of 
this schema as axioms does not guarantee an irreflexive Henkin frame; and although any 
instance of n -- G(Fn -- n) defines antisymmetry, the inclusion of all instances of this 
schema as axioms does not guarantee an antisymmetric Henkin frame. These problems 
form the starting point for the chapter. 
In the first section we examine the simplest problematic logic, the logic of irreflexive 
frames. We prove a simple lemma, the Irreflexivity lemma, which tells us that although 
the natural axiom schema does not force the Henkin frame to be irreflexive, it does force 
all points containing nominals to be irreflexive. We then show how our Henkin model 
can be `structurally rectified' - in this case, turned into an irreflexive model - in a way 
that does not affect the unique occurrence property. This discussion illustrates in very 
simple form the strategy that underlies much of the chapter. 
In the following section we give a detailed account of a powerful rectification technique 
that will be used throughout the thesis: Segerberg's bulldozing method. We first use 
this to axiomatise the logic of the SPOs, and then, in the following section, to axiomatise 
the POs. 
At last we are ready to examine the logics of linear frames, and at this stage a number 
of interesting things happen. Firstly, we no longer need to double generate our models; a 
single generative step suffices. Secondly, finite axiomatisations become possible on these 
frames. Thirdly, we note a peculiarity of the nominal modal logics of linear frames. 
By this stage we have an interesting crop of logics; next we consider the question 
Chapter 5. Extensions of Kt 119 
of their decidability. In spite of an apparent obstacle - many of the interesting logics 
lack the finite frame property - we can use simple filtration arguments to establish the 
decidability of all the logics introduced, and we do so. 
In the final section we axiomatise the logics of Q, R, Z and N. 
As has already been indicated, this chapter makes heavy use of the classic Segerberg 
method of cluster analysis. In fact, the chapter could be read as a rather lengthy footnote 
to Segerberg's "Modal Logics with linear alternative relations" [97], indicating how the 
techniques introduced there adapt to languages with nominals. For the most part I have 
used Segerberg's original notation and terminology, though in certain places I have used 
ideas from Robert Goldblatt's more recent [40, Chapter 81, which contains an original 
and very clear account of cluster analysis. 
5.1 The logic of irreflexive frames 
The axiomatisation I is obtained by adding all instances of 
n - -,Fn (I) 
to Km. (As usual n is a metavariable over nominals.) Note that if we are working with 
a purely Priorean language, I collapses into Kt as there are no instances of I or NOMw. 
I is characterised by the class of irreflexive frames. Soundness is immediate: we need 
only check that all instances of I are valid on the class of irreflexive frames - but any 
instance defines that class. What about completeness? 
We must show that any I-consistent set of sentences E has a model whose underlying 
frame is irreflexive. Given such a set E, doubly generate a Henkin model (T, Vt) in 
the usual fashion. Here we run into a problem. Certainly this model verifies all the 
sentences in E, but there is no guarantee that T is irreflexive: there may be points of 
this frame containing no nominals, and we cannot guarantee the irreflexivity of such 
points. Nonetheless, we do have the following: 
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Lemma 5.1.1 (Irreflexivity Lemma) Let t be any element of T containing a nomi- 
nal. Then t -At t. 
Proof: 
Suppose t contains a nominal, say i, and t <t t. As i -+ -'Fi is an axiom of I, -,Fi E t. 
That is, G-i E t. But t <t t means that G¢ E t implies ¢ E t, and thus we have -'i E t. 
As t is an MCS, this is a contradiction. 
If we could find some means of `structurally rectifying' our generated model - that 
is, if we could find a means of turning it into an irreflexive model that verified the 
same formulas - we would have our result. Of course we must take care to choose a 
rectification procedure that does not destroy the unique occurrence property enjoyed by 
the original model. Such a well behaved process for I is easy to describe: if we `stretched 
apart' each reflexive point t in T into two points s and s', each of which preceded the 
other, and neither of which preceded itself, we would have an equivalent model as each 
point would have access to exactly the same information as before. By the Irreflexivity 
Lemma this process would not affect the unique occurrence property: points containing 
nominals are irreflexive, and thus are never stretched. More precisely, given T define a 
new stretched frame S as follows: 
S = {(t, 0) : t E T and t -At t} U {(t,1), (t, 2) : t E T and t <t t}, 
and if (t, m), (t', n) E S, (0 < m, n < 2), then: 
(t, m) <, (t', n) iff t <t t', and t = t' implies m ,E n. 
Clearly <, is an irreflexive relation. Note that points t of T containing nominals can 
appear only in pairs of the form (t, 0) in S. 
Now define a valuation V. on S by V. (a) = { (t, m) E S : t E Vt (a) }, for all atoms 
a. This is a valuation: as V(i) is some singleton subset {t;} of T, V,(i) is the singleton 
subset {(t;, 0)) of S. 
All that remains is to check that (T, Vt) and (S, V,) are equivalent models. Consider 
the function f : S --- T defined by f ((t, m)) = t. It is a p-morphism from S to T, and 
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moreover a E V.(a) if f (a) E Vt(a), for all atoms a. Thus (T, Vt) is a p-morphic image 
of (S, V,) and the two models are equivalent. Thus every I-consistent set of sentences 
can be verified on an irreflexive model, establishing: 
Theorem 5.1.1 I is strongly complete with respect to the class of irreflexive frames. 
I is a rather simple axiomatisation, and the class of all irreflexive frames is not of much 
interest as far as temporal modeling is concerned; nonetheless, the above completeness 
proof is useful as it shows clearly the form of the arguments that will be encountered in the 
rest of this chapter. In general, the Henkin model produced by the double generation 
process cannot be guaranteed to have the desired relational structure and some form 
of rectification is required. We usually proceed by finding a method of producing a 
model (S, V,) of which our generated Henkin model (T, Vt) is a p-morphic image - 
exactly what was done above. The only difference is one of complexity: the `stretching' 
process is simple and obvious, whereas for the more complex logics to follow we need 
more powerful rectification techniques. Another point which recurs in later proofs is the 
way in which points containing nominals could be guaranteed to have the appropriate 
relational behaviour even though an arbitrary point couldn't. This enabled such points to 
be left alone: our rectification technique only had to be applied to points not containing 
nominals. Rectification was local. 
As the above completeness proof works for any language of NTL, it shows that the 
minimal tense logic for standard languages, Kt, is complete not only with respect to 
the class of all frames, but with respect to the irreflexive frames also. This result is 
well known and is perhaps the simplest of the `sharpening' results mentioned in the 
last chapter. This sharpening is due to the inability of purely Priorean languages to 
talk about irreflexivity: there simply are no validities in Priorean languages peculiar 
to irreflexive frames, and hence nothing new for the minimal logic to prove. That is, 
the positive sharpening result - the minimal axiomatisation Kt suffices even for the 
irreflexive frames --- is a reflection of a negative expressibility result. 
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As all instances of n --> -,Pn are valid on the class of irreflexive frames, by the above 
completeness theorem all instances are I-provable. I-proofs are easily displayed: 
1. i Assumption 
2. i --> HFi T4 1 
3. HFi 1,2; MP 1 
4. Fi --> -'i I contraposed 1 
5. H(Fi --> -'i) 4; HGen 1 
6. HFi --> H-'i 5; T2, MP 1 
7. i -->H-,i 2,6; PC 1 
8. H-,i 1,7; MP 1 
9. --Pi 8 1 
10. i --> -,Pi 1,9; Discharge 
Adding all instances of n --> -,On to K,,,,, axiomatises the nominal modal logic of the 
irreflexive frames; the argument given above establishes this. 
5.2 The logic of SPOs 
I4 is the axiomatisation obtained by adjoining all instances of the following two schema: 
n --> -,Fn (I) 
FF4, --> FO (4) 
to the axioms of Knt. (As usual, n is a metavariable over nominals and 0 a metavariable 
over arbitrary wffs.) Note that all I-theorems are I4-theorems. The inclusion is proper 
as no instance of 4 is I-provable by the soundness result for I. If we are working with a 
purely Priorean language I4 collapses into Kt4. 
I4 is an important axiomatisation as it is characterised by the class of SPOed frames, 
and thus captures what can reasonably be considered the minimal temporal logic in 
languages of NTL. I4 is obviously sound with respect to these frames, but as should 
be clear from the discussion of I, establishing completeness will be rather tricky. Let's 
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examine the problem. As usual, given a consistent set of sentences E, we doubly generate 
a Henkin frame T and then form a Henkin model by defining the natural valuation Vt. 
Because of the presence of the instances of schema 4, T will be transitive; but as we have 
already seen, the presence of the instances of schema I does not guarantee irreflexivity - only the irreflexivity of points containing nominals is assured. So how do we turn 
(T, Vt) into an equivalent model that is transitive and irreflexive? The simple stretching 
procedure used for I will not do: stretching a reflexive point t apart into two points s 
and s' certainly yields an irreflexive frame, but destroys transitivity in so doing, as now 
s <, s' and s' <, s, but s 14, s. Indeed a little experimentation should demonstrate 
that the problem of constructing an irreflexive and transitive model equivalent to (T, Vt) 
is non-trivial. Fortunately there is a technique due to Krister Segerberg which can be 
applied: bulldozing. An account of how to irreflexively bulldoze a transitive frame (T, <t) 
will now be given. 
As with the stretching argument we are going to perform surgery 2 on T. We're going 
to snip out the troublesome parts of the generated frame and sew in something more to 
our liking. But what are the troublesome parts of the frame? The obvious answer is: 
`any reflexive points'; but while this is correct, it is at the wrong level of abstraction. A 
better answer is: any cluster. (Remember from Chapter 2 that a cluster is a maximal 
equivalence relation on T.) The point is this: we shouldn't think in terms of removing 
single reflexive points, but of removing whole clusters at a time. We need to construct 
a frame equivalent to T, and by removing clusters as a single lump we've kept together 
information that, intuitively, needs to be kept together. `Thinking in terms of clusters' 
is the first important intuition behind bulldozing. 
But to make an equivalent model, what do we replace the clusters with? To gain our 
desired completeness theorem it must be some sort of SPO - and in fact certain STOs 
will be used - but how? Segerberg's answer is elegant. Note that any cluster, even a 
2This term is taken from Goldblatt [40, page 54]. As will become apparent, the surgery that 
patient T requires is a transplant. 
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simple one, introduces an infinity of information recurrence. Given any cluster C we can 
loop within C arbitrarily many times, visiting each point and its associated information 
as often as we please - clusters contain arbitrarily long paths. Thus when we replace C 
(somehow) by a STO we must take care that this STO duplicates all the information in 
C infinitely often. What the bulldozing procedure does is to impose an arbitrary strict 
total order on the information in a cluster - that is, it picks some route through the 
cluster that visits each point once and once only - and then lays out infinitely many 
copies of this path in both the forward and backwards direction. 3 The final step is to 
replace each cluster C by this infinite repetition of the chosen path through C: the fat 
clusters of T have been squashed into thin and infinitely long STOs: hence `bulldozing'. 
We now give the full definition. Let the clusters of T be indexed by some suitable set 
0. We assume that for each b E 0, C6 is embedded in a set C6 in such a way that if Co and 
Ci,, are distinct clusters of T then CB nCa = 0. (This is a refinement of the basic bulldozing 
idea that will be important later - we introduce it here even though for the simpler 
axiomatisations such as I4 it is unnecessary. For simple axiomatisations we merely choose 
the identity embedding of each cluster into itself.) For each b E A choose an arbitrary 
c E C6; we term this arbitrary element 7(C). (That is, 7 : {C6 : b E Al -I U3EA C6 
is a choice function.) Next, for each 5 E E we define an arbitrary strict total order <6 
on Co. This marks an important choice point in bulldozing. What we are doing here is 
irreflexive or heavy bulldozing. Our objective is to grind down all the clusters, including 
the simple ones, as we want an irreflexive frame - hence the arbitrary order we impose 
on C6 is a STO. In the next section when we consider the logic of POs we will want a 
reflexive frame - so we will leave the simple clusters untouched, bulldoze just the proper 
clusters, and at this point of the construction will define an arbitrary TO on Cg; that 
is, a transitive, trichotomous, antisymmetric and reflexive relation. This variant will be 
described as reflexive or light bulldozing. 
3Slightly more formally, once we have chosen our arbitrary STOed route R through the cluster, 
we pick a second arbitrary unbounded STO (say Z), and form the lexicographical product Z O R. 
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Finally, let a = (A, <A) be any order type without first or last element - for example 
the order type of Q or Z. Define Ca to be C6 x A. All the pieces are now to hand, and 
we can describe the set underlying our new frame. Define: 
S=(T\UC6)UC6. 
6EA 6EA 
That is, we've removed all the clusters from the frame - the things being bulldozed flat 
- and have sewn in place our new crossproducts C6, the results of the squashing. 4 
There is a potential difficulty here: what if T fl U6En C6 0? However it should be clear 
that this is only a matter of bookkeeping. Trouble can only arise if we are careless as 
to the sets C6 that the clusters are embedded in; clearly judicious set-theoretic juggling 
- indexing, pair formation etc. - will remove such pseudo-problems, and thus we can 
assume without loss of generality that these two sets are disjoint. 
Define a function f : S --> T by: 
8 if sET 
f (s) = c if s= (c, a) and c E T 
ry(C6) if s= (c, a), c V T, and c E C6 
Suppose 81, 82 E S. Define an ordering <, on S by sl <, 82 iff: 
1. Si E T or 82 E T and f (al) <t f (s2); or 
2. si = (ci, ai) and s2 = (c2, a2) and: 
either there are distinct clusters C1 and C2 such that cl E Ci, C2 E Cs and 
'Y(C1) <t 1(C2), 
or there is a cluster C6 such that c1, c2 E C6 and a1 <A a2, 
4Strictly speaking we can't yet say that our crossproducts C6 are `in place' as we have not yet 
defined the ordering on S; and for the same reason we can't yet see why the Ca are `flat'. Both 
matters will shortly be attended to. 
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or there is a cluster C6 such that c1, c2 E Cb, and al = a2, and cl <a c2. 
Lemma 5.2.1 S is a SPOed frame. 
Proof: 
Case by case examination. 
Lemma 5.2.2 f is a p-morphism from S onto T. 
Proof: 
0 
f is clearly surjective. To check that f forward preserves <, suppose that 81, 82 E S 
and sl <, 82; we need to show that f (si) <t f (s2). If either sl E T or 2 E T this is 
immediate, so suppose sl = (cl, al) and 2 = (c2, a2). If sl and 2 belong to distinct 
crossproducts Cl and C2 then as sl <, 2 we have -y(Cj) <t 'y(C2). But f (si) E Cl and 
f (82) E C2, and as <t is an equivalence relation on any cluster we have: 
f (sl) <t 'y(C1) <t 'y(C2) <t A82) 
and hence f (si) <t f (s2) by the transitivity of <t. On the other hand if both sl and s2 
belong to the same crossproduct Ca then f (sl) and f (s2) are both in the same cluster 
Cs and hence f (si) <t f (s2). 
Now we must check that f partially backwards preserves <t. Assume S102 E S and 
f (sl) <t f (s2); we need to show that there is an sg E S such that f (ss) = f (s2) and 
81 <, 83. Now if either sl or 82 E T then by the first defining clause for < sl <, 2 and 
so the choice sg = 2 suffices. So suppose neither sl, nor 2 are in T; that is, sl = (cl, al) 
and 2 = (c2, a2). There are two subcases to consider. 
Firstly suppose cl E Cl and c E C2 where Cl and C2 are distinct clusters. Then as 
f (sl) E C1, f (32) E C2, and f (si) <t f (s2) we have, because of the equivalence property 
of clusters, that: 
-Y(CI) <t f (sl) <t f (s2) <t 7'(C'2) 
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and thus ry(C1) <t 1(C2) by <t transitivity - but this guarantees that sl <, 82 and so 
again we choose ss = s2. 
Secondly suppose there is is a cluster C6 such that c1, c2 E C. As a is a STO it is 
trichotomous. If al < a2 choose 83 = 82. If al = a2 or a2 <A al then choose an as E A 
such that al <A as; such an as exists as a has no last element. Let ss = (c2i as). This 
choice gives sl <, ss and f (sl) = f (as) as required. 
The other part of the backwards clause for (temporal) p-morphisms - that if f (sl) <t 
f (82) then there is an ss such that f (ss) = f (sl) and ss <, 82 - is established analo- 
gously; note that in the last part we will appeal to the fact that a has no first element. 
So T is a p-morphic image of S under f . 0 
We now have everything we need to establish our completeness theorem: 
Theorem 5.2.1 I4 is strongly complete with respect to the class of SPO frames. 
Proof: 
Doubly generate the Henkin model (T, Vt) for an I4-consistent set of sentences E in 
the usual way, and heavily bulldoze T, embedding each cluster identically into itself, and 
choosing (say) Z for a. This creates the SPOed frame S. Let f be the p-morphism from 
S to T described above. Define a function V, : ATOM1 --i Pow(S) by s E V,(a) if 
f (s) E Vt (a) for all atoms a. It is easy to see that V. is a valuation - all we need to check 
is that all the nominals are assigned singletons. But the Irreflexivity Lemma tells us that 
every point t of T containing a nominal is irrefiexive and hence in no cluster, and thus no 
such point is bulldozed. (Intuitively, the bulldozing process does not duplicate nominals.) 
More precisely, this means that if t contains a nominal then f -1(t) is a singleton subset 
of S, as inspection of the definition of f shows. Hence V, is a valuation; and clearly 
(T, Vt) and (S, V,) are p-morphic models and thus equivalent. Hence E is verified on an 
SPO model and we have our strong completeness result. 0 
Note that once again a classic sharpening result has been lost for languages with 
nominals: the above completeness proof works for any language of NTL and thus shows 
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that for purely Priorean languages not only is Kt4 complete with respect to the transitive 
frames, but with respect to the SPOs also. Clearly the analogous sharpening for languages 
with nominals is lost: Kt4 is not complete with respect to the SPOs as (by soundness) 
no instance of I is provable. 
The SPOs are the most geometrically interesting class of frames we have axiomatised 
so far, and this is reflected in the theorems of R. Firstly note that all SPO'S are an- 
tisymmetric, so we expect every instance of n - G(Fn --4n) to be I4-provable as any 
instance defines antisymmetry. By completeness such I4-proofs exist; here is one: 
1. -,G(Fi -' i) Assumption 
2. F-'(Fi-i) 1 1 
3. F(Fi A -+i) 2; PC 1 
4. FFi 3; TL 1 
5. FFi -' Fi 4 1 
6. Fi 4,5; MP 1 
7. Fi -+ -,i I contraposed 1 
8. -ii 6,7; MP 1 
9. -iG(Fi - i) - -,i 1, 8; Discharge 
10. i - G(Fi -+ i) 9, Contraposition 
(Note that the annotation on line 5 of the above proof means that it is an instance 
of schema 4, not that it was obtained from line 4 of the proof.) The proof that I-74 i - 
H(Pi -+ i) is obtained analogously. s 
51n giving a syntactic proof of this mirror image formula we need to use the fact that I-r4 
PPi - Pi. By the above completeness theorem such a proof exists, but finding one is tricky. 
Proofs can be found in [5, page 178], or [63, page 26]. 
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SPOs are also asymmetric, thus we expect all instances of n -' -,FFn to be theorems. 
This is easy: 
1. i Assumption 
2. i -' -,Fi I 1 
3. -iFi 1, 2; MP 1 
4. --'Fi -' -,FFi 4 Contraposed 1 
5. -iFFi 3,4; MP 1 
6. i -' - FFi 1, 5; Discharge 
In fact we can say more than this. 
Definition 5.2.1 A frame T is said to be m-asymmetric if whenever there are m points 
of T such that t1 < < tm then t,n 14 t1. 
For any m > 1 we can define the class of rn-asymmetric frames in languages with nomi- 
nals. 1-asymmetry is just irreflexivity, defined by any instance of n -- -,Fn. 2-asymmetry 
is just asymmetry simpliciter, defined by any instance of n -' -,FFn. In general we have 
that for all m > 1 that m-asymmetry is defined by any instance of n -' -,Fmn, where 
FM (as usual) denotes a sequence of Fs of length m. Clearly any instance of n -' _Pmn 
also defines the same class. 6 
Now if T is a SPO we have that for all m > 1, T is m-asymmetric: transitivity allows 
all such rn-length paths to be collapsed to paths of length 1, giving the `no return' clause 
on pain of forming a reflexive loop. So by completeness all instances of n -' -,Fmn and 
n -+ -Pmn are theorems of R. Exhibiting syntactic proofs is easy. All instances of I are 
axioms, so the base case for an inductive construction is given. So suppose that for some 
m > 1 we have I t4-proofs of all instances of n -' _iFmn. Then it is easy to modify the 
above proof that 1-1,4 i -' -iFFi to yield a proof that 1-14 i -' -,Fm+li: simply uniformly 
6Note that for all m >_ 1, m-asymmetric frames are not definable in purely Priorean languages: 
Z is m- asymmetric for all such m, and for no m > 0 does (0, {0, 0}) have this property, and the 
familiar p-morphic collapse of the former to the latter destroys all hopes. 
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substitute -iFt'i for -iFi, and _iF"`+li for -,FFi. The new line 2 is justified by our 
inductive hypothesis, while the new line 4 is justified by noting that from FFi --; Fi we 
can obtain F'+' --> F'i by m - 1 applications of GGen and modus ponens, and hence 
we have an inductive specification of how to construct a proof of any desired instance. 
The proofs of instances of n --> -,P"n are constructed analogously, appealing to the fact 
that 1-14 PPi --; Pi. 
I4 underlies many of the logics of linear frames we later consider: here is a simple 
non-linear extension. The logic of unbounded SPOs is axiomatised by I4D. The proof 
is simply that the inclusion of the instances of D forces the doubly generated Henkin 
model to be unbounded, and unboundedness clearly is not destroyed by bulldozing - if 
anything, it is accentuated by it! 
The modal logic of the SPOs can be axiomatised by adding all instances of 
0 --+ -10(J (I) 
000 --; 00 (4) 
to the axioms of K,,,,,. Soundness is immediate, and completeness again follows by a 
bulldozing argument. The proof given above works; but note that we need not require 
our choice of a to be an order type unbounded in both directions, merely that it be right 
unbounded - thus N could be used in place of Z. This is yet another reflection of the 
fact that with modal languages we can only look forwards, never back. 
5.3 The logic of POs 
PO is the axiomatisation obtained by adding as axioms all instances of 
0-;F¢ (T) 
FFq5 -- F¢ (4) 
n --; G(Fn --; n) (Anti) 
to the axioms of K t. When working with purely Priorean languages this collapses into 
St4, the standard tense logical axiomatisation of the preorders. 
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PO is characterised by the class of POs. Soundness is obvious; completeness can be 
shown by means of a bulldozing argument as follows. Once more suppose that given 
our PO-consistent set of sentences E we have doubly generated a Henkin model (T, Vt). 
This model is guaranteed to be both reflexive and transitive due to the presence of all 
instances of 4 and T in every t E T, but antisymmetry is not assured. We do, however, 
have the following: 
Lemma 5.3.1 (Simple Cluster Lemma) Let t be any element of T containing a nom- 
inal. Then t <t t' and t' <t t implies t = t'. 
Proof: 
Suppose t contains a nominal, say i, and that both t < t' and t' < t. Then G(Fi -+ 
i)Et,andast<tt',Fi-+iEt'. But as t' < t, Fi E t' and hence i E t'. But Thas the 
unique occurrence property and thus t = t'. 0 
Now because T is reflexive, every point t E T is in a cluster; but what the previous 
lemma establishes is that no point containing a nominal is in a proper cluster. Points 
containing nominals are simple clusters. Our strategy is clear: we must lightly bulldoze 
T, and bulldoze only proper clusters. ! 
We sketch the changes that need to be made to the bulldozing construction outlined 
earlier. There are only two. Firstly, we only index all proper clusters of T. Thus in 
all the definitions involving C6, C6 and C6 in the bulldozing construction, everything is 
relativised to the proper clusters - and, in particular, only proper clusters are removed 
7The construction sketched below differs slightly from Segerberg's account of light bulldozing 
in this last mentioned detail. Even when lightly bulldozing, Segerberg bulldozes all clusters, 
including the simple ones. When dealing with standard languages this is harmless; for languages 
with nominals, on the other hand, such bulldozing would be disastrous: each nominal would 
be smeared across an infinite number of points, emphatically destroying the unique occurrence 
property. 
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from T and replaced by the Cr. Secondly, as was mentioned in the exposition of bulldoz- 
ing, when choosing a we choose a TO instead of a STO, thus ensuring the reflexivity of 
all points in the C6, and hence of all points in S. We thus guarantee that S is a partial 
order and that the f of the bulldozing definition is a surjective p-morphism from S to T. 
The proof of both points is simple; indeed, because of the relativisation of the indexing 
to proper clusters the earlier given proof that f is a p-morphism is unchanged. We refer 
to this construction as light bulldozing. V, is defined as in the previous completeness 
proof and again is a valuation, so once more we have an equivalent model of the desired 
form and thus: 
Theorem 5.3.1 PO is strongly complete with respect to the class of all partial orders. 
0 
Once again this proof shows that the obvious sharpening result is lost for languages 
with nominals: St4 is complete with respect to the POs, but St4 isn't as it fails to prove 
any instance of Anti. 
Note that to get the completeness result we didn't need to add as axioms instances 
of n -, H(Pn -+ n), so by the completeness result all such instances must be theorems. 
Finding syntactical proofs is not easy; the following one works by reducing the problem 
to a point where the Stopover Schema can be applied. 
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1. i Assumption 
2. -,H(Pi -+ i) Assumption 1 
3. P(Pi A -'i) 2; TL 1,2 
4. i-4HFi TL4 1,2 
5. HFi 1, 4; MP 1,2 
6. HFi A P(Pi A -,i) 3,5; PC 1,2 
7. P(FiA(Pin-i)) 6; Inst 1,2 
8. P(Pi A (-'i A Fi)) 7; PC 1,2 
9. iAP(PiA(-'iAFi)--F((-,iAFi)AF:) Stopover Schema 1,2 
10. F((-,i A Fi) A Fi) 1, 8, 9; MP 1,2 
11. F(Fi A -4) 10; PC 1,2 
12. G(Fi -+ i) Anti Instance, MP 1, 2 
13. F((Fi -+ i) A (Fi A -'i)) 11,12; Inst 112 
14. F(i A -'i) 13; PC 1,2 
15. 1 14; TL 1,2 
16. i-+ H(Pi--i) 15, 2,1 Discharge twice 
The modal logic of POs is axiomatised by Snm4Anti, consisting of all instances of 
0 00 (T) 
000--+00 (4) 
n -' 0 (On -, n) (Anti) 
added as axioms to Knm. Again a light bulldozing argument gives the strong complete- 
ness result, and as usual for modal languages we can simplify the bulldozing process by 
choosing merely right unbounded order types for a. 
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5.4 Logics of linear frames 
In this section we examine the logics of linear frames - that is, the logics of STOs and 
TOs. These logics are particularly natural ones: most importantly, we don't need to use 
a double generation process when proving completeness - the first generation step gives 
every nominal a home. Moreover, these frames drive an interesting wedge between modal 
and tensed languages. As we shall see, tensed languages are better than their modal 
counterparts at controlling nominals on linear structures. Finally, finite axiomatisations 
of these frames are possible: NOMfy or SWEEPW style schemas are no longer needed. 
We begin by considering the cumulative effect of the following four schemas on Henkin 
frames: 
FF4 --3 F4 (4) 
F4 A Fib --3 (F(4 A Ftb) V F(4 A 0) V F(tb A F4)) (RLin) 
PO A Phi --3 (P(O A PO) V P(O n 0) V P(O A PO)) (LLin) 
n V Fn V Pn (Tr) 
4 imposes transitivity. Each of the Lin schemas defines local linearity in the appropri- 
ate direction, and moreover their inclusion as axioms imposes local linearity on Henkin 
frames. 8 Now, it is clear that any point generated subframe of a transitive and locally 
linear frame is trichotomous, but this means that any axiomatisation which has both 4 
and the Lin schemas is bound to have a Henkin frame whose point generated subframes 
are trichotomous. Hence if we include all instances of these three schemas as axioms, the 
first stage of our typical completeness proof generations will almost yield the straight 
lines we are looking for. In general, of course, we'll get `quasi lines' instead of lines, as 
the structures we generate may contain clusters; but we know how to get rid of these 
$A simple argument shows that given three Henkin frame points h1ih2 and h3 such that 
h1 <h h2 and h1 <h h3, RLin guarantees that either h1 <h h2 <h h3 or h1 <h h3 <h h2. LLin 
works analogously leftwards. Proofs can be found in [16, page 103], and [63, pages 76-77]. 
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and this choice of axioms clearly takes us some way towards the completeness theorems 
we want. 
Double generation, however, would ruin everything. If we're forced to generate a 
second subframe to get the `nominal bookkeeping' right, we lose trichotomy and the 
theorems we're looking for. This is where Tr comes in. Including its instances as axioms 
obviates the need to double generate. To see this first note that the troublesome sets 
of sentences {-,Ei : E is an existential tense } are no longer consistent - they bluntly 
negate the new axioms, and we can no longer `drive out' nominals. More directly, because 
one of n or Pn or Fn is in every MCS, every nominal occurs in exactly one MCS in each 
point generated subframe of the Henkin frame. Tr `drives in' nominals. Note that this 
happens with any axiomatisation containing Tr, even K,tTr; it does not depend on 
anything said earlier about 4 or the Lin schemas. Also note that although any of its 
instances defines trichotomy, the Tr schema does not impose trichotomy on the Henkin 
frame. The problem is the usual one: points of the Henkin frame not containing any 
nominal cannot be guaranteed to be 'trichotomously placed'. We will need the Lin 
schemas. 
In short, the combination of 4, LLin, RLin and Tr gives us the basic Henkin frames 
we need to handle linearity: the first three schemas take care of the relational structure, 
while the last regulates the nominals and renders double generation unnecessary. Thus 
the completeness results we want are at hand. We begin with the STOs. Let LIN, be 
the axiomatisation obtained by adding all instances of LLin, RLin and Tr to R. 
Theorem 5.4.1 LIN, is strongly complete with respect to the class of STOs. 
Proof: 
Given a consistent set of sentences E, singly generate a verifying model. This is a 
model because, as all instances of Tr are axioms, the natural mapping on this frame is 
already an NTL valuation. Further, because of the instances of 4, LLin and RLin, the 
frame so generated will be transitive and trichotomous. The only thing that could go 
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wrong is that it's not irreflexive, but we can fix this by heavy bulldozing. We thus have 
verified our original set of sentences E on a STO and are through. 
Another useful result can be obtained by adding all instances of D to LIN giving 
the axiomatisation LIN,D. As D forces unboundedness on the Henkin frame, and as 
unboundedness is not affected by bulldozing the following result is clear: 
Theorem 5.4.2 LIN,D is strongly complete with respect to the class of all unbounded 
STOs. 
We can also axiomatise the reflexive analogs of the STOs, the TOs. Let LIN be the 
axiomatisation obtained by adding all instances of Llin, RLin and Tr to PO. 
Theorem 5.4.3 LIN is strongly complete with respect to the Tos. 
Proof: 
Singly generate a model. This will be a trichotomous preorder by previous reasoning, 
and any proper clusters can be eliminated by light bulldozing. 
Let's now consider the nominal modal logics of linear frames. As we shall see, these 
are a little peculiar. As a way into the problem, let's temporarily remain with tensed 
languages and consider what would happen if we dropped Tr from the three axioma- 
tisations above. Clearly, because we're no longer driving nominals in to every point 
generated subframe, a double generation argument would be required to give each nomi- 
nal a home. Thus these weakened axiomatisations give us `local' versions of the previous 
completeness theorems. That is, they axiomatise the classes of all locally SToed frames, 
unbounded locally SToed frames, and locally Toed frames, respectively. Moreover, it is 
clear by soundness that these weakened axiomatisations really are weaker - none of 
them has Tr as a theorem. Now consider what happens with modal languages. 
Let 14.3 be the nominal modal axiomatisation obtained by adding all (modal) in- 
stances of the schemas I, 4, and RLin to K,,,.; I4.3D be 14.3 augmented by all instances 
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of QT (modal D); and S4.3 be the axiomatisation obtained by adjoining all (modal) in- 
stances of of Anti, 4 and T to K1if11. These axiomatisations are clearly the modal analogs 
of the weakened tense axiomatisations just considered: so far they contain no modal 
analog of Tr. Double generation arguments show that these axiomatisations capture the 
nominal modal logics of the obvious classes of frames. For example, 14.3 is strongly 
complete with respect to the class of all transitive, irreflexive and right locally linear 
frames. 
The fun starts when we try to add a modal analog of Tr to capture the logics of STOs, 
unbounded STOs and TOs respectively. There simply doesn't appear to be anything 
more to say about these more restricted classes. Because we can't `look back' in modal 
languages we clearly run the risk of `leaving our nominals behind', or `losing track of 
them'. In short, restricting ourselves to these classes doesn't seem to introduce any new 
validities and it seems reasonable to suppose that we can do in the modal case what 
couldn't be done in the tensed case: obtain a sharpening result by showing that 14.3, 
I4.3D and S4.3, respectively, already suffice. 
This can be shown and the proof is simple. In each case singly generate a weak model. 
As we have no `driving in' schema we need to find a home for any unassigned nominals, 
but we don't do this by means of a second generation. Instead we adjoin a new point t- 
that precedes all the points in our generated frame but is not itself preceded by any of 
them. (We stipulate that t- < t- or tr t- depending on whether we want a reflexive 
or irreflexive model.) All unassigned nominals are assigned {t-}. Clearly this model is 
transitive and trichotomous and verifies our original set of sentences. Bulldozing then 
gives us the precise sort of model required. 
Generalising slightly yields the following. Let M (TranTr) be the class of all transitive 
and trichotomous models, and M (TranRLL) be the class of all transitive and right locally 
linear models. Then for any NML wff 0 we have that M (TranTr) 0 if M(TranRLL) 
0. The right to left direction is immediate, and the reverse direction is similar to the 
proof above. That is, given some M E M (TranRLL) that falsifies 0 at t, make a second 
model M' by taking the subframe of M modally generated by t and adjoin a new point t- 
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that precedes all these points. Construct the new valuation in the obvious way, assigning 
t- to any nominals which don't denote points in gen(t) in the old valuation. Clearly 
M' also falsifies 0 at t, and by construction M' E M(TranTr). Note that any relational 
condition enjoyed by subclasses of M(TranRLL) that survives this `modally generate 
and add a point at negative infinity' process yields completeness results of the sort noted 
above: irreflexivity, unboundedness and reflexivity are merely three examples. Modal 
languages won't be discussed further in this thesis. 
Finite axiomatisations of at least the more obvious nominal tense logics of linear 
frames are possible. Define Ot4' to be P4' V 0 V F4', and to to be Ho A 0 A Go. On 
linear frames Ot is a `somewhere' operator, and t an `everywhere' operator - they are 
S5 possibility and necessity operators. Note that any instance of the Tr schema can be 
rendered as Oti - Tr says that any nominal must occur somewhere, which is precisely 
what modal languages couldn't say. Now define two new schemas: 
n A Ot(n A 0) -' 0 (NOM< ) 
n A 0 -+ t(n - 0) (SWEEPD,) 
It is easy to see that the inclusion of either schema in place of NOMw suffices to force 
unique occurrence on linear Henkin frames: we don't need all the path equations on 
linear frames because easy routes between points always exist. In turn, this means that 
by using axioms and a rule of substitution a finite axiomatisation can be given. The 
required rule is that of NTL substitution. We say that a wff tP is obtained from a wff 0 
by NTL substitution if t is the result of substituting arbitrary NTL wffs 0 for variables 
in 0, and uniformly substituting nominals for nominals in 0. 
The way these defined S5 operators successfully replace the usual existential and 
universal tenses suggests that it might be a good idea to introduce into our languages 
primitive S5 `everywhere' and `somewhere' operators defined on arbitrary frames. This 
will be done in the following chapter. 
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5.5 Decidability and the finite model property 
139 
The logics we have considered so far are decidable. This is not particularly surprising: 
what is interesting is that in spite of an apparent obstacle, filtration methods can be 
used to prove this. The required adaptation brings to the fore a theme that will become 
increasingly prominent in the remainder of this thesis: the importance of classes of 
models, rather than classes of frames, when working with sorted intensional languages. 
In standard tense languages filtrations provide a reasonably general method for es- 
tablishing decidability. A typical proof runs as follows. Given an axiomatisation KKS 
which we know to be (say, strongly) complete with respect to some class of frames T, 
we attempt to show that it is also (weakly) characterised by the class of all finite frames 
in T. In many important cases this can easily be proved using filtrations - as was 
mentioned in Chapter 2, unboundedness, trichotomy and reflexivity are inherited by all 
filtration; taking Priorean filtrations ensures transitivity; and the whole point of working 
with filtrations is that filtrating through a finite set of sentences yields a model based on 
a finite frame - and when it can be shown we say that KtS has the finite frame property 
with respect to T. Given that the theorems of KtS form an re set - and in most cases 
of interest they will - this establishes decidability. For, if the finite frames in T form an 
re set - and again, in almost all cases of interest they will - searching through all the 
finite models based on these frames is an effective (if inefficient) procedure for generating 
all the non-theorems of KtS, and thus the theorems of KtS form a recursive set. 
The apparent impediment to the application of filtration methods for this purpose in 
NTL is illustrated by the axiomatisation I4D. Any class of frames on which all its axioms 
are valid must consist solely of unbounded SPOs, hence no finite frame can validate its 
axioms and I4D does not have the finite frame property. Thus the way appears blocked 
- but there is an interesting loophole. Although I4D does not have the finite frame 
property it does have the finite model property. That is, it is possible to define a class 
of models M such that I-14D 0 if M = 0, for all M E M. The class of models needed 
will shortly be described, for now merely note that the loophole we are exploiting does 
Chapter 5. Extensions of Kt 140 
not exist in standard languages: a well known theorem of Segerberg's states that if L 
is any classical modal logic, then L has the finite model property if L has the finite 
frame property [98, page 33]. Thus Segerberg's theorem does not hold in NTL as I4D is 
a counterexample. 
The following arguments take this general form: certain classes of models are defined, 
and (weak) completeness results are proved for the axiomatisations we have already 
considered with respect to these new classes. ® What are these classes of models? 
Simply the most obvious class of models to which the Henkin models produced by our 
double generation process belong! That is, we abstract the required classes of models 
from the information we have about the global structure of our Henkin models, together 
with the local information we have as encapsulated in the Irreflexivity or the Simple 
Cluster Lemmas. Thus the weak completeness theorems for these classes of models have 
in effect already been proved by our double generation arguments, and the important 
step is to transfer these results to the finite case by means of filtration. This proves 
straightforward. Because of the `additive inheritance' by filtrations of the more obvious 
relational properties, the real work takes place in our two base logics 74 and PO. We 
begin with R. 
Call T = (T, <) an irreflezivity containing frame if there is a t E T such that 
t 14 t. Call a valuation V on such a frame T irreflexivity respecting if t E V(i) is 
irreflexive for all nominals i. That is, irreflexivity respecting valuations are valuations on 
frames containing irreflexive points that send all nominals to irreflexive points. We call 
M = (T, V) an Il model if T is an irreflexivity containing frame and V an irreflexivity 
respecting valuation on T. The class of all Il models is called M(Ij). 
9 We could prove strong completeness results with respect to these classes of models - indeed, 
as will soon become apparent, in effect we have already done so - but won't bother here. The 
real interest lies not with these rather trivial results, but in their sharpenings to the finite case 
by means of filtration, and in these sharpenings only weak characterisations are possible. 
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Lemma 5.5.1 I4 is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive Il 
models. That is, I-14 ¢ ifM 1 ¢, for all M E M(I,) n M(Tran). 
Proof: 
(Soundness). The only axiom schemas that require checking are 4 and I, the others 
being universally valid. As the models M we are considering are transitive, any instance 
of 4 is true in all such M; and as all nominals denote irreflexive points in M, all instances 
of I are true in these M. All three rules of inference preserve truth in a model, and so 
14 is sound with respect to M(I1) n M(Tran). 
(Completeness). This is shown by the first part of the completeness proof for 14 given 
above - the stage preceding bulldozing. Given any I4-consistent sentence ¢, the double 
generation process yields a transitive Henkin model verifying ¢ at some point; moreover 
the Irreflexivity Lemma shows that every point containing a nominal is irreflexive, and 
thus this Henkin model is in M (I,) n M (T ran) . 0 
The important thing about this result is that it can be sharpened in the following 
fashion: we don't need all the models in M (II) n M (T ran) to establish completeness - 
simply the finite ones will do. 
Theorem 5.5.1 Lj has the finite model property with respect to M (Ii) n M (T ran) . That 
is: 
f-14 0 i.U M I= 
for all finite M E M(I,) n M(Tran). 
Proof: 
Soundness follows from the previous lemma. The following filtration argument estab- 
lishes completeness. By the previous lemma we know that given an 14-consistent sentence 
0 we can find an M E M(I,) n M(Tran) such that M 1 ¢[t], at some point t. Now, if 0 
contains occurrences of nominals, define E" to be 
{¢} U {i --> -,Fi : i occurs in ¢}; 
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while if 0 contains no occurrences of nominals choose any nominal - say i - and define 
E- to be {0} U {i --+ -Fi}. Let E be the smallest set of wffs containing E- that is 
closed under subformulas. Form any Priorean filtration Mr of M through E such that 
for all nominals j V E, Vj(j) V1(i), for some nominal i E E. (This last point is just 
`bookkeeping': nominals j such that j ¢ E aren't important. What is important is that 
there is always at least one nominal in E. As we shall shortly see, this guarantees that 
there will be irreflexive points in the filtration.) 
By the Filtration Theorem M1 O[E(t)]. But Mr is a model in the required class: 
clearly it is finite, because E is a finite set of sentences; and it is transitive because we 
took a Priorean filtration. Moreover Mr does contain irreflexive points, and all nominals 
are assigned irreflexive points in this filtration. To see this, note that it follows from the 
definition of Priorean filtrations that: 
3¢(F¢ E E & M j ¢[t] & M K F¢[t]) implies E(t) j4r E(t). 
But for all nominals i E E - and there is always at least one - Fi E E. Further, as our 
original model was in M(11), M = i[t] means M J Fi[t], and thus for all such points t, 
E(t) j4 E(t). This means that all points in the filtration Mr denoted by nominals are 
irreflexive, and we have our result. 
Corollary 5.5.1 14 is decidable. 
Proof: 
0 
Suppose Vrs 0. By the previous theorem we can falsify 0 on a finite transitive Il 
model. This means that routine search through all such finite models will eventually 
falsify j. It is clear that a program to generate all the required frames can be written, 
and although we cannot generate all the models, for any formula 0 we only need to 
consider the possible assignments that can be made to the finite number of atoms actually 
occurring in 0. Thus the set of wffs that are not provable in 14 is an re set. But the 
set of wffs that are provable in 14 is also re - we just keep systematically pumping out 
theorem from our axioms. (Alternatively, we could use the fact that there is an upper 
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bound, for any wff 0, on the size of the models that need to searched. Failure to falsify 
0 on a model below this size means that 0 must be a theorem.) Therefore the set of wffs 
provable in 14 is recursive. 
Decidability for other extensions of I4 follow from this basic result. 10 For example, 
I4D is decidable because our double generation argument establishes that h74 0 iff M = 
0, for all unbounded M E M(I,) fl M(Tran). As filtrations inherit unboundedness, the 
filtration described above for I4 establishes the finite model property for I4D relative to 
this class of models, and decidability follows. Similarly, a result for LIN, is obtained by 
noting that the double generation process establishes its completeness with respect to 
the class of all trichotomous M E M(I1) fl M(Tran), and as filtrations inherit trichotomy 
we again have the finite model property and decidability. 
Theorem 5.5.2 I4D, LIN, and LIN,D are all decidable. 
Thus we have a tool that works for at least some of the logics of interest above R. 
I'll now sketch how to prove analogous results for logics above PO. The concepts we 
need are essentially those given above but with talk of `simple clusters' replacing talk 
of `irreflexive points'. That is, we define notions of simple cluster containing frames, 
simple cluster respecting valuations, and SC1 models analogous to those given above, 
and denote the class of all simple cluster respecting models by M(SCI). Our double 
generation method establishes that I-po 0 if M 0, for all M E M(SC1) fl M(Pre), 
where M (Pre) is the class of all preordered models. Now for the key step: 
Theorem 5.5.3 PO has the finite model property with respect to M (SC1) n M (Pre). 
That is: 
I-po 0 iff M -- 0 
for all finite M(SC1) n M(Pre). 
"Indeed the weaker logic I must also be decidable. It has the finite model property with 
respect to M(I1). 
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Proof: 
Soundness is immediate, completeness again follows by filtration. Given a PO- 
consistent wff 0 containing occurrences of nominals, define E- to be 
{q5}U{i--> G(Fi-+i):i occurs in q5} 
and if 0 is purely Priorean define E- to be {q5} U {i --> G(Fi --> i)}, for some selected 
nominal i. Let E be the smallest set of wffs containing E- that is closed under subfor- 
mulas. 
Given a model M verifying 0, filtrate M through E to form Mf. By the Filtration 
Theorem this model also verifies 0. Now Mf is finite and transitive, and as filtrations 
inherit reflexivity automatically we have that M is a finite preorder. If it contains simple 
clusters, and if all nominals denote these, we are through. 
Now we know from Chapter 2 that any nominal in E is assigned a point E(t) in 
the filtration which is a set containing a single point t of the original model. Suppose 
that there is another point E(t') in the filtration such that E(t) <f E(t') and E(t') <f 
E(t). As M = G(Fi --> i)[t] (which it does, because in the original model both i and 
i -- G(Fi --> i) are true at t), and as G(Fi --> i) E E, Mf G(Fi --> i)[E(t)] by 
the Filtration Theorem. But as E(t) <f E(t') and G(Fi --- 0) E E, this means that 
Mf = Fi -+ i[E(t')]. But E(t') <f E(t), and as Mf i[E(t)] and Fi E E, we have 
that Mf = Fi[E(t')], which by modus ponens yields M i[E(t')]. But this means 
that E(t') = E(t), and thus all points in the filtration denoted by nominals are simple 
clusters. 
Corollary 5.5.2 PO and LIN are decidable. 
To summarise, the Henkin models we build by our double generation process embody 
important information which can be read in (at least) two ways: in terms of frames or in 
terms of models. Under the first reading our task is to realise the information in Henkin 
frames in relational terms, and we search for `structural rectification' techniques that lead 
to frame characterisation theorems. Under the second reading our task is to condense 
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the information into a smaller model, and we search for size rectification techniques, and 
finite model results. Both tasks exist in standard intensional languages of course, but in 
such languages purely structural matters tend to dominate - Segerberg's Theorem is an 
example of this. In sorted frameworks, on the other hand, constraints on the frame order 
< are simply one of two important parameters of variation; the other is the constraints 
in force on our valuations. This raises a theme that will be explored in the remainder of 
this thesis: the need to abandon the frame centred view of standard languages and pay 
more attention to models. For now I'll merely say that the results of this section show 
that we need read flexibly the information in Henkin frames. This noted, let us resume 
our examination of linear time logics. 
5.6 Special structures 
In this section we axiomatise the frames Q, R, Z and N. The four axiomatisations are 
pleasantly uniform: each arises from the corresponding standard tense logical axiomati- 
sation by adding all instances of the schemas NOMw, I and Tr. Either of the new finite 
minimal schema for linear frames could be used in place of NOMw. 
As far as proving these results is concerned, the simple nature of the extensions 
required indicates that we shouldn't have to alter the standard proofs much. In fact, 
to secure the completeness results all we really have to do is ensure that the various 
rectification techniques applied in the course of these proofs preserve unique occurrence. 
They do: the standard proofs use various permutations of heavy bulldozing, Priorean 
filtration and some (simple) new devices. As usual the Irreflexivity Lemma tells us that 
bulldozing will not be troublesome, constructing filtrations as was shown in the proof 
that I4 has the finite model property ensures that these work appropriately, and the new 
devices turn out to be unproblematic. In short, most of the work has already been done. 
The NTL logics of these frames are also decidable, though only in the case of Q will we 
be able to prove this by means of filtration arguments. The problem with Z, N and R is 
that although filtrations are used in their completeness proofs, and although in all three 
Chapter 5. Extensions of Kt 146 
cases these give rise to natural finite classes of M(I,) models - ̀dumbells', `lollypops' and 
`necklaces' respectively - the respective logics are not sound with respect to these 
classes. Nonetheless, decidability results for the other three frames follow from more 
general considerations. Briefly, we know that NTL validity corresponds to the validity 
of certain I' L2 wffs. Rabin-Gabbay arguments show that this fragment of Z and N's 
higher order theory is decidable, and more recent results by Burgess and Gurevich show 
that the same holds for R. Further details of both proofs may be found in [17]. 
In the following I sketch the strong completeness and decidability results for Q and 
then indicate, following Robert Goldblatt, how a (weak) completeness result may be 
obtained for R. Then weak completeness results for Z and N are presented, with the 
emphasis on the result for Z. As with so much else in this chapter, the account given es- 
sentially follows Segerberg's [97]. However at a number of indicated places simplifications 
introduced by Goldblatt [40, Chapter 8] have been incorporated. 
LIN,DA is the axiomatisation obtained by adding to LIN,D all instances of 
F4 -+ FF4 (A), 
the schema corresponding to density. Note that when we write out in full the schemas 
LIN,DA contains in addition to those of Kt, we find we have 4, LLin, RLin, D and A 
- the schemas that axiomatise the tense logic of Q in standard languages - and in 
addition NOMw, I and Tr. As we shall now sketch, LIN,DA does axiomatise the tense 
logic of Q in languages of NTL. 
Theorem 5.6.1 Let the class of all dense, unbounded, transitive and trichotomous mod- 
els be called M (Qw) Then: 
1. LINDA is sound and strongly complete with respect to M(I,) n M(Qw); 
2. LINDA is strongly complete with respect to the class of all unbounded dense STOed 
frames; 
S. LINDA is strongly complete with respect to the frame Q. 
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4. LINDA has the finite model property with respect to M(I,) n M(Qw); and 
5. LINDA is decidable 
Proof: 
(1). Soundness is clear. Next, given a LINDA-consistent set of sentences E, singly 
generate a verifying model M1. The occurrences of 4, LLin, RLin and D ensure its 
transitivity, trichotomy and unboundedness respectively; and it is simple matter to show 
that A guarantees its density - a proof may be found in [16, page 105]. Moreover each 
nominal occurs somewhere, and that somewhere must be irreflexive by the Irreflexivity 
Lemma, hence M1 E M(Il). All the conditions are met, and the existence of M1 yields 
strong completeness. 
(2). Heavily bulldoze M1, taking care to first embed each cluster C& of M1 in some set 
Ct that is unbounded and dense - b indexed copies of R will do. This produces a model 
M2 that also verifies E. By the reasoning of previous proofs M2 is an unbounded STO, 
and in addition it is dense. (This boils down to the observation that when bulldozing we 
took care to replace clusters by suitable dense sets.) Thus the existence of M2 establishes 
the second part. 
(3). Although `Q-like', M2 in general will be too large. However by our correspon- 
dence results M2 is also a model for the set of L1 wffs obtained by standardly translating 
all the wffs in E. Using the Downward Lowenheim Skolem Theorem for L1 establishes the 
existence of a countable dense unbounded model for these wffs, and this countable model 
is also a model for E. However there can be only one such frame (up to isomorphism) 
on which this model is based - namely Q - and we are through. 
(4). Given a LINDA consistent sentence 0 make a model M for it by the process 
described in part 1. We know that M E M(I,) n M(Qw). Form E- and E by the process 
described in the proof that I4 has the finite model property, and Prior filtrate M through 
E to form the finite model M1. This model verifies 0 and moreover has all the desired 
relational properties save possibly density. In fact in must be dense as well: Segerberg's 
Chapter 5. Extensions of K t 148 
Lemma 1.1 [97, page 307] shows that M cannot contain adjacent irreflexive points, and 
thus the existence of M1 establishes part 4. 
(5). Part 4 yields an re set of finite models on which any non-theorem can be falsified. 
0 
The use of the Lowenheim Skolem Theorem to prove part 3 can be avoided. A method 
of building the required model in stages is given by de Jongh et al in [50], and has been 
adapted to D-logic by Maarten de Rijke in [89, pages 36-38]. The method is essentially 
a sophisticated version of the Makinson technique introduced in the previous chapter. It 
is very elegant, and the only reason it has not been adopted here is because of the length 
of such a proof. 
Th(R) in standard languages can be axiomatised by adding all instances of the schema 
O t (H¢ -+ FH¢) -+ (H¢ -+ G¢) (Cont) 
to the standard axiomatisation of Q, as Goldblatt proves in [40, pages 66-69]. 11 An 
examination of Goldblatt's proof shows that LIN,DACont axiomatises the Th(R) in 
languages of NTL. Briefly, given a LIN,DACont-consistent sentence ¢ generate a model 
for it and filtrate this model to form M1 as described in part 4 above. M1 may not do 
as it stands. We want to be able to `expand' it into a copy of R - that is, we want to 
define a p-morphism from an R based model to M1. This is impossible if M1 contains 
adjacent clusters. However it is possible to interpolate new irreflexive points between 
any such cluster in a truth preserving way; this is the tricky part of the proof, and here 
use must be made of Cont. For our purposes all we need to observe is that in Goldblatt's 
construction none of these interpolated points are assigned nominals, thus the new `gap 
filled' finite model has the unique occurrence property and (by Goldblatt's p-morphism) 
11Segerberg seems to have been the first to show that Th(R) could by axiomatised by adding 
schemas to the axiomatisation of Q. For this purpose Segerberg added (F4 +-- HO) - (Qt' -- 
Ot4), together with its mirror image. The proof that this suffices may be found in [97, pages 
315-316]. 
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is equivalent to M1. This new model can be successfully expanded to an R based one 
and weak completeness follows. 
Theorem 5.6.2 LIN,DACont is weakly complete with respect to R 
Let us now axiomatise the NTL logics of the discrete structures Z and N. Because of 
the failure of compactness noted in the previous chapter we cannot hope to prove strong 
completeness theorems for these frames, but weak completeness results are forthcoming. 
Let LIN,DZ be the axiomatisation obtained by adding all instances of the schemas 
G(G¢ 0) (FG¢ GO) (Zr) 
H(H¢ - ¢) - (PH¢ --> H¢) (Zj) 
to LIN,D. These modified Lob schemas are familiar from Chapter 3, where they were 
used together with other LIN,D axioms to define Z up to isomorphism. We now give a 
reasonably detailed proof that LIN,DZ successfully captures Th(Z). The only important 
step missing is the proof of the Z-Lemma, and this may be found in [40, page 551. 12 
Theorem 5.6.3 LIN,DZ is weakly complete with respect to Z. 
Proof: 
Given a LIN,DZ-consistent sentence ¢, singly generate a verifying Henkin model 
M1. By previous reasoning M1 E M(II) and is transitive, trichotomous and unbounded. 
Define E- and E as in the proof that 74 has the finite model property, and Prior filtrate 
M through E to form M1. As M1 E M(I1), none of the cluster rectification techniques 
applied below will effect the nominals. 
M1 is a finite linear sequence consisting of some mixture of irreflexive points and 
clusters. Each cluster can only have finitely many members. Because M1 is unbounded 
12The proof of this lemma is where the Z axioms are used, hence its name. Goldblatt's Z-Lemma 
is a simplification of Segerberg's Lemma 1.6 [97, pages 309-310]. 
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and finite it must have a cluster at each end. Call the cluster at the beginning of time 
the first cluster, and the cluster at the end of time the last cluster. Note that these 
two clusters are distinct as our filtration method guarantees the existence of at least 
one irreflexive point in M1, and this must lie between the first and last cluster. Call 
any cluster that is neither the first nor the last cluster an intermediate cluster. The 
completeness proof proceeds in two stages. First we must remove all the intermediate 
clusters to create a dumbell shaped model Md. We then replace the first and last cluster 
in Md by a backward pointing and a forward pointing copy of N respectively, yielding a 
frame isomorphic to Z. Justifying both stages requires use of the Z-Lemma. 
In our terminology this lemma says that if C is a non-first (non-last) cluster in M1 
such that E(t) E C, then if Go E E (Ho E E), and M1 GO[t] (M1 HO[t]), then 
there exists a point t' in M1 such that M1 4[t'] and c <f E(t') for all c E C (E(t') <p c 
for all c E C). Note that by the Filtration Theorem this means that M1 O[E(t')]. 
This enables us to get rid of all intermediate clusters. Choose such a cluster C and 
impose an arbitrary strict total ordering on its points and then `sew in' this STO into 
the frame underlying M1 in place of C. (Or, to express matters another way, weaken 
the equivalence relation on this cluster to some strict total ordering. That is, throw 
away certain pairs (c, c') from <f nC2 including all reflexive loops (c, c) until a STO 
is obtained.) Call this new model Mf'1. We now seek to prove by induction that 
M1 is equivalent to Mf-1. This is simple save for one case: given a formula of the 
form Ho or Go that is false at some point in M1, how do we know it remains false in 
Mf-1? (The corresponding point in Mf-1 is related to fewer potential falsifiers due to 
the weakening.) The Z-Lemma provides the answer. For any formula of the form GO or 
HO in E it guarantees the existence of a point E(t') outside the weakened cluster that 
falsifies 0. This, together with the fact that both models are transitive, removes the only 
impediment to the induction and the two models are equivalent. 
Remove all the (finitely many) clusters in this fashion, and call the resulting dumbell 
shaped model Md. We now want to eliminate the first and last cluster in the manner 
previously described. Consider the last cluster. Modally bulldoze it by embedding this 
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finite cluster identically into itself and choosing N for the order a. This means that the 
right end of our new model looks like: 
C1i C2, ... , Cn, C1, C2, ... , Cn, C1, C2, ... , Cn, ... 
where the c,n (1 < m < n) are all and only the elements of the last cluster. The usual 
map f from the resulting model to Md is a modal p-morphism, thus an inductive proof 
of the equivalence of the two models will not founder on wffs of the form G¢. What 
about wffs of the form H¢? Again we use the Z-Lemma: the last cluster was not first, so 
the lemma applies for formulas of the form H¢, and thus the equivalence induction goes 
through. We then perform the `mirror image' process on the first cluster of this model, 
and the result is a verifying model for ¢ based on a frame isomorphic to Z. 0 
We now axiomatise Th(N). Let LIN8DrZrW1 be the axiomatisation obtained by 
dropping DI and Zi from LIN,DZ and adding all instances of 
H(H¢ --> 0) - HO (WI), 
the leftward Lob schema. 
Theorem 5.6.4 LIN8D,ZrW1 is weakly complete with respect to N. 
Proof: 
Similar to the previous theorem. The major change is that the inclusion of WI allows 
us to prove a `W-Lemma' which is stronger than the Z-Lemma as it allows us to weaken 
any cluster in the manner described above without affecting formulas of the form H¢. 
This means that we can eliminate the first cluster in M1, as well as all the intermediate 
ones, yielding a lollypop shaped model. We then modally bulldoze the last cluster as 
described in the previous proof and have a model based on a frame isomorphic to N. O 
The nominal tense logics of the structures (Q,<), (Z, <), (N,<) and (R,:5) can be 
axiomatised by adding all instances of the Anti and Tr schemas to the respective standard 
tense logical axiomatisations. The reader will be able to verify this by modifying either 
Segerberg's or Goldblatt's proofs. 
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5.7 The COV rule 
Gargov, Passy and Tinchev have investigated using a rule they call COV in systems 
of nominal modal logic. 13 This rule is useful because when assumed as part of an 
axiomatisation it often allows models with strong valuations to be constructed directly, 
thereby avoiding the cluster analysis methods of this chapter. 
COV can be stated as an infinitary rule of inference. It then takes the following form: 
if for all nominals i we can show L-ii, then we can deduce L I. (Here L is one of the 
necessity forms defined at the end of the last chapter.) As the authors mention, however, 
the rule is not intrinsically infinitary as the following version is equivalent: if we can 
deduce L-ii for any nominal i not occurring in L, we can deduce L I . The rule is sound 
in any model enjoying a strong valuation. Note that the use of COV does not result in 
new theorems in our axiomatisations (at least for languages with a non-finite number of 
nominals) by the equivalence between strong and ordinary validity proved in Chapter 2; 
rather, COV encapsulates something about reasoning in a strong model. 
In [34] the minimal completeness theorem for nominal modal logic is proved with 
the aid of COV. The proof proceed in two stages. Firstly, following [39, page 73 - 
76], a maximal theory is built, and following this certain points are equivalenced. This 
builds a model, but does rather more: because of the COV rule it is possible to show 
that the valuation is strong. In the later paper [35], the authors mention two extended 
completeness results which can be proved with its aid: they can axiomatise the nominal 
modal logics of the STOs and Q, and doubtless a wide variety of other logics too. However 
13The rule was first introduced in [34] and used there to axiomatise the minimal nominal modal 
logic. Extended completeness results are not treated there, but are mentioned in the recent [35]. 
The newer paper also extends the use of the rule to incorporate the shifter operator discussed in 
the following chapter, and goes on to discuss hierarchies of COV rules for this system, but these 
developments cannot be considered here. 
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the use of the rule does not always guarantee that a strong model will be formed; the 
later paper gives a counterexample involving N. 
I have not yet tried proving tense logical completeness results using a tense logical 
analog of COV. For the sake of discussion I'll assume that the natural analog will yield 
simpler completeness results for many of the classes of frames considered in this chapter. 
What import does this have have for the completeness results above? Basically, viewed 
from the COV perspective, they amount to proofs that on certain classes of frames the 
use of this rule is eliminable. (At present, even in NML, there don't seem to be any 
general results stating when the use of the rule can be dispensed with.) There are 
good reasons for believing that COV will prove useful, nonetheless in general I think 
it is desirable to try and form as simple a deductive base as possible. Thus, even if 
easier completeness proofs become available using the new rule, the above results retain 
independent interest. Note that the decidability results proved above transfer to nominal 
modal logics using COV. For the systems given above, these results seem to be new. (In 
the later paper there is only a brief comment to the effect that if a purely nominal modal 
logic is decidable, its minimal extension - that is, the logic obtained by straightforwardly 
extending to the new language - must be also [35, page 211. Of course this is true; but 
the more interesting results lie with the failure of Segerberg's Theorem and non-minimal 
extensions.) 
The COV rule is a beautiful idea, and it may prove very valuable in more complex 
systems. At present I'm investigating using it in interval based logics. As we shall see 
in the final chapter, cluster analysis methods become complex in the richer intervallic 
setting, and the COV rule may be a useful addition to these investigations. 
Chapter 6 
Interval Nominals, the Shifter, and 
Sorting Generalised 
In this chapter we turn from our examination of nominals to wider issues. First we intro- 
duce a new sort, interval nominals, which are name for intervals in the same fashion that 
nominals are names for points. Following this we add a new operator to our languages, 
the shifter, which allows us to exploit the referential abilities of nominals and interval 
nominals more directly. The resulting languages - tensed languages with nominals, 
interval nominals, and the shifter - are called fully referential tensed languages , or 
languages of TREF, and form the basis for the applications in natural language semantics 
investigated in the next chapter. In the final section we consider the idea of sorting in 
more generality, and examine some of the questions raised by such general systems. 
6.1 Interval nominals 
Interval nominals are a sort whose interpretation is constrained to be true at precisely 
the points in some unbroken stretch of time, or interval. Just as nominals can be thought 
of as names for instants, interval nominals can be thought of as names for intervals. The 
ability to refer to intervals will prove useful in the following chapter when we consider 
applications in natural language semantics. Briefly, natural language contains a variety 
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of mechanisms for referring to such stretches of time and insisting that some item of 
information is associated with it. For example, we can use indexical adverbials and say 
such things as `Yesterday Harold gave up fishing', or a proper name as in `On Saturday 
John went fishing'. The inclusion of names for intervals in our object languages is a 
preliminary step towards an analysis of the above type of example. 
But although in a clear sense we will now be `doing interval logic', and are working 
towards `doing interval semantics', the way in which we will do these things differs fun- 
damentally from the norm that has become established over the past twelve or so years. 
During this time there has been considerable interest in the formal semantics community 
in constructing interval based semantics for natural languages. 1 Over the same period 
a number of logicians became interested in developing interval based tense logics. 2 But 
what could be meant by `interval tense logic'? What these authors have in common 
is that they understand by this phrase a radical change to the Kripke style intensional 
truth definition: tensed languages are no longer evaluated at points but rather at inter- 
vals of time. This move gives rise to all sorts of (interesting) problems of interpretation; 
see [16, pages 126-1271 for a discussion of these issues. For example Humberstone [48] 
in one of the earliest papers in this tradition has suggested that this shift calls for a 
reinterpretation of the logical constants; he suggests an 'intuitionistic' negation. The 
seemingly innocuous change to intervallic evaluation thus has profound consequences, 
and Burgess' comment that "the whole problem of interpretation for period-based tense 
logic deserves more careful thought" [16, page 127] seems a fair one. Indeed a number of 
authors, notably Antony Galton [28] [29], and Pavel Tichy [106], have heavily criticised 
the whole interval based approach. 
'Pioneering work in this tradition was done by David Dowty [25], and M.J. Cresswell [22]; for 
more recent work which combines these ideas with those of Discourse Representation Theory, see 
Partee's [75]. 
2Early contributors include Humberstone [48] and Roper [92]. Some later results may be found 
in Burgess' [15], and a full survey is provided in [5]. 
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My own view - at least as far as logical issues are concerned - is that interval 
based languages are too interesting to ignore, and in the final chapter of this thesis some 
preliminary results concerning interval based systems with referential sorts are presented. 
However as far as applications of interval based languages are concerned, matters are not 
so clear to me. I certainly believe that ordinary interval based systems, which don't allow 
reference to intervals, are inadequate for such applications for precisely the same reason 
that standard (non-referential) Priorean languages are. 
With this motivation, to work. s By a language of interval nominal logic C is meant 
the selection of two (countably infinite) disjoint sets of symbols, VAR (whose members are 
typically represented by p, q, r,...), and INOM (whose members are typically represented 
by e, d, c,,. .. . ). The members of INOM are called interval nominal, and as usual the 
members of VAR are called variables. Wffs are formed in the normal fashion by boolean 
combination and application of tense operators. In short, as with NTL, the only syntactic 
change is that we have a second atomic sort. We take the usual syntactic definitions as 
read and turn to semantics. Unlike languages of NTL, these languages are only interpreted 
on frames that contain intervals; sets of points that `look like an interval of time'. What 
do we mean by this? The decision that has been adopted here is that these are sets which 
both form an unbroken flow, and lie in a straight line. More precisely, we are interested 
in (non-empty) subsets which are both convex and trichotomous. 
Let T = (T, <) be any frame. By Conv(T) is meant the set of all non-empty convex 
subsets of T, that is: 
Conv(T)=IS CT:Vsls2ESVtET(sl<t<ss=tES) andS O}, 
and by Tr(T), the set of all non-empty trichotomous subsets of T, that is: 
Tr(T) = IS C T : Vs1s2 E S(sl < as or sl = 82 or 82 < sl) and S O}. 
31n general in this chapter the presentation will be swifter than in previous work, and usually 
definitions will be less formal. The more precise definitions given for NTL in earlier chapters are 
intended as a guide for the work given here. 
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By Int(T), the intervals of T, is meant Conv(T) fl Tr(T). 
The first thing to note is that not all frames contain intervals. For example, let Bu, 
(B, <) be the binary branching tree of depth w. Note that B,, is intransitive, irreflexive, 
asymmetric and unique up to isomorphism. Let SC(BW) be the symmetric closure of this 
frame. There are no intervals on SC(B,,):there is only one convex subset on SC(B.) - namely B itself - and this is not trichotomous, hence Int(SC(B,,)) = 0. This 
example also shows that singleton subsets of a frame need not be intervals. Nonetheless 
there is a rich class of frames that do contain intervals. Note that any antisymmetric 
or asymmetric frame T contains intervals, since any singleton subset {t} satisfies both 
requirements. Moreover, on such classes as the SPOs and Pos not only do intervals exist, 
but they have a number of pleasant global properties, as will be noted presently. 
Let I be the class of frames T such that Int(T) ,t 0. We interpret languages with 
interval nominals on frames in 1, and the constraint we impose on functions V from 
the atoms of our language to Pow(T) (where T E I) if they are to be valuations is 
that V (e) E Int(T), for all interval nominals e. We call such a function an interval 
nominal valuation, or simply an interval valuation. This atomic level constraint is the 
only change we make; all higher level definitions such as truth in a model and validity 
are as for languages of NTL. It is useful to have the notion of a weak interval valuation. 
For languages of nominal interval logic this means a function V that either is a valuation, 
or only fails to be one because it assigns 0 to some of the interval nominals. Note that 
weak interval valuations make sense on the class of all frames U. 
The model theory of interval nominals is rich and complex. We begin by giving some 
examples of newly definable classes of frames. 
Firstly, e defines the class of frames T such that for all T E T, T is trichotomous 
and conv(T) = {T}. For suppose T is such a frame. Then any valuation V must assign 
T to e, and thus e is true everywhere in any valuation. Conversely suppose that T is 
not in this class. If T is not trichotomous there are points t, t' E T such that t ,4 t', 
t -A t' and t' A t, and clearly in any valuation V we cannot that have both t and t' are 
in V (e). Thus in any valuation either V (e, t) = -1 or V (e, t') = -1. So suppose T is 
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trichotomous and that there is an S C T such that S is convex and S # T. Note that 
as T is trichotomous, S must be also, and thus S is an interval. Let V be any valuation 
such that V (e) = S. By assumption there exists a t E T\S, hence V (e, t) -1 and we 
are through. This class of frames is not definable in a purely Priorean language: any 
element of this class is a connected frame, thus the class is not closed under the formation 
of disjoint unions. Conversely, the definability of this class using interval nominals shows 
that the disjoint union result fails for languages with interval nominals. In passing note 
that in languages with weak interval nominals ew , d., cd, ...; the wff -'e,,, defines the class 
of all frames without intervals. 
Fe defines the class of frames T such that for all S E Int(T), t E T implies there 
exists an s E S such that t < s. That Fe is valid on all such frames is clear. Conversely, 
if T is not in this class then there exists an S E Int(T) and t E T such that for all 8 E I, 
t 14 s. Any valuation V which assigns S to e falsifies Fe at t. Again this class is not 
definable in purely Priorean languages because each frame in this class is connected. 
The next example is rather more interesting. First some notation. Let Tri(y, z) be 
the Lo predicate (y < z V y = z V z < y). Then on transitive frames containing intervals, 
e -+ F- e defines the condition ` x yz(x < y A x < z A -Tri(y, z)). 
To see this first suppose that T is a transitive frame satisfying the above condition. 
Let V be any valuation on T, t E T and suppose (T, V) = e[t]. By assumption there 
are tl and t2 such that t < tl and t < t2 and -rTri(tl, t2). It is impossible that both 
tl and t2 E V (e), for this would mean V (e) was not trichotomous and that V was be a 
valuation; thus V = F-,e[t]. 
For the reverse direction, suppose that T is transitive and does not satisfy the given 
condition. That is, 3zVyz(x < y A x < z -+ Tri(y,z)). Let S. = {x} U {t E T : x < t}. 
Trivially S. is trichotomous. It also must be convex, for suppose there was an w E T 
such that for some s,s'ES.,s<w<s'butwig S.. Now if s = x, then we have x < w 
and w ig Ss, a contradiction. On the other hand, if s # x then as s E V (e) we have 
x < s, and as T is transitive and s < w we have x < w; as wig S., this yields another 
contradiction. So there can be no such w and S. is convex and hence an interval. Let 
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V be any valuation such that V (e) = Ss. Any such valuation falsifies e -+ F-ie at x, 
establishing the result. 
Purely Priorean languages cannot define this class on the transitive frames. Let B. be 
the uniformly branching binary tree of depth w, and let TC(B,,,) be its transitive closure. 
Then the function f : T (B,,,) -+ N that assigns every node its depth is a p-morphism. 
Hence no purely Priorean wff can define the above condition on transitive frames, for 
if such a 0 existed it would have to be valid on TC(B,,,), and f would then force 0 to be 
valid on N as well. 
An example of an Lo condition not definable in a purely Priorean language, but 
definable with interval nominals, is Vt3t'(t < t' A t' < t). This can be defined by e y Fe; 
the example is van Benthem's. Firstly suppose that T is a frame satisfying the condition, 
and suppose that V (e, t) = 1. By assumption there is a t' E T such that t < t' and 
t' < t, and as V (e) must be convex, t' E V (e). But this means that V (Fe, t) = 1. 
Conversely suppose that T does not satisfy the condition; thus there is a t E T that is 
not symmetrically related to any point t' E T. (In particular, t 54 t.) But this means 
that {t} is an interval, and any valuation V which assigns {t} to e refutes e -+ Fe at t. 
These examples should convince the reader that interval nominals are model theo- 
retically complex. How are they to be modeled in classical languages? The fundamental 
correspondence is this: interval nominal validity corresponds to the validity of certain L2 
wffs. Let's first impose a little more order on Ls. Divide its predicate variables into two 
disjoint countably infinite sets. One set, whose elements are written P1, P2, P3, ...; cor- 
responds to the propositional variables in the usual fashion, while the other set, whose 
elements we write as Ei, E2, E3, ...; corresponds to the interval nominals. In order to 
allow the second set of predicate variables {E,, : m E N} to capture the effect of interval 
nominals we first define for each predicate variable E in this set a second order predicate 
I(E) by: 
btit2(Eti A Et2 -+ Tri(ti,ty)) A btist2(Eti A Et2 A t1 < s < t2 -+ Es) 
We then extend the standard translation to languages with interval nominals by adding 
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the new atomic clause: 
ST(e) = Eto. 
We then have: 
T = ¢ if VP1...VP nVE1...VEVto(I(El) A ... A I(En) + ST(cb)), 
and thus the validity of an arbitrary wff ¢ of a language with interval nominals corre- 
sponds to the validity of certain lIi wffs of L2. 
What preservation results do we have? Clearly validity is preserved under the for- 
mation of generated subframes. As with languages of NTL we need to be a little careful 
when formulating the notion of a generated submodel - once more we need the notion 
of a valuation being in a generated subframe - but this is straightforward. 
As we have already noted, the disjoint union result fails, but we can say more than 
this. Recall that in Chapter 3 we gave a necessary and sufficient condition for an NTL 
formula to have its validity preserved under the formation of disjoint unions. We showed 
that the validity of an NTL formula ¢ is so preserved if ¢l is valid in all component 
frames making up the disjoint union, where ¢l is the result of conjoining all possible 
substitutions of I for nominals in ¢. Reflection shows that that this result has little 
to do with with nominals as `names for points of time', but rather reflects two general 
facts about the constraint on NTL valuations. Firstly, nominals are required to be true 
somewhere in every valuation - we might say that nominals are an existential sort. 
Note that interval nominals are also existential sorts, and that neither weak nominals 
nor weak interval nominals are. Secondly, note that the constraint in force on both 
nominals trivially requires that the denotation of any nominal must lie wholly within 
a single point generated subframe of any frame. We might express this by saying that 
nominals are a single island sort. Note that interval nominals are also a single island 
sort, as are weak nominals and weak interval nominals; and that a sort constrained to 
denote precisely two distinct points would not be. It is clear that the necessary 
and sufficient condition given in Chapter 3 for nominal validity to be preserved under 
disjoint unions, really reflects the fact that nominals are an existential single island sort. 
The definition of ¢l is just a way of taking into account the existential and single island 
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aspects of NTL valuations. The same argument used to prove the result for nominals will 
establish the same result for any existential single island sort, and in particular the same 
necessary and condition holds for interval nominals. 
For languages of interval nominal logic it is easy to `read off' a useful notion of 
validity preserving morphism without running the danger of collapsing into isomorphism 
that plagued our investigations in NTL. Let S and T be frames and f a p-morphism from 
S to T. We say f is interval invertible if for all intervals I E Int(T), f -1[I] E Int(S). 
Now we already know that p-morphic interval models are equivalent, no matter what 
sortal constraints are in force, so the following claim should not be surprising: if f is an 
interval invertible p-morphism from S to T, then S ¢ implies T ¢. The point is 
this; given such a connection between frames then we can always `pull back' any falsifying 
valuation on T to S, as the inverse images of the denotations of interval nominals are 
guaranteed to be elements of Int(S). This establishes the result. 
At least one useful interval invertible p-morphism lies to hand: the collapse of Z to 
({O), {(O, 0) }); the inverse image of the only interval on ({0}, 1(0,0))) is the (very large) 
interval Z. So irreflexivity, asymmetry, and in general m-asymmetry, are not definable in 
interval nominal languages. As van Benthem points out, antisymmetry is not definable 
either, as the map f (n) = n (mod 2) from (Z,:5) to the frame with points 0 and 1 bearing 
the universal relation is an interval invertible p-morphism. 
On the other hand, this type of morphism has clear practical and theoretical limits. 
On the practical side, such morphisms are rather difficult to construct. For example, 
it seems to be intuitively clear that discreteness is not definable in interval nominal 
languages, but I do not know how to prove it; the p-morphism that van Benthem [5, 
pages 160-161] gives to demonstrate this for Priorean languages will not work here, as it 
is not interval invertible. 
More theoretically, I feel that the observation that interval invertible p-morphisms 
preserve validity tells us rather little about the way interval nominals see frames; it does 
not help reveal what aspects of frame structure are important to this sort. As with NTL 
we need new preservation results, but this is very much work in progress. 
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In the following section we will embed languages with interval nominals into D logic, 
thus establishing the ultrafilter extension antipreservation result holds for this sort, so 
I'll conclude the discussion of the model theory of interval nominals with this remark: 
many obvious questions demand an answer. In particular: precisely what can be defined 
with the aid of interval nominals (both on their own, and in collaboration with either 
or both of variables and nominals), and how do the Lo expressive capabilities of interval 
nominals compare with those of purely Priorean and purely nominal languages? 
The basic proof theory of this new sort turns out to be straightforward: in particular, 
the axiomatisation of the minimal logic is reminiscent of K,,t, and decidability results are 
easier to obtain than in NTL. 
The minimal logic for languages L of interval nominal logic can be axiomatised by 
K:nt, which is obtained by adjoining to Kt all L instances of: 
PE A FE -+ c (Cony) 
E A E(c A 0) --* (P4) V 0 V F4)) (INOMw) 
Here c is a metavariable over interval nominals. As usual E is a metavariable over 
existential tenses, and 0 over arbitrary wffs. The SWEEPw analog, 
(c A 0) -+ A(c -+ (P4) V 0 V F4))) (ISWEEPw) 
could be used in place of INOMw. We occasionally use the Qt notation introduced in 
the previous chapter to abbreviate INOMw to c A E(c A 0) -' Qto, and ISWEEPw to 
(EA0) -+A(E-+ <:>to). 
That Ki,,t is sound with respect to the class of all frames is clear; to establish strong 
completeness, argue as follows. Given a K;,,t-consistent set of sentences E, form E°°. 4 
Let Win" = (H, <h) be the Henkin frame for languages of interval nominal logic. That 
4 We assume the obvious definitions of K;,,t-consistency (which we henceforth refer to as consis- 
tency), and related notions in what follows; use the NTL definitions given in Chapter 4 as a guide. 
Clearly Lindenbaum's Lemma holds for these languages. By E°O we still mean the Lindenbaum 
expansion of E with respect to some canonical ordering of the wffs of our language. 
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is, H is the the set of all K;,,t-MCSs and <h is the usual ordering on temporal Henkin 
frames. Let HE be the subframe of the Henkin frame Hhint generated by E°°. The 
only real task we have to perform is to ensure that for any interval nominal that occurs 
in some h E HE, the set {h' E HE : e E h'} E Int(HE), as this establishes that the 
natural mapping is a weak interval valuation. Let us first show that for all such interval 
nominals e, {h' E HE : e E h'} E Tr(HE). The major burden falls on the INOMw schema 
in establishing this. 
Suppose there are hl, h2 E HE such that e E hl, h2, and hl h2, hl 141, h2, and 
h2 14h hl. As both hl and h2 are distinct MCS there is a wff that differentiates them; 
call this wff A and suppose that -'A E hl and A E h2. Moreover, as hi 4 h2 there is a 
wff 0 such that -,F0 E hl and 0 E h2. b In a similar fashion, as h2 i4h hl we can find a 
wff 0 E hl such that -'FO E h2. In short, -'A A -,F0 A IP E hl and A A 0 A -'Ftt E h2. 
Now as hl and h2 are in the same generated subframe there lies a zig-zag path between 
them. Hence E(e A (A A 0 A -,Fo)) E hl, where E is the existential tense that accesses 
h2 from hl via this path. By INOMw this means that Ot (A A 0 A -FtP) E hl. 
But A A 0 A -,Ftt hl, otherwise A A -'A E hl, an immediate contradiction. Similarly 
F(A A 0 A -,FtP) h, as otherwise FO E hl, and hence Fc A -,FO E hl. Finally, 
P(A A 0 A -,Fo) hl, as otherwise P-,FO E hl, that is, -,HFi E hl. But as 0 E hl, 
by TL4 we have that HFtP E hl, another contradiction. Thus two such points hl and h2 
cannot exist, and for all interval nominals e such that e E h for some h E HE, we have 
that {h' E HE : e E h') E Tr(HE). 
Establishing that this subset is also convex is now easy. Suppose that hl, h2, h3 E HE 
and that e E hl, e E hs, hl <h h2 <h hs and e h2. But then we have that Pe A Fe E h2 
which by Conv means that e E h2. Thus we have established that {h' E HE : e E h'} E 
Int(HE). 
5This follows from the Order Equivalence Lemma of Chapter 4, which among other things 
states that hi <h h2 if for all wffs ', ' E h2 implies Fc E hl. Thus whenever hi A h2 we can 
find some 0 such that 0 E h2 and FO 95 hl. 
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As usual this result only tells us that the natural mapping is a weak valuation - for 
as in NTL we have that sets of sentences of the form {-,Ei : E is an existential tense} 
are consistent, and such sets `drive out' interval nominals. But as usual we can add a 
point at infinity, or take disjoint unions, or regenerate starting with a suitable new set of 
sentences to obtain a valuation. We thus have a interval nominal model, and the usual 
induction establishes: 
Theorem 6.1.1 K;,,t is strongly complete with respect to I. 0 
What about extensions? Firstly the obvious: K;,,t4 is strongly complete with respect 
to the transitive frames, and K;,,t4T with respect to the preordered frames. There is 
nothing to prove here - as usual the inclusion of 4 guarantees a transitive, and T a 
reflexive, Henkin frame. However we really should step up and consider the SPOs and 
POs. The point is this: while many frames do contain intervals, not all the frames in 
I can be said to carry interesting interval structures. For a full discussion of interval 
structures the reader is referred to [5], especially Chapter 1.3 ("Periods"), and Chapter 
1.4 ("Points and Periods"); here we content ourselves with a brief look at van Benthem's 
basic definitions. By an interval structure or period structure is meant a triple (I, C, <). 
We read C as the inclusion relation on intervals, and demand it be a PO. 6 We read < 
as ordinary temporal precedence - essentially the flow of time - and demand it be a 
SPO. We then put a constraint on how C and < should interact: 
dxy(x < y -+ Vu C x(u < y)) (Left monotonicity) 
Vxy(x < y -+ Vu C y(x < u)) (Right monotonicity). 
It is easy to build interval structures. For example, if we start with an ordinary SPOed 
frame T and form Conv (T), then (Conv (T), C, <co,,,,) is an interval structure. Here C 
6van Benthem further demands that C satisfies CONJ: 
dxy(xOy--' 3zCx(xCynVu Cx(uCy-,uCx))). 
Here 0 is the predicate `overlaps', defined by zOy =d f 3u(u C z A u c y). 
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is set-theoretic inclusion and <,ori is the natural induced precedence relation; this is all 
discussed on [5, pages 82-83]. For present purposes all we really need to note is that 
the concept of a frame carrying an interval structure is a much richer one than that of 
a frame that contains intervals: frames carrying interval structures embody important 
global structure on the set of intervals - a structure which is necessary if our temporal 
predilections are to be honoured in intervallic frameworks. In view of the previously 
mentioned result, to ensure that our frames possess such pleasant properties we should 
work on at least the SPOs. 7 
When we consider axiomatisations for the SPOs and POs we obtain sharpening results 
for both classes of frames, as we can show that simply Kcnt4 axiomatises the SPOs, and 
that K;,,t4T suffices for the POs. 8 
Theorem 6.1.2 K;,,t4 is strongly complete with respect to the class of SPOs. 
Proof: 
Given a K;,,t4-consistent set of sentences E, expand it to E°° and form the verifying 
model (T, Vt) in the usual way. Irreflexively bulldoze it, forming (S, V,). What we need 
to check is that V, is a interval nominal valuation; that is, for all interval nominals e, 
V,(e) E Int(S). Recall that by the definition of the bulldozing construction given in the 
previous chapter we have that s E V,(a) if f (s) E Vg (a), for all atoms a, where f is the 
bulldozing p-morphism. It is trivial from the bulldozing definition that V,(e) E Tr(S). 
To see that V,(e) E Conv(S) for all interval nominals e, we reason as follows. Suppose 
that si, 83 E V. (e) for some interval nominal e, and further suppose that for some 82 E S, 
81 <s 82 <, 83. As f is a p-morphism it is monotonic in < hence f (s1) <t f (sy) <t f (ss). 
TThe POs are also pleasant. Of course precedence is reflexive, but we still have all the other 
intervallic conditions. 
sNote that all SPOs are in I: all such frames are asymmetric, hence every singleton is an 
interval. 
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By assumption f (sl) and f (ss) E Vg(e), but as Vt is an interval nominal valuation, Vt (e) 
is a convex set, hence f (sz) E V (e). By the definition of V. this means that 82 E V,(e), 
and thus V, (e) is convex for all interval nominals e. 
Thus V, is an interval nominal valuation, E has been verified on a SPO, 9 and K;,,t4 
is strongly complete with respect to the SPOs. 
A similar argument invoking reflexive bulldozing establishes the completeness of 
K;,,t4T with respect to the POs. Because of these two sharpenings, obtaining com- 
pleteness results for the classes of frames considered in the previous chapter is routine; 
we content ourselves with stating the results for STOs and TOs. Firstly, let Trr, be the 
schema P E V E V FE; any instance is valid on all transitive frames. The TOs are axiomatised 
by K;4,t4TLinTr,; and the SPOs by Kt t4LinTr,. The results follow by light and heavy 
bulldozing respectively. 
Let us consider whether these logics are decidable. As we can't define irreflexivity and 
antisymmetry in these languages we might hope that the logics of all the more obvious 
classes of frames have the finite frame property, and that this can be proved by routine 
adaptation of filtration arguments. This turns out to be the case. 
The definition of filtrations is that given in Chapter 2 for languages of NTL, save that 
the second two clauses in the definition of Vf now read: 10 
E(t) E Vf(e) if t E V(e), for all e E INOM n E 
Vf(e) E Int(F), for all e E INOM\E. 
Our ability to form filtrations is unchanged - in particular we can always form Priorean 
filtrations. However there are two minor difficulties; it is unclear that the Vf obtained 
9R.ecall from Chapter 3 our discussion of surjective model p-morphisms, in which we com- 
mented that no matter what constraints we place on sorts, a p-morphic link between models is 
all we need to get the usual model equivalence result. The above reasoning establishes that the 
bulldozing process builds a new interval model p-morphically linked to the original. 
1oThe notation is that introduced in Chapter 2. The filtration is Mf = (F, Vf), and E is the set 
of sentences closed under subformulas through which we are filtrating our original model (T, Vg). 
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after filtrating an arbitrary model (T, Vt) through an arbitrary (subformulae closed) set 
of sentences E need be a valuation; further, it is unclear that there need be any intervals 
at all in a filtration. Once we have solved the first problem, the second yields easily, so 
we begin by examining the valuations obtained by filtration. 
Trichotomy is unproblematic: for all interval nominals e we have that V1(e) C Tr(F); 
this is immediate by the fact that t <t t' implies E(t) <r E(t'), for all t, t' E T. The 
problem lies with convexivity: how can we guarantee that no point E(s) which falsifies 
some interval nominal e is placed between two points E(t) and E(t') which verify it? 
The, solution is straightforward: given E, we extend it to a larger (subformulae 
closed) set of sentences E+ which has the property that any filtration through E+ yields 
a Vr satisfying the convexivity constraint. Let E be any set of sentences closed under 
subformulas. Define: 
E'={e-»F(-,enFe):eEINOMnE}. 
Note that all wffs in E' are theorems of Kint. 11 Let E+ be the result of closing E U E' 
under subformulas. We claim that filtrating any interval nominal model (T, Vt) through 
E+ yields a filtration in which every interval nominal e E E is assigned an interval in 
the filtration, because the convexivity constraint cannot be violated. Note that in the 
11That all such formulas are valid is clear. We can derive instances in Ktnt as follows: 
1. e Assumption 
2. F(-,e A Fe) Assumption 1 
3. GPe 1; TL4, MP 1,2 
4. F(-,e A Fe A Pe) 2,3; Inst 1,2 
5. F(-le A Fe A Pe A e) 4; Conv, Inst, MP 1,2 
6. 1 5; PC 1,2 
7. -,F(-'e n Fe) 6; Discharge, PC 1 
8. e --+ -F(-,e A Fe) 7; Discharge 
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following argument we make use of the Filtration Theorem even though we have not 
yet established that Vf is an interval valuation. This is perfectly legitimate; it is just 
as though we were temporarily regarding the interval nominals as ordinary variables, 
subject to no constraints. 12 That filtration gives rise to an equivalent standard model 
is not in doubt, and this equivalent standard model verifies formulas containing interval 
nominals: the point at issue is whether this equivalent model is also an interval nominal 
model. 
So suppose there are E(t), E(s), E(t') E F and some interval nominal e E E such that 
E(t) <f E(s) <f E(t'), Mf = e[E(t)], Mf e[E(s)], and Mf = e[E(t')]. This means 
that in our original model M we have that M = e[t] and M z e[t']. But e -+ -F(-eAFe) 
is a validity hence it is true at every point in every model, which means in particular 
that it is true at tin M, hence by modus ponens we have that M z -iF(-e A Fe)[t]. By 
the Filtration Theorem this means that Mf z -'F(-,e A Fe) [E(t)], as - F (-e A Fe) E E+. 
On the other hand, as Fe E E+, Mf z e[E(t')] and E(s) <f E(t') we have by the second 
clause in the definition of <f that Mf H Fe[E(s)]; and thus Mf z -'e A Fe[E(s)]. But 
F(-,e A Fe) E E and E(t) <f E(s) so, again by the second clause defining <f we have 
that, Mf H F(-,e A Fe)[E(t)] - contradiction. 
There remains the second barrier, but it is now clear how to resolve this. If E+ 
contains even one interval nominal, the previous argument shows that Mf must contain 
intervals. So before forming E+ we first enlarge E by adding an arbitrary interval nominal 
to it, and this removes the potential difficulty. The rest is routine. If E is a finite set 
of sentences, E+ is too, thus we can show that the logics of the obvious frames have the 
finite frame property and are thus decidable; this includes all the logics discussed above. 
The details are left to the reader. 
12This is analogous to the strategy used in Chapter 2 to establish the sufficient condition for 
p-morphisms to preserve nominal validity. 
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6.2 The shifter 
Throughout this thesis it has been said that the introduction of nominals (and now 
interval nominals) brings important referential mechanisms into tensed languages. While 
this is true it is slightly misleading, for the task of referring to indices in intensional 
languages clearly splits into two subtasks. Firstly, we need devices for naming indices - 
both nominals and interval nominals are examples of this type of device - but secondly, 
and just as importantly, we need mechanisms which shift the point of evaluation to the 
named points. That is, we need ways of moving to the indicated point as otherwise our 
names are rather idle additions. This second aspect of referentiality has been ignored 
till now; the only mechanism we have for performing such shifts are the tense operators. 
While admirable on many classes of frame - for example, the linear frames omnipresent 
in natural language semantics - unless the frame geometry is particularly simple they 
are rather clumsy. In order to use tense operators we have to `know the path' (if there 
is one) from our present location to the point we wish to access; a `jump instruction' or 
`goto statement' would be simpler. 
We now introduce such an operator: it's written L and is called the shifter. Seman- 
tically it is an `everywhere' - or `everywhen' - operator. That is, LO is true if 0 is 
true at all points of the frame. 18 I call it the shifter because in collaboration with - it 
shifts wonderfully: L(i -+ 0) jumps to the point named by i and tests the condition 0 
there, and L(e --> 0) `runs the 0 test' on every point in the interval named by e. There 
is a rather evocative phrase we can borrow from the PDP community: they often talk 
of `content addressable memory'. Suppose we think of a model as a computer memory, 
with the points of the frame being the memory locations. Accessing these points using 
tense operators is a little like using a system of pointers and addresses; L, on the other 
hand, is a `content addressable' operator. L(4 -+ tb) checks all the locations holding 0 to 
13The idea of using this operator is partly due to Mike McPartlin. 
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see that they contain 0 as well. More prosaically, we could gloss such conditional forms 
uses of L by saying `whenever 0, 0'. 
We now go on to describe fully referential tensed languages. These will be tensed 
languages containing both nominal and interval nominals, and in addition the shifter. 
We develop the languages in two stages. First we add the shifter to languages of NTL, 
and, once we have described the minimal logic for these languages, go on to add interval 
nominals as well. 
Before going any further I should make it clear that while this work was done inde- 
pendently, every previous person who has considered nominals has introduced the shifter 
as well. Firstly, Prior discusses tensed languages with shifter and nominals - for ex- 
ample in [79, Appendix B], and [80]. This work will be discussed in the final chapter. 
Secondly, Robert Bull in [12] introduced a tensed language with strong nominals. His 
languages are actually a lot more powerful than anything we have considered, as these 
strong nominals can be quantified over. They also utilise the shifter, and in fact the 
completeness proof for languages of NTL with shifter sketched below is a subproof of his 
basic completeness result. Lastly, in a recent manuscript [43], Valentin Goranko and 
Solomon Passy investigate in detail the effect of introducing the shifter into standard 
modal languages. In section 8 ('Several advertisements of the universal modality') they 
state: 
The prime stimulus for considering the universal modality has come up in 
the context of the proper names for the possible worlds [43, page 22] 
They then state how to axiomatise the minimal logic for languages of nominal modal 
logic with shifter; it's essentially what's given below. In short, the idea of the shifter is 
not new, though I believe the extended completeness results and the decidability results 
discussed below are original. 
We first describe languages of NTLL. These are languages of NTL augmented by the 
L operator. Wffs are made in the obvious way, with application of L being allowed in 
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addition to tense operator application. We define the dual operator M of L by MO = 
-'L-'c, and read it as `Somewhere .0'. 
The semantics has already been described; L is a universal (S5) operator. We could 
just add an extra clause to this effect, but completeness proofs proceed a little smoother if 
we explicitly include the universal relation in the definition of frames for these languages. 
So, we treat languages of NTLL in multimodal fashion and say that multiframes for these 
languages are triples T = (T, <t, Ut) where <t as usual is any binary relation on T - 
it's this relation that embodies temporal flow - and Ut is always T x T. It's usually 
going to be clear from context what our underlying set T is, so we normally drop the 
subscripts and just write < and U. 
We interpret our atoms on these multiframes in the obvious way; valuations can 
assign atoms arbitrary subsets of the frame, but nominals must be assigned singletons. 
Tense operators use < as their accessibility relation; and L uses U. That is, L4 is true 
at a point t if 0 is true at all points U-related to t. As U is T x T this is clearly what 
we want. 
We now assemble the axiomatisation of the minimal logic in languages of NTLL. As 
usual we include Kt. Then, because L is an S5 operator, we include the axiomatisation 
SSL, which consists of KL 14 augmented by all instances of L4' - LL4' (4L), Lq5 --> 0 (TL), 
and 0 -+ LM4 (BL). Now we need to add further axioms to control the interactions 
between L, the tense operators and the nominals. Firstly we add all instances of the 
following inclusion schema: 
L4 -+ HO A Go (Inc). 
Next observe that as every nominal is true at some point in our multiframe, the M 
operator will always see this point of occurrence; thus we include all instances of: 
Mn (Force); 
"'All instances of L(¢ -- +G) - (LO - LO), together with the rule of necessitation F- 0 F- L¢. 
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recall that n is a metavariable over nominals. Finally we need schemas that guarantee 
the Unique Occurrence Property. Either of the following variants of our familiar NOMw 
and SWEEPW schemas can be used for this purpose: 
n A M(n A 0) - 0 (NOMM) 
(n A 0) -- L(n -- 0) (SWEEPL). 
In short, K = Kt + S5L + Inc + Force + NOMM (or SWEEPL). Conspicuous by their 
absence are schemas such as NOM or SWEEP that explicitly control the interaction of 
the nominals with the tense operators; in fact they are not needed but are derivable from 
the interaction of Inc and NOMM. We now sketch the completeness proof. 
Let HKn = (H, <h, <L) be the canonical Henkin frame for our language. That is, H 
is the set of all Kim-consistent (henceforth consistent), sets of sentences; <h is the usual 
temporal ordering on Henkin frames; and <L is defined by hl <L h2 if Lq5 E hl implies 
0 E h2, for all hl, h2 E H. 
Given a consistent set of sentences E, form E°°, and let HE be the subframe of HKLt 
formed by generating on both <h and <L. That is, HE is the smallest subframe of HKnt 
containing E°° that is closed under both <h and <L. 
First observe that <hC<L; this is immediate because of the Inc schema. Next observe 
that <L is universal on HE. This follows from two facts. Firstly HE was formed by gen- 
erating on two relations, one of which was a subset of the other. Hence HE is connected 
under the larger of the two generating relations, namely <L. Secondly, the schemas 4L, 
TL and BL guarantee that <L is an equivalence relation - but any connected equivalence 
relation is universal. Thus we can justifiably denote <L by U (= HE x HE) and write 
HE as (HE, <h, U); we have the requisite type of multiframe. 
The rest is simple. By the Force schema every nominal occurs in at least one h E HE; 
and the familiar style of argument shows that NOMW guarantees Unique Occurrence. 
(Note that because U(=<L) is universal, U-paths are very simple; we can U-step from 
any h E HE to any other point h' E HE in one stride.) Thus we have the right sort 
of multiframe, the natural mapping is a valuation, and thus by the usual induction we 
have: 
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Theorem 6.2.1 K is strongly complete with respect to U. 
Two observations are worth making. The first is that while HE is U-connected, it 
need not be <h-connected. 15 To see this note that the familiar sets of sentences of 
the form {-,Ei : is an existential tense} are still consistent and will force nominals out 
from <h-generated subframes. But such `temporally forced out' nominals are now `forced 
in' automatically at some other temporal generated subframe by the Force schema; the 
enrichment of the language has rendered unnecessary our previous strategies for turning 
weak valuations into ordinary ones, 
Secondly, where have our path equations gone? Clearly both NOMw and SWEEPw 
are still valid, so they must be derivable. We show how to derive NOMw. First observe 
that from the Inc schema we have that both I- F¢ -' M¢ and I- P¢ -* M¢. But this 
means that for any n length existential tense we have that I- E¢ -; M" ¢; this follows by 
induction on n, using the previous two theorems as the base case. But, by the dual of 
4L, we have that I- MnO -* M¢; hence I- E¢ -' M¢. But now we have: 
1. i Assumption 
2. E(i A ¢) Assumption 1 
3. M(iA¢) 2; Ee,b -;MO 1,2 
4. ¢ 1,3;NOMM 1,2 
5. i A E(i A ¢) -* ¢ 1, 2; Discharge twice 
In short, the path equations were swallowed up by, and are retrievable from, L and M. 
Rather than look at extensions of K we move straight onto languages with shifter, 
nominals, and interval nominals. More explicitly, we will now work with languages of 
temporal reference, TREF, by which are meant languages with three mutually disjoint 
sorts of atomic symbol, VAR, NOM and INOM, in which wffs are formed by boolean 
combinations, application of tense operators, and applications of the L operator. The 
15Robert Bull also makes this remark in [12, page 2861, attributing the observation to Dov 
Gabbay. 
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semantics is defined on multiframes T = (T, <, U) of the kind described for languages 
of NTLL, where (T, <) E Jr. Valuations on such multiframes T are subject to 
two constraints. Firstly, nominals must be assigned singletons; and secondly, interval 
nominals must be assigned elements of , Int(T). 
The minimal logic for such languages is called Kt,,r and it is easily described: it is 
KL,t augmented by all instances of Conv, Me (Force,), and in addition all instances of: 
C A M(e A 0) ---> (PqS V 0 V Fq5) (INOMM) 
(As usual a is a metavariable across interval nominals. INOMM is clearly a cousin of 
INOMtiv.) 
Completeness is straightforward given what we already know. The first part of the 
proof merely consists of forming the Henkin frame HKIr = (H) <h, <L), where H con- 
sists of all the Ktrer-consistent sets of sentences and <h and <L are as described in the 
completeness proof for K. Given our consistent set of sentences E we take the subframe 
HE formed by generating on both <hand <L, and by the reasoning of the previous proof 
we see that <L is universal on Hr . Further, as in the previous proof, the Force schema 
and the NOMM schema conspire to force each nominal into exactly one h E Hr, and thus 
the natural mapping satisfies the constraint on assignments to nominals. The only addi- 
tional work lies in showing that for all interval nominals e, {h E Hr : e E h} E Int(HE). 
As usual, showing this falls into two parts. Firstly, that {h E Hr : e E h} E Tr(HE) 
follows from the INOMM schema by essentially the same argument that was used for 
K;,,t in the previous section. That is, we again assume that there are distinct h, h' E Hr 
containing the same interval nominal and such that h 14h h' and h' th h, and manu- 
facture a contradiction as previously shown. The only difference is that we don't use a 
<h path to access h from h' and vice-versa, but step directly from one to the other in a 
single U-step. With this demonstrated, showing that {h E Hr : e E h} E Conv(HE) is 
immediate by the instances of the Conv schema. So we have: 
Theorem 6.2.2 Ktre1 is strongly complete with respect to I. 
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Let's turn to extensions. As languages of TREF contain nominals they have a grip on 
irreflexivity and antisymmetry, so the crucial logics to examine are those of the SPOS and 
POs. It is natural to suspect that Kt,,fR (henceforth I4trej) and Ktr,j4TAnti (henceforth 
POtrei), respectively axiomatise these classes. Now clearly, just as with languages of NTL, 
the Irreflexivity and Simple Cluster Lemmas noted in the last chapter hold. So the way 
is open to apply bulldozing - that is, if the inclusion of the L operator hasn't affected 
our ability to bulldoze. In fact it hasn't. This follows from the following general remark 
about surjective model p-morphisms for languages of TREF. 
By a surjective p-morphism f from the multiframe S = (S, <,, U,) to T = (T, <t, Ut) 
is meant a surjective (temporal) p-morphism f from (S, <,) to (T, <t). The fact that the 
universal relation U. is preserved (and anti-preserved) under such mappings is obvious; 
this holds with any surjection. Next, by a surjective p-morphism f from the TREF model 
M, = (S, V,) to Mt = (T, Vt) we mean a surjective p-morphism f between the TREF 
multiframes S and T such that s E V,(a) if f (s) E Vt(a) for all atoms a. That M, = 0[s] 
if Mt O[f(s)] is clear by induction on deg(q). 
This guarantees that bulldozing - which in this context means the flattening of 
<h-clusters in transitive TREF models - is going to work. This immediately yields that 
Kt,,fR is complete with respect to the SPOs (by heavy bulldozing), and Ktj4TAnti 
with respect to the POs (by light bulldozing); both results should be clear by considering 
the completeness proofs for languages of NTL and interval nominal languages on these 
classes of frames. Note that we move to linear frames the L operator becomes definable 
in terms of F and P; L is just O t and M is Qt. The logic of STOs can be axiomatised 
by Ktrejl4LinTrTrc, and that of the TOs by Kt,,f4TAntiLinTrTrc; and the unbounded 
STOs can be axiomatised by adding all instances of the D schema as well. 
As with languages of NTL, many important logics in languages of TREF lack the finite 
frame property - for example, the logic of any class of frames which validates I, 4, and 
D. Nonetheless, by exploiting the fact that sorted languages may possess the finite model 
property while lacking the finite frame property, just as we did with languages of NTL, 
useful decidability results may be obtained. We examine the case for I4trej. 
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By Mt,,f(I,) and Mtref(Tran) are meant the classes of TREF models ((T, <, U), V) 
such that ((T, <), V) E M (I,) and ((T, <), V) E M (T ran) respectively; where M (Il) and 
M (tran) are as defined in the previous chapter. We first observe that I4t,e f is strongly 
complete with respect to Mt,,f(I1) fl Mt,ef(Tran) - this is an immediate corollary of 
the completeness proof for I4tr,f, as the Henkin model there generated is in this class - 
and now seek to show by means of a filtration argument that I4t,o has the finite model 
property with respect to this class. 
As we are working in a multimodal framework with two distinct referential sorts, we 
are going to have to augment our filtration technique somewhat. So, given a TREF model 
M = ((T, <, U), V) and a finite subformulae closed set of sentences E, we first define 
F to be {E(t) : t E T}, where, as in Chapter 1, the E(t) are equivalence classes of T 
created by E agreement. How do we proceed from here? 
We define our filtration Mf of M through E to be ((F, <f, Uf)Vf), where ((F, <f 
), Vf) is the ordinary Priorean filtration of M through E we are used to, and Uf is just 
F x F. The important thing to note is that ((F, Uf), Vf) is the smallest filtration of 
((T, U), V) through E. This is immediate: it follows from the universality of U that sUt 
iff E(s)U1E(t), which is the way smallest filtrations are defined. 16 But this means that 
the structure Mf we have defined is just a componentwise filtration of both relations on 
M through E. This guarantees that 
Va E E(M = a[t] if Mf a[E(t)]), 
by Segerberg's statement of the Filtration Theorem [97, page 303], which is stated in full 
multimodal generality for all such `componentwise filtrated' constructions. 
In short, defining filtrations for tensed languages with an additional universal operator 
is straightforward. It only remains to ensure that we end up with the desired relational 
structure on our filtrations. As we took a Priorean filtration to make <f, and as we 
161H fact this filtration is the only filtration of M through E that exists - the largest, the 
smallest, and hence all other filtrations coincide if we start with a universally related model. 
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directly built in a universal relation on F, what this amounts to is that we must guarantee 
that the filtration contains irreflexive points, that all nominals denote these, and that 
interval nominals denote intervals. We know from our previous discussions that all this 
can be achieved by judiciously extending our original subformulae closed set of sentences 
E to a new such set E+. That is, given E, if E contains no nominals we add an arbitrary 
nominal i to E; and if it contains no interval nominals we add an arbitrary interval 
nominal e. Call this (possibly new) set V. We then define E" to be: 
E' U {i -+ -,Fi : i occurs in E'} U {e -. -'F(-'e n Fe) : e occurs in E'}. 
Finally, we let E+ be the smallest subformula closed set of sentences containing E". By 
the reasoning of the previous chapter and the previous section, these additions have the 
desired effect. Thus Mf is a finite member of Mt,,f(I,) n Mtr,f(Tran), and the usual 
argument shows that I4t,, f is decidable. 
Other extensions in this vein are straightforward. In particular, we can show that 
POt,ef has the finite model property with respect to Mt,,f(SC1) n Mt,,f(Pre), where 
these classes of models are defined in the obvious way from their NTL correlates. The 
proof is essentially that just given, save that when we define E" we add all E' relevant 
instances of i -. G(Fi -+ i), the antisymmetry axiom, instead of the relevant instances 
of the irreflexivity axiom. The reasoning of the previous chapter again establishes that 
this has the required effect. 
One of the motivations for developing NTL and the other sorted languages described 
here has been the wish to model at least the more obvious facts of natural language 
temporal reference and its interaction with tense in constrained languages. The demon- 
stration that this can be done must wait till the next chapter, but we should pause to 
check that languages of TREF can still be described as constrained; as van Benthem has 
shown in great detail, 17 intuitive tense logics are often augmented with extra machinery 
to the point where they become (unadmitted) notational variants of first order languages. 
Where do we stand with TREF? 
17There is some discussion of this in [5, pages 132-133], and it's the major point of [4]. 
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We already know that the addition of nominals and interval nominals increases the 
expressive power of tensed languages; what about the shifter? This addition takes us 
still higher: to select a particularly simple example from the work of Goranko and Passy 
[43, page 11], we can now define 3t1t2(t1 < t2); that is, the class of frames such that 
<# 0. Simply MFT accomplishes this. Note that this class is not definable in a tensed 
language - even with the help of nominals or interval nominals - because of the gen- 
erated subframe validity preservation result. However we can still claim to be working 
in(constrained class of languages, as languages of TREF can be simulated by tense logic 
augmented by the D operator, as will now be shown. 
We have already seen that nominals can be simulated by means of the uniqueness 
operator U that is definable in terms of D. Further, as we saw in Chapter 2 (where 
Ron Koyman's A notation was used), the shifter can be defined in terms of D: Lq =df 
0 A -aD-,O. The only messy part is simulating interval nominals. For this purpose we 
need a defined operator which we dub I: 
10 =d1L(Pq A F4 --- 0) AL(qS A DO --* Fq V Pq) A Mo. 
The first conjunct is Conk; the last Force; the second uses D to force trichotomous 
behaviour. 
So, given any TREF formula Oil, ... , in, e1, ... , em), where the subscripted is and 
es are all and only the occurring nominals and interval nominals in 0, we can con- 
struct a logically equivalent formula using just variables, F, P, and D as follows. Let 
OD(i1) ... , in, e1, .... em), be the result of replacing all Ls in 0 using the equivalence 
LO = 0 A -,D-,O. Then we have that for any (temporal) frame T = (T, <) that: 
(T, Ut) ct(il, ... , in, el, ... , em) 
if and only if. 
(T,Ot) [-- UpiA...AUpnA1g1A...AIQm--+OL(p1Iii, ...,gm/em); 
where the pl, . . . , pm, q1, ... qq are variables not occurring in 0. This translation gives 
us an useful upper bound on the expressive power of TREF. In passing note that it also 
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shows that TREF validity is antipreserved under the formation of ultrafilter extensions; 
we need merely translate and appeal to Maarten de Rijke's result in [89, page 6]. 
This concludes the presentation of languages of TREF. We will further develop them 
in the following chapter to allow them to model common features of temporal reference 
and their interaction with tense. However a further logical topic beckons: giving a more 
general account of sorting, and we devote the following section to this. 
6.3 Sorting generalised 
We have encountered several sorts in this thesis: nominals, weak nominals, interval 
nominals, and the `separated sort' used in Chapter 4 to show that K + NOMw does not 
axiomatise the minimal nominal modal logic. It is easy to give other examples: sorts 
constrained to denote precisely 2, 3 or m distinct points; sorts constrained to denote a 
finite set of points, or a countable infinity of points; or a sort that denotes equivalence 
relations. However we will not extend the catalog of sorts in this chapter; rather the 
discussion will revolve around two questions: does the imposition of sorting have any 
effect on what should be regarded as logically paramount, and might it be possible to 
develop any general theory of sorted intensional logics? Briefly, my answer to the first 
question will be `Yes', and my answer to the second `I don't know'. The positive answer 
to the first question comes from considering what a sorted intensional logic might be, and 
noting the impact the failure of substitutivity has. The answer to the second question 
is my response to the variety and complexity of issues raised by sorting. I do have one 
positive suggestion however: alternative semantics for our languages should be explored 
if these wider issues are to be addressed, and I briefly sketch two alternatives. 
Intuitively a sorted intensional language is an intensional language whose atoms are 
divided into mutually disjoint sets, or sorts. Associated with each sort is a constraint 
on the functions that count as valuations. This is vague: it is not clear what sort of 
constraints can be placed on valuations. Are global demands, of the type made by 
strong languages of NTL to be permitted? I have no wish to rule out such possibilities - 
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as the example of strong NTL shows, such constraints can be very important - but for 
the purposes of this chapter sorting will have a narrower sense: only local constraints on 
valuations will be considered. Let's define this precisely. 
Given a non-empty set A, by an (uninterpreted) A-sorted language of tense logic 
C° is meant a pair (LOG, {S6 : b E A}), where LOG is as defined in Chapter 2; for 
each b E A, S6 is countably infinite; for all b, b' E A, b 0 b' implies S6 n S6. = 0; and 
LOG n U{S6 : b E A} = 0. We say that such a language has syntactic signature A. By 
the atoms of C°, ATOM,, is meant U{S6 : b E 0}; and an atom that is an element 
of S6 is called an atom of sort b. The wffs of C° are made in the usual tense logical 
fashion out of these atoms using the elements of LOG as connectives. Thus syntactically 
the wffs of a A-sorted language C° look like ordinary tense logical wffs, save that at the 
atomic level we need to determine not only that a non-logical symbol is a symbol of the 
language, but what sort it is as well. For practical purposes we will only be interested 
in A-sorted languages where A is recursive, indeed finite. 
At the heart of the semantics for these languages are A-sorted frames. A A-sorted 
frame is a triple T° = (T, A, f) where T is a frame, A a non-empty set, and f : A --> 
Pow(Pow(T)). We say such a frame has signature A. Given a fixed A, any A-sorted 
language C° must be interpreted on a A-sorted frame. By a valuation V for such a 
language on such a frame (T, A, f) is meant a function from ATOM to Pow(T) such 
that for all a E ATOMCo, a E Ss implies V (a) E f (b). We extend V to a function 
defined on all wffs in the usual fashion. If 7° = (T, A, f) is a A sorted frame, and V a 
valuation for Ca on T°, we call M° = (T°, V) a A-sorted model; and for any wff 0 of 
our language, and any t E T, we say that M° O[t] if (T, V) = O[t]. This last definition 
makes use of the fact that the frames T underlying A-sorted frames 7° are just ordinary 
frames, and the valuations on them are just ordinary valuations: nothing has changed 
save that we have sortal constraints at the atomic level. The extra machinery is simply 
to allow such constraints to be expressed. 18 
18Another piece of machinery could prove useful: splitting valuations V into A-indexed sub- 
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As an example of these definitions consider mixed languages of NTL. We can regard 
them as is-sorted language where A is any doubleton. Let 2 be the doubleton {O,1}, 
and let us express what it is for a 2-sorted language £2 to be a mixed language of 
NTL. The intended interpretation for mixed languages of NTL is that variables denote 
arbitrary subsets of arbitrary frames, and nominals singleton subsets of arbitrary frames. 
Thus if a 2-sorted language is to be a mixed language of NTL we must interpret it on 
2-sorted frames of the form: (T, 2, {(O, X), (1, Y)}), where T E U, X = Pow(T), and 
Y E Pow(Pow(T)) such that y E Y if y is a singleton subset of T. The talk of 
`intended interpretation' should make it clear that we are going to have to relativise the 
interpretation of A-sorted languages to particular classes of A-sorted frames if we are to 
capture the particular constraints we are interested in. For example, there is no syntactic 
difference between mixed languages of NTL, mixed languages of weak NTL, and languages 
with variables and interval nominals: all three languages are just 2-sorted languages, and 
the difference between them lies in their intended interpretation. Thus to capture this 
we now define what interpreted A-sorted interpreted languages are, and give a notion of 
validity. 
Given a fixed non-empty set A, by a A-sorted interpretational base is meant a non- 
empty collection T1 such that each element in T' is a A-sorted frame. (That is, we 
gather together a collection of sorted frames of the same signature.) Given a A-sorted 
language C', and any A-sorted interpretational base T°, valuations exist for C° on each 
element of T°, as the syntactic and frame signatures match, and thus we can interpret 
our language on any element of the interpretational base. We call such a pair (C°, TA) 
an interpreted A-sorted language, or simply an interpreted language. This notion of 
interpreted languages yields the required distinctions between sorted languages of the 
same signature. For example, let C2 be any 2-sorted language. Then the interpreted 
valuations Va such that Va : Sa - f (S). This is probably a neater way to define things, but we 
won't need it in what follows. 
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language (C2, T. where Tj is 
{(T, 2, f) : T E I and f (0) = Pow(Pow(T)) and f (1) = Int(T)} 
is what we mean by a language of interval nominal logic. 
With this to hand we can now define a notion of validity. We say T° = 4 if for all 
T° E T°, all valuations V for C° on T°, and all t E T, (V, V) 4[t]. 
It is straightforward to extend these definitions to multimodal systems - essentially 
this amounts to changing the definition of LOG to (LOG {F, P}) U {Qa : A E A}, where 
A is some new index set. As the concept of an 'intensional language' is somewhat elastic, 
it is pointless to try and give a fully general definition of a sorted intensional language, 
but the basic idea should be clear, and can be adapted to other intensional systems. In 
the following chapter, for example, we use sorting in a double indexed system. 
Given a sorted language C°, what subsets of WFF,Co should count as intensional 
logics in fl? At the beginning of Chapter 4 we stipulated that tense logics were sets 
of formulas closed under modus ponens and temporal generalisation. A standard de- 
mand was omitted from this specification: the demand that tense logics be closed under 
substitution. 
The reasons for omitting this demand are clear: the theories of our structures should 
be logics, but such theories are not substitution closed. For example, i -+ -'Fi is valid 
on the SPOs, but p -+ -,Fp is not. Looking at the matter axiomatically, an unrestricted 
rule of substitution is not a sound rule - we don't want to derive Pp A Fp -+ p in 
K;,,t, for example. This failure of substitutivity is neither surprising nor objectionable - 
indeed we might say that the failure of substitutivity is the hallmark of sorted systems. 
Underlying sorting is the idea that different types of information are combined in uniform 
fashion. Given that the types of information are genuinely different, this difference must 
emerge somewhere, and it does so at the level of logics. On a fixed class of frames, 
different schemas may be validated for the different sorts: sorted sublogics arise. 
Nonetheless, while the failure of substitutivity is to be expected, indeed desired, the 
ramifications of its failure are many and often surprising. Probably the deepest we have 
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so far encountered is the failure of Segerberg's Theorem in NTL: sorted frameworks can 
have the finite model property even though they lack the finite frame property. Another 
consequence, which nicely illustrates the care we must exercise when dealing with sorted 
languages, concerns the conditions nominalisations of purely Priorean formulas define. 
Suppose 01 and 02 are two Priorean formulas that define the same class of frames T. 
Let 0' be the nominalisation of 01, and 024 be the nominalisation of 02, let T1 be the 
class of frames defined by oi, and T2 be that defined by on 2. Although by the Inheritance 
Lemma we have that T C T1 and T C TZ, it need not be the case that that T1 = T2. For 
example, we have already seen that the nominalisation of Lobs formula, G(Gi -+ i) -+ Gi 
defines the condition 
`Nto(dx(to<x-+(dy(x<y-+i=y)-+i=x)-+Vz(to<z-z-i)). 
Note that this condition holds of the singleton reflexive loop ({O}, {(0, 0)}), and hence we 
know that G(Gi - i) -+ Gi is valid on this frame. (In passing, Lob's formula itself is not 
valid on this frame, nor on any frame containing reflexive loops.) Now consider the variant 
of Lob's formula obtained by uniformly substituting -'p for p, G(G-'p -+ -'p) -+ G-'p. 
This formula defines the same class of frames as the original - 
- however it's nominalisation G(G-4 -+ -i) -+ G-'i defines irreflexivity. This 
can easily be seen by considering its contrapositive, Fi -+ F(i A -Fi). 
Simpler examples abound. Consider p. This defines the empty class of frames, as does 
-'p. But the nominalisation of p is i, which defines the class of singleton frames, and the 
nominalisation of -'p is -i, which defines the empty class of frames. In both this example 
and the case of Lobs formula, the negation has performed a `aortal transformation'. 
Nominals are the sort `just above' 1, and negating them produces a `composite' or 
`defined' sort `just below' T. There is no reason to suppose that two such different sort6 
will exhibit the same logical behaviour - and as these examples show, they don't. 
Let us turn from these model theoretic questions to completeness theory, and our 
original question: what should count as a sorted intensional logic? We begin by observing 
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that one of the effects of the failure of substitutivity is to render frame incompleteness 
results a virtual triviality. 
We know that Kt + (FF4 -+ F4) is sound and complete with respect to the class of 
transitive frames; the added 4 schema insists that arbitrary information is transitively 
accessible. But can we be more parsimonious in our axiomatisation; is K, +(FFn -+ Fn) 
- or 4" - also complete with respect to the transitive frames? Intuitively no. Adding 
just this schema will not give us enough information about the Henkin frame to yield the 
desired result, anymore than adding i --+ -,Fi to K, forces irreflexivity on the Henkin 
frame. In fact the axiomatisation K"t + (FFn --> Fn) is not only incomplete with respect 
to the class of transitive frames, it is not characterised by any class of frames at all. This 
can be seen as follows. First a general note. Let K"tE be K"t augmented by some 
collection of axioms E. Suppose M is a model such that for all or E E, M = v. Then we 
have that I-E 0 implies M 0. This is merely soundness stated generally, and follows 
because modus ponens and necessitation preserve truth in a model. 
Now let T be the frame ({1, 2, 3}, {(1, 2), (2,3) }). Although T is an intransitive frame, 
it is easy to make all nominal instances of the transitivity schema true in this model, 
while falsifying all variable instances of the schema. For consider the valuation V that 
assigns all nominals {I',} and all variables {3}. Clearly all the axioms are true in this 
model, and equally clearly all variable instances of the transitivity schema are false at 1. 
Hence for any variable p, V4n FFp -+ Fp. Moreover I. cannot be characterised by any 
class of frames at all, for any characterising class would have to be transitive, and hence 
would validate FFp -+ Fp which is not derivable. In short, K t is not strong enough to 
transfer the `transitive accesibility' of singleton information to arbitrary information. 19 
"'On the other hand, if we were working with a language of strong nominals, adding the 
4 schema for nominals only would suffice. In such a language, given that we knew the truth of 
FF¢, any ¢ verifying time must be `marked' by some strong nominal, say i, by strongness. Hence 
we could deduce FF(i A ¢). But this means that FFi is_ true, and from the axiom FFi -+ Fi 
we deduce Fi. But then from Fi A FF(i A ¢) we obtain F(i n ¢) by NOM, and hence F¢. In 
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Frame incompleteness results for purely Priorean languages are not such trivialities 
- indeed the discovery of such results, and second order perspective on intensional 
logic which attended them, marked the beginning of a new and important phase in 
intensional logic - and the ease with which we obtained the result above may suggest 
that nothing is at stake here save the correct definition of what a sorted logic should be. 
Perhaps a natural closure condition on logics is missing - some sortal approximation to 
substitutivity - which would rule out 4' as a logic? This may well be, and it is true 
that 4' does not seem particularly interesting; but there are natural frame incomplete 
logics, where the incompleteness, as with 4, trades on sorting and can be proved with 
similar ease. Such logics are harder to dismiss as pathologies. 
Consider the TREF axiomatisation I4t,LinTrTrED, which for the remainder of this 
discussion we will call LIN,D. As we have already noted, this logic is strongly complete 
with respect to the unbounded STOs. Now consider the extension of LIN,D obtained by 
adjoining as axioms all instances of 
f -- (F-,c A P-e). 
At first glance this may appear absurd. We know that on the transitive frames any 
instance of e - F-'c defines the condition 
Vx3yz(x < y A x < z A -,Tri(y, z)), 
and clearly any instance of a --+ P-,e defines the mirror image condition. As the LIN,D 
axioms demand that time is an unbounded STO, accepting the new axioms seems tanta- 
mount to demanding the existence of a STO containing non-trichotomous pairs of points. 
However this is illusory. The new axiomatisation is not inconsistent. It is frame incom- 
plete, but nonetheless it is sound and complete with respect to a rather natural class of 
models. 
short, because strong valuations cover frames, the transitivity stipulation transfers from strong 
nominals to arbitrary information. 
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The point is that we need not interpret the truth of the new axioms as reflecting a 
constraint on frame orderings. We can view matters rather more simply: the new axiom 
reflects a (possible) truth concerning our usage of the word `interval': that intervals 
must be `small'. The new axiom asserts that intervals cannot be insanely large: real 
intervals have a beginning and an end, and our adoption of this axiom reflects in our 
temporal logic this understanding of what it is to be an interval in our logic. Before 
discussing the underlying intuitions further, let's prove the soundness and completeness 
results. 
Call the augmented axiomatisation LIN,DSmall. Let VUSTO denote the class of 
TREF valuations for our language on the class of unbounded STOed TREF frames, and let 
VSMALL be the (non-empty) subclass of VUSTO defined as follows. A valuation V E VvsTo 
on T = (T, <, T x T) is in VSMALL iff for all interval nominals e, there exist an u E T such 
that for all t E V (e), t < u; and for all interval nominals e, there exist an I E T such that 
for all t E V (e), 1 < t. That is, we are interested in the class consisting of all valuations 
on unbounded STOs such that assignments for all interval nominals e are bounded above 
and below. The result we seek is that LIN8DSmall is sound and complete with respect 
to all models (T, V) such that T is an unbounded STO, and V E VsMALL. 
Soundness is straightforward. As VUSTO C VSMALL the soundness of the LIN,D 
axioms is assured. The only thing that requires checking is that the instances of Small 
are true in all such models, but the restriction to the valuations in VsMALL is precisely 
what is required to achieve this. All the rules of inference preserve truth in a model, 
thus soundness is proved. This in turn meanSthat the logic is consistent, hence it is 
not characterised by the empty class of frames. As this was the only possible class of 
frames which could have characterised it, the logic cannot be characterised by any class 
of frames at all and is frame incomplete. 
To obtain the indicated completeness result, we reason as follows. Given a consistent 
set of sentences, we make the Henkin frame in the usual way. Because of the presence 
of Lin, Tr, and Trr, we know that the generated subframe is `almost linear' (it may 
contain clusters), that it is unbounded because of the D schema, and that every nominal 
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and interval nominal occurs in some MCS. We know we can heavily bulldoze this frame 
into an unbounded STO, but before we do so let's check that the natural valuation is 
bounded above and below. That is, we want to show that it is impossible that any 
interval nominal e can be in some point h in the Henkin frame, and also in all h' such 
that h <h h', or all h' such that h' <h h. So suppose there is some interval nominal e 
such that e E h, and for all h' such that h <h h', e E h'. This means that Ge E h, or 
-'F-ie E h. But all instances of e --> F-,e E h, hence as e E h, F-'e E h - contradiction. 
Showing that the natural valuation is bounded below is similar. Given this, and recalling 
that the set of points in the generated Henkin model containing any interval nominal e 
must be trichotomous and convex, it is clear that heavily bulldozing the frame preserves 
the `boundedness' property of the natural valuation. But as the bulldozed frame is an 
unbounded STO, its valuation is in VSMALL, and we have a model in the desired class 
and our completeness result. 
A second example of this type of logic is LIN,D augmented by all instances of 
E --> (PE V FE). Read as reflecting a possible constraint on the entities we can call 
intervals, the axiom is perfectly reasonable. It says that intervals must take time; points 
are not to be considered intervals as they are too small - real intervals take time. In 
view of this we call the schema Dur, for duration. 
Call the nonempty class of valuations on the unbounded STOed TREF frames such that 
for all interval nominals e, card(V(e)) > 1, VD,. It is easy to show that LIN,DDur is 
sound and complete with respect to the class of all TREF models (T, V) such that T is 
an unbounded STOed TREF frame, and V E VDUR 
Now I am not particularly concerned whether these three examples are `universal 
truths of usage' or `natural language conventions' concerning which stretches of time we 
can properly dub intervals or not. The Dur schema appears problematic - making a 
decision either way seems arbitrary. The Small schema is perhaps more plausible: there 
certainly are some clear examples of interval names which do obey this constraint. For 
example, once only dates - 12th July 1959 - do, as do `periodically repeating' interval 
names such as Monday. Furthermore - and this is one of the joys of sorting - no claim 
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of universality need be made to defend the use of this axiom. Given a clear example of 
unbounded interval names - we might dub these `scientific' or `metaphysical' interval 
names, given their likely source - we need merely subdivide our interval nominals into 
two subsorts - a bounded and an unbounded sort - and only add the instances of this 
schema in the bounded sort. (And clearly we must add the instances of this schema, or 
some equivalent, in such a sort. This bounded behaviour constitutes part of the logical 
properties of such names, and we cannot hope to accurately model their behaviour with- 
out imposing such a restriction.) Nonetheless, I don't think either axiom is particularly 
exciting; what I find more interesting are the ideas these logics point towards: the im- 
portance of classes of models, rather than classes of frames, for applied temporal logic; 
or, more accurately, the importance of considering systematic constraints on valuations 
which are syntactically reflected in our tensed object languages. 
Applying temporal logic is about modeling. At the very least what we are doing is 
attempting to reflect, to a degree of accuracy suitable for the purposes at hand, some 
aspects of the problem (physical, linguistic or computational) in the semantic structures 
of our languages. Given some problem we seek to provide a `picture' of it, an image 
that is not too simplified, in the semantic structures our logical languages talk about. 
Then, by examining the logics of these `pictures', we hope to provide useful answers to 
our questions. 
But what tense logical semantical structures should be used, frames or models? The 
tense logical tradition has revolved around `photographing intuitive temporal ontology' 
in frames. 20 Now up to a point this is sensible: it is clearly crucial to know what logics 
our modeling choices regarding the flow of time give rise to. However implicit in any 
position which regards only the relational structure of frames as logically important is 
the claim that the flow of time constitutes our temporal ontology, and this I believe is 
mistaken. Equally important are our pretheoretic notions concerning events, and event 
2OAs we shall see in the final chapter, constraints on valuations have often been imposed in 
interval based logics. 
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structure - in short, the intuitive constraints we feel are placed on the distribution of 
information on the temporal flow. Given that such constraints are important, and given 
that different types of information are subject to different constraints, we are led to a 
position which demands that we investigate not just the effects of the varying relational 
structure, but in addition the effects of sortally constraining valuations as well. 
The logic LIN,DSmall illustrates, in rather simplistic fashion, the results of attempt- 
ing this sort of modeling. The example in certain respects is rather artificial; rather than 
reflecting some aspect of natural `event structure', the Small axiom reflects a certain, 
rather peripheral, aspect of referential usage. (In general, all uses of sorting to model 
reference have this `conventional' aspect. In many ways this is less exciting than model- 
ing event structure, but on the other hand some pleasant results can be achieved in such 
modeling, and the problems are by no means always peripheral, as we shall see in the next 
chapter.) Nonetheless, this insistence that intervals be bounded is a useful illustration of 
a general point. We tried to model a certain convention regarding referential usage, and 
succeeded in doing so in a natural way: the `pictures of time' with respect to which we 
managed to prove a completeness result `looked right': the flow was the desired one (an 
unbounded STO), and correctly decorated with the right sort of referential information. 
In short the model we built, in which both the temporal flow and the (referential) 
information distribution were correctly constrained reflected our intuitions. Such logics 
should not be regarded as odd just because they cannot be captured by constraints on 
frame ordering: there is no particular reason why we should want to so capture many 
sorted logics in the first place. Such completeness results - and their associated com- 
pleteness results - are the natural concomitants of the view of temporal modeling here 
expounded. 
I am not going to discuss this matter further. (This is not because I believe there 
is nothing more to be said, but because an adequate treatment is impossible here.) I'll 
simply state that I believe the discussion so far has established the importance of classes 
of models, rather than classes of frames, as our fundamental semantic touchstone. This 
granted, I will now consider other matters. In particular, I want to argue that if we are to 
achieve any general results concerning sorting we should consider alternative semantics 
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for our languages. As a first step, let's consider the problems that will be faced by 
0-sorted languages, and what we might hope from a general theory of sorting. 
Sorting any intensional language raises anew the traditional problems of definability, 
completeness and decidability. Moreover, although prior acquaintance with other sorts 
may prove useful, solving these problems is a new exercise each time, sometimes a difficult 
one. Consider sorting a standard tensed language by introducing the sort of 2-nominals 
is, :Z, is, ..., the sort constrained to denote precisely 2 distinct points. How can we 
axiomatise its minimal logic on the basis of kt? Certainly Kt itself won't do: 
i2 A p A Fi2 A -Fp -+ (E(i2 A 0) -'' (0 V F4)) 
is valid, whereas 
gApAFgA -Fp -' (E(gA0) -' (0V FO)) 
is not. The solution promises to be messy, yet this is a fairly obvious variant of NTL; for 
more exotic sorts the problems may be severe. 21 
Moreover, sorting does not only inherit the old problems, it gives rise to new prob- 
lems of its own. A good example concerns transference between sorts, something briefly 
touched on when discussing the incompleteness of 4. Consider a mixed language of 
NTL. Are there examples of logics which we can axiomatise by adding only schemas in 
nominals, but which are not conservative over K t with respect to the purely Priorean 
formulas provable? That is, are there axiomatisations KwE where all the axioms in E are 
41Actually, although 2-nominals seem similar to nominals, they differ in an important respect: 
nominals are a single island sort, whereas 2-nominals are not. This is the source of the messiness 
in axiomatising this sort. In passing, for any cardinal number c > 1 we could define c-gsf- 
nominals: a sort constrained to denote precisely c distinct points, no two of which can lie in the 
same generated subframe. For all c > 1 . the minimal tense logic for purely c-gsf-nominal 
languages is axiomatised by K. To see this, simply doubly generate an NTL model in the usual 
way (we can do this because of the NOMw schema), and then add the required number of isolated 
points at infinity to provide the remaining references for the c-gsf-nominals. 
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purely nominal wffs, and yet there exists a purely Priorean formula 0 such that I-x,,,r 0 
and yx,,, 0? We have seen no examples of such a phenomenon so far: the axiomatisation 
I we considered in the previous chapter, for example, though of the requisite form was 
conservative over K, ,t in this fashion. Nonetheless, simple examples lie to hand 
Firstly consider the axiomatisation Km+n. This is complete with respect to the class 
of all singleton frames. Proving this could hardly be simpler: any generated subframe of 
its Henkin frame consists of a single MCS containing all nominals - the axiom schema 
n drives in all nominals immediately. Note that for any universal tense A, all instances 
of An are derivable in K t + n; simply apply the appropriate sequence of temporal 
generalisations. We then get the following transference: all instances of AqS V A-eqS are 
derivable, for all universal tenses A and wffs 0. 
1. 0 Assumption 
2. iAO 1; Axiom, PC 1 
3. iA0-->A(i---0) NOMw variant 1 
4. A(i --> qS) 2,3; MP 1 
5. Ai Theorem 1 
6. AO 4,5; TMP 1 
7. 0-->AO 1, 6; Discharge 
8. - q -->A-0 (Similarly) 
9. 0V-'0 PC 
10 AqS V A-'qS 7, 8, 9; PC 
In particular, this means we can prove all instances of Ap V -'Ap for any variable 
p. This cannot be done in K,t, thus there has been transference from the nominal 
schema to the variables. Two other simple examples are provided by the axiomatisations 
K t + (n A Fn) and Kt + (n A -,Fn). The first is complete with respect to the class of all 
singleton reflexive frames, the second with respect to the class of all singleton irreflexive 
frames - the proofs are straightforward. We first note that K t + (n A Fn) has as 
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theorems all instances of the T schema: 
1. ¢ Assumption 
2. iAGiAO-G¢ Minimal theorem 1 
3. i Axiom 1 
4. Gi 3, GGen 1 
5. G¢ 1, 2, 3, 4 MP 1 
6. G(iA¢) 4,5 TL 1 
7. Fi Axiom 1 
8. F¢ 6,7 TMP 1 
9. 0 - F4) 1, 8 Discharge 
192 
(The minimal theorem in line 2 is a semi-contraposed instance of the end effect i A Gi A 
F¢ - ¢ derived in Chapter 4.) 
In contrast, K t + (n A -Fn) transfers all instances of the irreflexivity schema I to 
arbitrary wffs. That is, we can prove any instance of ¢ -+ -F¢, including instances in 
variables such as p -+ -iFp. 
1. 0 Assumption 
2. F¢ Assumption 1 
3. Gi Theorem 1,2 






7. ¢--+--F¢ 1, 6; Discharge twice 
In passing, I would like to find a result determining exactly which logics can be so 
axiomatised. 22 I'll also add that there are many related problems that could broadly be 
classified as `transference problems', and I find them some of the most fascinating open 
221 think such a result can be found, for I think transference is possible only under very limited 
circumstances. This is suggested both by the use of end effects to generate the above examples, 
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questions about NTL; however my present interest in transference problems is simply as 
an example of a question peculiar to sorted systems. Consider an arbitrary A-sorted 
language. Similar questions arise in this setting, but in general they will be more difficult. 
In the case of NTL we only had two sorts, and one of these was the unconstrained sort 
sort we call variables. In the more general case we will have multiple sorts, the subsort 
relation will be complex, and there may be no unconstrained sort. Investigating the 
question of transference will bring to the fore the difficulties involving substitutivity. 
Matters get more difficult yet: some A-sorted languages are, intuitively, much better 
behaved than others. Consider any language of TREF. As far as completeness theory 
is concerned such languages are very well behaved indeed: the choice of operators and 
sorts seems a good one. On the other hand, consider a tensed language with 2-nominals. 
As we have seen, the completeness theory promises to be messy; and at a more intuitive 
level, the tense operators don't seem to be able to do much with 2-nominals. Adding the 
shifter doesn't seem to improve matters much - but adding the D operator does. For 
example 
i2A4 -D(i2A-,D(i2A-0)) 
becomes valid: D can find the other end of the invisible rope linking the denotation of 
the 2-nominals. 
Such considerations suggest to me the need to investigate alternative semantics. 
Firstly, for some A-sorted languages these investigations will undoubtedly be difficult - and the more analytic tools available the better. This is an uninteresting (though 
compelling) argument. However the real reason for the shift is motivated by the suspi- 
cion that there may really be a general theory of sorting. It seems unsatisfactory that one 
should have to build ones logical theory from scratch for each new sort - are there no 
general results which allow some interesting theory transfer? Further, is there any math- 
and by the fact that to axiomatise the logics of the previous chapter, we only ever had to add to 
the standard tense logical axiomatisations some combination of n -+ -'Fn, n -+ G(Fn -+ n), or 
Pn V n V Fn. 
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ematical content to the intuition that some sort/operator combinations are particularly 
natural? I don't know, but I believe the matter to be worth investigating - and I am 
dubious that an investigation in frame theoretic terms alone will be revealing. Accord- 
ingly, I'm going to outline two alternative semantic bases for our languages: quasi-frame 
based semantics, and algebraic semantics. 
Quasi-frame semantics, for languages of NTL, is a minor variant of the frame based 
semantics we are used to: a quasi frame is simply a frame with distinguished elements, 
and these elements are the only elements the nominals can denote. There are three 
reasons which suggest that quasi-frames are worth closer examination. The first is that 
they have a notion of validity preserving morphism; the second is that in addition to a 
global notion of validity, they possess a local notion of validity which captures some of the 
phenomena noted in Chapter 3 and 4; and thirdly they naturally give rise to operations 
which may yield specifically nominal preservation results. 23 
Definition 6.3.1 (Quasi-frames and quasi-models) Let T be a frame and I C T be 
non-empty. The pair (T, I) is called a quasi-frame based on T. If (T, I) is a quasi-frame 
and V E V al (T) is such that UiENOM V (i) C I, then MI = ((T, I), V) is called a quasi- 
model on (T, I). A quasi-frame is said to be finite if T is finite, and quasi-finite if I is 
finite. 
We say that a wff is true at a point t in a quasi-model ((T, I), V) if (T, V) J fi[t]. 
We say is valid on a quasi-frame (T, I) if for all quasi-models ((T, I), V) on (T, I), 
and all t E T, ((T, I), V) ¢[t], and we write (T, I) = ¢. It is clear that if 4 is any 
wff, and card{i E NOM : i occurs in ¢} = m, then T ¢ if (T, I) ¢ for all T 
based quasi-frames (T, I) where I has cardinality at most max{1, m}. This means that 
as far as the validity of single formulas is concerned, we need only look at quasi-finite 
quasi-frames. 
"The idea of isolating quasi-frames and quasi-models as semantic structures was suggested to 
me by Kit Fine. The observation that they have a notion of validity preserving morphism is also 
his. 
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Definition 6.3.2 Let (S, Is) and (T, IT) be quasi-frames. If f : S ---+ T is a p- 
morphism from S to T such that f'1[IT] C Is, and for all i i' , E Is, i, # i', and 
f (i,) = f (i;) implies that f (i,) ¢ IT, then f is called quasi p-morphism (qp-morphism) 
from (S,Is) to (T,IT). 
Given this definition and the discussion of p-morphisms in Chapter 2 we have that: 
Lemma 6.3.1 If there is a qp-morphism f from (S, Is) to (T, IT), then (S, Is) 0 
implies (T, IT) 0. 
Intuitively, quasi-frames provide an inherently `local' semantics for NTL: nominals 
can only denote points in I, hence (as nominals and variables have different expressive 
powers) we can talk about the I-regions of frames differently from the rest of the frame. 
Let's make this precise. 
If (T, <, I) is a quasi-frame then (I, < n12) is a subframe of T. We say that 0 is 
quasi-valid on (T, <, I) iff (I, < nI2) = 0, and write (T, <, I) =q 0. Quasi-validity is 
local validity. For example, consider the quasi-frame 
(z u {*}, {*}, <s u{(*, *)}), 
where Z is the integers and <s their usual ordering. The wff i -+ Fi is not valid on this 
quasi-frame (all the elements of Z are irreflexive), but it is quasi-valid as {*} is a region 
of local reflexivity. Quasi-validity gives rise to a notion of local definability: we say that 
0 quasi-defines a class of quasi-frames Q if for all quasi-frames (T, I), (T, I) =q 0 if 
(T, I) E Q. For example, i -+'Fi quasi-defines the class of quasi-frames (T, I) such that 
I is irreflexive - we call these the quasi-irreflexive frames. 
In various forms this sort of local validity has permeated our, discussion of NTL. 
Consider the completeness result we proved for the logic PO in Chapter 4. We first 
generated a Henkin model, but this was not necessarily antisymmetric. What we did 
know, however, was that any point in this frame containing a nominal was a simple 
cluster. In the terms of the present discussion this amountgto saying that 
((HE°, (h: 3i E NOM, such that i E h}), V) I 
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(where HE° is the doubly generated Henkin frame and V the natural valuation), is a 
quasi-model. Moreover, the Simple Cluster Lemma tells us that it's a special quasi-model, 
for by that lemma we know that 
I = {h : 3i E NOM, such that i E h} 
is antisymmetric. That is, the quasi-frame is quasi-antisymmetric, and our model genera- 
tion process has produced a quasi-frame which validates all the schemas in arbitrary wffs, 
and quasi-validates the purely nominal schemas. This type of phenomenon is perfectly 
general for all the completeness results we have considered. 
We can also recast the decidability results of Chapter 4 in quasi-frame terminology. 
For example, the result for PO showed that this logic has the finite quasi-frame prop- 
erty with respect to the class of quasi-antisymmetric frames. In short, many of the 
constructions we have already met can be more naturally viewed as methods of making 
quasi-frames and quasi-models which quasi-validate certain formulas. 
Finally, the notion of a quasi-frame naturally suggests certain operations; and it is 
worth investigating whether these give rise to interesting quasi-validity preservation re- 
sults. Two give two examples, given a quasi-frame (T, I) it is natural to ask whether there 
are interesting order theoretic constraints on how we may decompose I into two non- 
empty sets K and J in such a fashion that the quasi-validity of ¢ on (T, I) is transferred 
to the quasi-frames (T, J) and (T, K). In a similar manner we can look for interesting 
necessary or sufficient conditions governing when merging two quasi-frames (T, I) and 
(T, J) to form (T, I U J) is a quasi-validity preserving operation. I am trying to use these 
ideas to find a criterion for distinguishing those conditions definable in purely nominal 
NML, from those definable in purely nominal NTL. 
It is straightforward to define quasi-frame analogs for other sorts, and these also 
provide `local semantics' that may prove useful heuristics for investigating the properties 
of various sorts. Nonetheless, while I do expect quasi-frames to yield further insight 
into NTL, and expect that such a local semantics will always be a useful addition for 
investigating any particular sort, -I doubt that such semantics will be of much help in 
formulating or solving more general problems: we have probably remained too close to 
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our original frame based semantics to obtain any really new insights into sorting. If we 
are to investigate more general issues I believe we should turn to algebraic semantics. 
Historically algebraic semantics for standard tense and model languages have proved 
invaluable, especially since the discovery of the frame incompleteness results. Duality 
theory, the study of the inter-relationships between algebraic constructions and the more 
familiar constructions on frames (or general frames), has provided answers to many 
difficult questions. 24' The success of this algebraic semantics for standard languages 
suggests it may be useful to develop sorted equivalents. I'll now sketch what is involved. 
Let B = (B, 0, 1, -, +, x, p, f) be a temporal algebra as defined by S. K. Thomason 
[103]. That is, (B, 0, 1, -, +, x) is a Boolean algebra - B is the carrier set, whose 
elements are represented by b, b', b",...; 0 is bottom; 1 top; and the operators have the 
obvious readings - and p and f are unary operators on B such that f (0) = p(0) = 0; 
f (b + b') = f (b) + f (b'); p(b + b') = p(b) + p(b'); and f (b) x b' = 0 if b x p(b') = 0. 
How can we adapt this semantics to languages with nominals? Let's first examine a 
plausible, but misguided, attempt. By an atomic temporal algebra is meant a temporal 
algebra whose underlying algebra is atomic; that is, for each b E B such that b # 0 
there is an atom i E B such that i < b, where < is the usual operator induced ordering 
on the Boolean algebra. 2' As the use of i to denote atoms suggests, we are going to 
interpret nominals on these structures as atoms. Given any wff 4 of NTL we form the 
corresponding temporal polynomial h# by replacing each propositional variable pm by 
the corresponding variable pm over arbitrary elements of our Boolean algebra; replacing 
each nominal it by the corresponding variable it over atoms; and replacing -,, V, A, F and 
P by -, +, x, f and p respectively. We say that an atomic Boolean algebra B validates 
0 (B = qS) if hO = 1 identically in B. 
24An encyclopedic overview of duality theory, one which greatly extends and generalises the 
existing theory, may be found in Goldblatt's recent [41]. An interesting feature of this monograph 
is the way it concentrates on the dualities between algebras and frames, not general frames. 
25An atom in a Boolean algebra is a minimal non-zero element 
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That the NOMw schema is sound in this interpretation follows by induction on the 
length of existential tenses, 26 but we don't get much further than this. Firstly note 
that it is not easy to generalise the kind of `structural selection' of temporal algebras, 
exemplified in our isolation of the atomic modal algebras, to other sorts. Further, we 
have no easy way of building such algebras, save, as we shall later see, building them 
from frames. In particular, Lindenbaum algebras are not atomic temporal algebras. 27 
We have stuck too closely to the intuitive interpretation of nominals, and the algebraic 
structure is not doing any work for us. Let us liberalise our class of algebras by letting 
the algebraicisation of the NOMw schema select the particular temporal algebras 
required. 
Accordingly we define a nominal temporal algebra to be a pair N = (B, I) where B is 
a temporal algebra and I a non-empty subset of B such that for all i E I, for all b E B 
and for all compositions e of the f and p operators (including the null composition), 
i x e(i x b) x -b = 0. Given such an algebra we interpret a language of NTL on it in the 
obvious fashion. That is, we form our polynomials as before, and insist that the variables 
ii in these polynomials that correspond to nominals range over all and only the elements 
26In the inductive proof that follows we write the algebraic counterpart of an existential tense 
E by e - an m length sequence of existential tenses corresponds to the m composition of the 
corresponding algebraic operators. The base case is to show that i x (i x b) x -b = 0, which 
is clear. Suppose that for all e such that len(e) < n, i x e(i x b) x -b = 0. Now suppose that 
9 is an existential tense of length n. We want to show that i x oe(i x b) x -b = 0, where o is 
either p or f. As i is an atom in the algebra, for any element b E B, i x b = i or i x b = 0, so if 
i x oe(i x b) x -b ,E 0, it must equal i instead. But assuming it to equal i leads to a contradiction 
as follows. Firstly, this immediately implies that i x -b = i. But the inductive hypothesis is that 
i x e(i x b) x -b = 0, and substituting i x -b for i means that i x oe(i x -b x b) = i, but this 
means oe(0) = i, which is impossible. 
"The problem, using the standard notation introduced below, is that for all i E NOM, [i] is 
not an atom as (for example) [i Aj] < [i], [i A j] # [i], and [i n j] # [1], where j is any nominal 
distinct from i. 
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of I. In short, we have moved to a two sorted algebraic semantics - the sorts in question 
being B and I - and when evaluating our polynomials we only consider the sortally 
correct evaluation possibilities. As before, we say that a nominal temporal algebra B 
validates 0 (B 0) if h# = 1 identically in B; and we say that 0 is algebraically valid 
iff B 0 for all nominal temporal algebras B. Note that all atomic temporal algebras 
are nominal temporal algebras. 
Given any algebra N = (B, I) of the same type as a nominals temporal algebra - 
that is, B is an algebra of the same type as a temporal algebra, and I is a non-empty 
subset of B's carrier set B - we can interpret a wff 0 on N exactly as though N were 
a nominal temporal algebra. However, following Thomason, we have that the nominal 
temporal algebras are precisely the algebras that validate the K,,t theorems: 
Lemma 6.3.2 Let N = (B,I) be an algebra of the type of nominal temporal algebras. 
Then N validates all theorems of K,,t if N is a nominal temporal algebra. 
Proof: 
Suppose (B, I) is a model for Knt. By Thomason's proof B must be a temporal 
algebra. Only the part peculiar to the nominals thus remains, and this is immediate: if 
(B, I) is a model for K,,t it validates all instances of i A E(i A 0) ---+ 0, that is, 
-(iAE(iA0)-->0)Hl, 
which means that in (B, I), i x e(i x b) x -b = 0, for all i E I, b E B, and composition 
sequences e. 
Proving that any nominal temporal algebra is a model for K,,t merely involves the 
usual inductive soundness argument. 0 
This shows that the set of all algebraically valid NTL wffs is identical to the set of 
wffs valid on all frames. 
We can build nominal temporal algebras easily, and without any reference to the 
frame based semantics, by using the Lindenbaum construction. There is a small catch: 
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examination of (say) Lemmon's proof [60, page 51] that this can be done for standard 
modal languages reveals that \ the proof depends on the fact that standard intensional 
logics are closed under uniform substitution, something that is not the case in NTL. 
However we can impose a weak (and natural) substitutivity closure condition on logics 
of NTL, which, because our algebras are two sorted, enables the construction to perform 
its task. In fact, if we take this closure condition' ;` , I._,, as part of what we mean by a 
nominal tense logic, we can prove a Thomason style adequacy theorem for the algebraic 
semantics. 
Recall from Chapter 5 that a wff 0 is said to be obtained from a wff 0 by NTL 
substitution if 0 is the result of uniformly substituting arbitrary NTL wffs 0 for variables 
in 0, and uniformly substituting nominals for nominals in 0. We define a nominal tense 
logic L to be a set of wffs such that all K,a theorems are in L, and L is closed under modus 
ponens, temporal generalisation, and NTL substitution. This is not unduly restrictive: 
there are many interesting nominal tense logics, and in particular, the theory of any class 
of frames is a nominal tense logic - the proof of this is left to the reader. This enables 
us to prove: 
Theorem 6.3.1 (Adequacy Theorem) For any nominal tense logic L there is nomi- 
nal tense algebra .IIL = (B, f) such that .WL 1 0 if I-L 0- 
Proof: 
let V be the Lindenbaum algebra for L. That is, B = {[O] : 0 E WFF}; [0] = [0] 
if I-L 0; 0 = P-]; 1 = [T]; -[0] = [- 01; [0] + [t'j _ [0 V 0]; [0] x [01 = [0 A 
f ([0]) _ [FO]; p([4]) = [PO]; and I = {[i] : i E NOM}. By the usual reasoning B = 
(B, 0,1, -, +, x) f , p) must be a temporal algebra. Moreover, as Km includes among its 
theorems all instances of NOMw and T, we have that any instance of NOMw is equivalent 
to T in Km, and hence in L. This means that for all [i] E f, [0] E B and composition 
sequences a we have in the Lindenbaurn algebra that -([i] x e([i] x [0])) + [0] = 1, or 
[i] x e([i] x [0]) x -[0] = 0. Thus the Lindenbaum algebra is a nominal temporal algebra 
and hence validates all theorems of K,a. The key point, however, is to show that the 
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Lindenbaum algebra validates not just the K, theorems, but all L theorems, and here 
is where we use the fact that nominal tense logics are closed under NTL substitution. 
Let 0 be any wff. When we evaluate the polynomial h# on the Lindenbaum algebra, 
each evaluation yields a value [S(4')], where S(4') is an NTL substitution instance of 0. 
(This follows by induction on deg(4').) So suppose F-L 0. As L is closed under NTL 
substitutions, F-L S(4') for all NTL substitution instances S(4') of 0. Hence for all such 
S(4'), [S(4')] = 1, thus h# = 1 identically, and L's Lindenbaum algebra validates every L 
theorem. 
To show that any non-theorem 0 of L is falsified in this algebra, suppose that VL 0. 
If for each variable p,,, and nominal it in 0 we evaluate h# with the corresponding 
polynomial variables interpreted by [p,,,] and [it] respectively, we obtain [0]. Clearly 
[0] [1] as otherwise F-L 0, which contradicts our assumption of 4's non-theoremhood. 
0 
We now must link our frame based semantics with our algebraic semantics; the work 
involved is standard. Firstly, each frame (T, <) gives rise to a temporal algebra 
B = (Pow(T),0,T,\,U,n,irp,irj), 
where \, U and n are the usual set theoretic operations, and 9fp and ir1 are as defined in 
Chapter 2. In order to make a nominal temporal algebra out of this we merely form the 
pair N = (B, I), where I is the set consisting of all and only the singleton subsets of T. 
Note that this algebra is an atomic temporal algebra. 
As for the other direction, every algebra gives rise to a frame via Stone representation. 
Given a nominal temporal algebra (B, I), we define F((B, I)) to be (Ultra(B), <u), where 
Ultra(B) is the set of all ultrafilters U on B, and <U is defined by Ui <U U2 if for all 
b E B, b E U2 implies f (b) E U1. It is not difficult to show that in any frame F((B, I)) 
manufactured by this process, no distinct ultrafilters in Ultra(B) containing common 
elements of I can be in the same generated subframe; the proof is essentially an algebraic 
reformulation of the proof of the Unique Occurrence Lemma. This last observation opens 
up the topic of how we make models, and general frames out of algebras. I am not going 
to discuss this, but will content myself by pointing out the following (unsurprising) 
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relation between the Henkin frame of an arbitrary nominal tense logic L and the Stone 
representation of L's Lindenbaum algebra: they're isomorphic. As the reader knows how 
to build models out of Henkin frames, this result should make clear the essence of what 
is involved in building models from algebras. 
Theorem 6.3.2 Let L be a nominal tense logic. Let F(ML) be the frame constructed out 
of the Lindenbaum Algebra for L as defined above, and let HL be the canonical Henkin 
frame for L. Then F(,NL) ^' HL. 
Proof: 
Define g : HL --i F(NL) by g(h) _ {[O] : 0 E h}, for all h E HL. This is a well defined 
function: for all h E HL, g(h) is a subset of the carrier set of the Lindenbaum Algebra 
of L; and because of the familiar closure properties on MCSs, it is always an ultrafilter. 
That g is injective is clear. To see that it is also surjective, for all U E F(ML) define 
MAXv to be U{u : u E U}. We claim MAXv is an MCS and that g(MAXu) = U. That 
for all U E F(ML), MAXu is set of wffs is clear. It cannot be an inconsistent set, for 
this would mean that for some wff 0 both 0 and -,0 were in MAXv. This would mean 
that for some u, u' E U, 0 E u and -0 E q', which in turn would mean that [0] = u and 
-[0] = u', but both of these cannot belong to any ultrafilter. Similarly, MAXv must be 
maximal, for as U is an ultrafilter either [0] or -[0] E U, hence 0 or -E MAXu. Thus 
MAXU is always an MCS. To see that for all g(MAXu) = U we need merely observe 
that it it is clear from the definition of g that g(MAXu) U. But as both g(MAXu) 
and U are ultrafilters it must be that g(MAXu) = U. In short, g is surjective, and MAX 
is the inverse g-1 of g. 
Moreover g is a frame isomorphism. Firstly, for all h, h' E HL, h <h h' if 0 E h' 
implies F4 E h. But then it is immediate from the definition of g that if h <h h' 
then g(h) <v g(h'), where <v is the ordering on F(NL). Conversely suppose that 
g(h) <u g(h'), and that 0 E h'. Then [0] E g(h), hence by the definition of <u, 
f[0] E g(h'). But g`1(g(h')) = MAX,(hs), hence F4 E MAX,(hs), and so h <h h', which 
is what we wanted to show. Thus g is an isomorphism. 
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This concludes our discussion of nominal temporal algebras. Using it as a guide the 
reader will find it straightforward to define the notion of an interval nominal algebra, 
and prove analogous results concerning them. Let's conclude the chapter by defining an 
algebraic semantics for A-sorted languages. 
Let A be a non-empty set. By a A-sorted temporal algebra is meant a pair (B, {Is : 
6 E A}), where B is a temporal algebra, and for each 6 E A, Ia is a non-empty subset of 
B, the carrier set of B. We denote such an algebra by B°. Given a A-sorted language £ , 
we evaluate wffs .0 of L° on a 0-sorted algebra B° by evaluating the sorted polynomial h# 
in the expected way: variables in h# of sort Sb - that is, the variables in the polynomial 
which correspond to atoms of sort Sb - are taken as ranging over all and only the 
elements of I$. We say B' --n ¢ if hO = 1 identically in B°; and given any class of 
A-sorted algebras CB, we say that CB --o ¢ if for all B° E CB, B° =o ¢. 
4han 
This semantics is simpler/the apparatus of A-sorted frames and interpretational bases. 
Moreover, sorts are algebraically reflected by multisorted equations over the algebras; this 
immediately suggests a number of questions. Which standard operations on algebras 
preserve which equations, and given an algebra satisfying a set of equations involving 
sorts in A, when can a set of equations involving sorts A C A' pick out the same algebra? 
(This seems to be the algebraic analog of transfer.) Whether the algebraic approach will 
help us to gain interesting answers to the more general questions posed in this chapter I 
don't know; I think it's a sensible place to start looking. 
This brings the chapter to an end, and with it a major portion of the thesis: with 
the exception of a brief excursion into sorted interval based logics in the final chapter, 
our logical work is done. I believe this work has shown that sorting is of logical interest, 
and strongly suggests that much work of interest remains. But now it is time to turn to 
a new topic: the applicability of sorting. 
Chapter 7 
Applications in Natural Language 
Semantics 
In this chapter referential sorting is used to model aspects of tense, temporal reference, 
and their interaction. In the first section we sketch the referential, or Reichenbachian, 
account of natural language tense, and show that TREF accommodates it rather well. In 
the second section a series of four languages, L° through L, is presented. Each is an 
extension of TREF, and increases its coverage in a uniform way: these languages have new 
atoms - such as now, 1999, Monday and yesterday - which may be freely combined 
in the usual manner. These extensions cope straightforwardly with a number of puzzles 
such as the mismatch between tense and indexical reference in "John will run yesterday". 
In the course of this discussion, matters of more general concern emerge, and these are 
discussed in the third section. When the atoms now, today, tomorrow and yesterday 
were added to TREF in the second section, heavy use was made of one of the central 
ideas of the California theory of reference [68) [69] [52] [56) [55], contextual evaluation. 
Some technical changes were introduced - the contextual apparatus was exploited by 
means of sorting, not new operators, for one thing - but these additions were intended 
to be in the spirit of the Californian tradition, and I believe they are. Now, work in a 
field that has come to be known as two dimensional logic also took as it's starting point 
the Californian idea of evaluating expressions at a pair of indices. While this tradition 
is technically interesting, it has had two unfortunate effects. Firstly it has obscured 
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the semantic insights afforded by the California theory of reference - indeed obscured 
them to the point where these insights are seen as merely amounting to the discovery of 
primitive forms of two dimensional logic. Secondly the complexity of these logics, and 
their complete lack of natural language motivation, has made it appear that tense logic 
has little to offer natural language semantics. In this section I show that plain ('one 
dimensional') TREF handles the problems that motivated such extensions as multiple 
Vlach operators. 
The fourth section discusses the application of referential sorting to discourse phe- 
nomena. It is noted that nominals and interval nominals can be used as discourse markers 
to model the some of types of phenomena discussed by Partee [75], such as indefinite 
antecedent anaphora, bound variable uses, and `temporal donkeys'. The relationship 
between TREF and temporal DRT is briefly discussed. 
7.1 Tense and Reichenbach 
Standard Priorean tense logic contains no mechanism for referring to times; it can merely 
quantify over them in restricted fashion using its operators. This means that its use as a 
model of tense in natural language has severe limitations, even when it comes to modeling 
such apparently unproblematic tenses as the simple past and simple future of English; 
these tenses aren't solely, or even primarily, quantificational in nature. Barbara Partee 
[75, pages 244-245], for example, compares the use of the past tense in the sentence "I 
didn't turn off the stove" (uttered without previous linguistic context while driving down 
a freeway) to the way third person pronouns function: both devices refer to some entity 
that is salient to the listener. In this sentence the salient entity is a time: possibly a point, 
more likely an interval, and perhaps occurring just before the drive down the freeway 
began. This means that the usual purely Priorean representation of this sentence, 
P(-+ I turn off the stove), 
is not particularly good, for the act of temporal reference is uncaptured. Far too many 
points of time are relevant to the truth value of this wff. (Presumably there is no stove 
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in the car, so no act of stove-turning-off can have occurred during the journey - but 
this means that any time during the duration of the journey makes the above wff true 
in a way that is irrelevant to the meaning of the original sentence.) In contrast, in a 
language of TREF we could write down 
P(i A I turn off the stove); 
we have used a nominal to refer to a specific time, asserted of that time that no stove- 
turning-off took place then, and have thus captured the required element of referentiality. 
Since the time of `not turning off the stove' is probably associated with the rather fuzzy 
interval centred round the preparations for the journey, the use of an interval nominal, 
yielding 
P(e A -'I turn off the stove), 
may be preferred. 
Let's consider another example. In the same paper Partee considers the sentence 
"When John saw Mary, she crossed the street" which she considers to be analogous to 
the paradigmatic case of pronominal anaphora; 1 the first clause picks out a time, and 
the second anchors the crossing of the street to this time. Representing this inter-clausal 
shared temporal reference is crucial, and is easily accomplished in TREF: 
P(i A John sees Mary) A P(i A Mary crosses the street). 
Actually this wff is probably better regarded as an encoding of the two sentence discourse 
"John saw Mary. She crossed the street." The single clause variant given above might 
be better represented as 
P(i A John sees Mary A Mary crosses the street). 
'That is, where an antecedent noun phrase picks out a particular individual and a later 
pronoun is used to denote the same individual. For example, "Gordon is feeling unwell. He has 
the 'flu." 
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Of course these two wffs are logically equivalent - note that the implication from the 
first to the second is an instance of NOM - but the function of the `When' here seems 
precisely to perform a NOM style `compression' of the matrix of the second clause into the 
tense structure created by the first, and presumably this is something a good translation 
function would do. 
These referring uses of simply tensed sentences are not isolated. It would be an exag- 
geration to call them canonical, but in general it is easier to construct simple sentences 
in which the tense does refer rather than ones in which it doesn't. 2 Some sentences 
don't make full use of this referential potential, but tenses can and usually do refer. 
Such observations suggest the following. In general the tense of a simply tensed 
sentence seems to embody at least two types of information. Firstly it encodes a `shift' 
- though a directed shift, unlike the shift of L - an instruction to move (or search) 
forwards or backwards in time according as the tense is future or past. $ Secondly 
it encodes a (perhaps not particularly tight) specification of which temporal region in 
the indicated direction the event under consideration took place at. This suggests the 
following heuristic: we should try to break tensed information apart into a `shift' and 
a `reference' and code the result in TREF. For example, simple tensed sentences should 
be encoded in the form P(r A 0) or F(r A 0), where 0 is the `event matrix' - the 
condition asserted to hold - and r is one of our TREF referring atoms. (Usually r will 
be a nominal or an interval nominal; but in order to cope with any genuine cases where 
simply tensed sentences have no referential import we allow T to count as a referring 
2As an example of a sentence with a tense that doesn't seem to refer, consider "All persons 
alive now will be dead". Other possible candidates for non-referential use of tense are "Modus 
ponens will be valid", and "One plus one was two". Another source arises from certain uses of 
the simple future, exemplified by "If something isn't done about that tooth, you'll have a bad 
time of it". The use of the future tensed `you'll' doesn't refer to a future time in any simple 
fashion; as is so often the case, the use of the future tense here is not purely temporal. Such uses 
raise interesting problems, but these will not be considered here. 
3That is, "Look right!", or "Look left!". 
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atom.) If something along the lines of this heuristic is sustainable it would be very 
pleasant, for shifting and referring is what languages of TREF were designed to do. Does 
this construal of natural language tense lead anywhere interesting? Firstly, it links neatly 
with Reichenbach's account of tense [86, pages 287-298]. 
Reichenbach insisted that understanding tensed expressions involved understanding 
the temporal relations that can hold between three special points of time. The first two 
points, point of speech and point of event have the obvious meanings: for example, given 
an utterance of "John ran" at time to, to is the point of speech, and the time when John 
actually ran is the point of event. 4 
It is the third type of point, point of reference, that is Reichenbach's novelty. Consider 
the past perfect sentence "John had run". Note the way it works - our attention is not 
directed immediately to the time at which John runs; rather we are first referred to 
some point t' preceding the point of speech and told that at some point prior to this 
intermediate point John ran. This intermediate point is called the point of reference; 
it is the `vantage point' from which the event in the sentence is surveyed. Reichenbach 
accounts for the variety of tenses found in natural language in terms of the different 
patterns of temporal precedence and coincidence these three points can exhibit. For 
example, in the past perfect we have that E < R < S, or in the `diagram notation' that 
Reichenbach uses, E - R - S. 6 The simple past is characterised by Reichenbach by the 
pattern E,R-S; just as we have seen, in the simple past we refer to the time the event 
described took place. 
4In general Reichenbach treats point of event as being a point of time rather than an interval. 
At one stage, [86, page 290] he does consider extended or intervallic events, but this possibility 
is only raised for sentences in the progressive. Allowing `point of event' to be an interval seems 
a natural augmentation of his position however. A rather more interesting question is whether 
`point of reference' (discussed next) can be an interval. In what follows I simply assume that this 
is the sensible thing to do. (Much later we'll see an example which indicates why.) 
SReichenbach indicates that a point P precedes a point P' by writing P - P'. If these two 
points coincide he writes P,P'. 
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Let's systematically consider the thirteen original Reichenbachian possibilities. The 
first three columns of the following table are due to Bernard Comrie [19, page 25]; they 
tabulate the possibilities admitted by Reichenbach's idea. The fourth column gives our 
representation of these tenses in TREF. 
Structure Name English example Representation 
E-R-S Pluperfect I had seen P(r A P¢) 
E,R-S Past I saw P(r A ¢) 
R-E-S Future-in-the-past I would see P(r A F¢) 
R-S,E Future-in-the-past I would see P(r A F¢) 
R-S-E Future-in-the-past I would see P(r A F¢) 
E-S,R Perfect I have seen P¢ 
S,R,E Present I see ¢ 
S,R-E Prospective I am going to see F¢ 
S-E-R Future perfect I will have seen F(r A P4) 
S,E-R Future perfect I will have seen F(r A P¢) 
E-S-R Future perfect I will have seen F(r A P¢) 
S-R,E Future I will see F(r A ¢) 
S-R-E Future-in-the-future (Latin: abiturus ero) F(r A F¢) 
Note that the perfect and past tenses are represented differently. The identical rep- 
resentations these two tenses receive in standard tense logic is one of the major sources 
of dissatisfaction with the use of tense logic in the analysis of natural language. That a 
distinction exists in TREF is pleasant, but it would be premature to attach a great deal of 
importance to this. The TREF representation has added something - a Reichenbachian 
component - to Prior's account of tense; but we have added nothing to the (very un- 
satisfactory) Priorean account of the perfect. I'll make a brief remark concerning the 
perfect at the end of the chapter. 
Also note that all three logically possible permutations of R, E and S for each of the 
Future-in-the-past and the future perfect are represented by a single formula. Comrie 
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declares that such representations are essential [19, pages 26 - 27]: while one form may 
be favoured, and one largely ruled out, these are Gricean implicatures, all three usages 
are possible, and a uniform representation is needed. 
The table does not exhaust all the possibilities, even for the case of English. Consider 
the example, due to Prior [79, page 13], "I shall have been going to see John". This 
seems to require two points of reference, R1 and R2. In Reichenbach's diagrams the 
most pragmatically likely pattern they will exhibit is S - R2 - E - R1. The semantic 
possibilities are captured in TREF by: 
F(r A P(r' A F(See John))). 
More generally, Comrie [19], [20, pages 122 - 130] proposes a modification of Reichen- 
bach's system which essentially amounts to the following: Reichenbach's simultaneity 
relation is replaced by an intervallic overlap relation, there may be an arbitrary number 
of reference points, and the point of speech is linked to the point of event by a (possi- 
bly null) zig-zag sequence of reference points. This isn't made completely precise, but I 
believe the following captures everything Comrie intended. We take as primitive tenses 
the three forms PO, ¢, and FO. We then say that if 0 is a tensed form, so are P(r A t&), 
(r A t/'), and F(r A t'), for all referential atoms r, and inductively close the set in the 
usual fashion. The set of tensed forms seems to capture Cowrie's intention. (In fact it 
may overgenerate - it's not clear to me whether Comrie wants closure under the form 
(r A t&) -- but this stipulation can be dropped.) 
7.2 Indexicals and dates 
While the use of nominals and interval nominals to model the deictic and anaphoric 
aspects of tense is a natural one, and while the link between the work of Prior and 
Reichenbach their use suggests is pleasant, a charge of triviality looms. Standard Priorean 
logic's lack of referential mechanisms - so the charge runs - is a major defect. That 
languages of TREF with their two referential sorts can achieve more is a truism: given 
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such apparatus how could one fail to do better? Such success does not establish that 
the approach is an interesting one, and until this is shown the previous remarks remain 
isolated observations and the link with Reichenbach's work a piece of interpretational 
whimsy. 
To rebut such a charge we must show that referential sorting can naturally model 
further phenomena and this is the princippj task of the remainder of the chapter. In the 
present section we model two common types of temporal referring terms, indexicals and 
dates. I believe the results show that referential sorting is an interesting approach, and 
for two reasons. 
The first is the simple and uniform mode of representation. All such terms - ̀now', 
`October', `Monday', `yesterday' and `1984' - are handled in syntactically uniform fash- 
ion: in particular, they are treated as atoms and freely combined with all the logical 
connectives just as nominals and interval nominals are. This will permit the sentence 
"John climbed yesterday" to be represented as 
P(yesterday A (John climbs)); 
and "John reached the summit of Ruapehu on Wednesday the 15th November, 1989" to 
be represented by 
P(Wednesday A 15 A November A 1989 A AD A (John ... Ruapehu)); 
and some well known difficulties are cleared up on the way. 
But there is another, deeper, reason for satisfaction: the use the semantic machinery 
of the California theory of reference is put to. In this section I will show that not only 
can we successfully sort in contextualised semantics, but that sorting is an elegant way 
to exploit double indexing. 
We proceed as follows. Four contextualised languages are introduced, L 9 9 to £ . L° 
is the base language; in C we add a name for `now'; in L we add names for `yesterday', 
'today' and `tomorrow'; and in .C we add the paraphernalia of calendars. 
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7.2.1 The language L° 
By the contextualised language of temporal reference to is simply meant the fixed choice 
of some language of TREF. That is, syntactically to has a denumerably infinite supply 
of variables VAR = {p, q, r,...}; a denumerably infinite supply of nominals, NOM = 
{i, j, k ...J; and a similar supply of interval nominals, INOM = {e, d, c, ...}. As usual 
VAR, NOM and INOM are pairwise disjoint, and VAR U NOM U INOM is the set 
of 4° atoms. The wffs of L° are inductively produced by boolean combination and 
application of the operators F, P and L. The respective dual operators G, H and M are 
defined as usual. 
We give this language a slightly different semantics however. The semantics of to - 
and indeed of all the contextualised languages considered in this section - is ultimately 
in terms of contextualised frames. We augment our old temporal structures (frames) with 
a new set of indices called contexts of utterance, and link these new items with frames in 
the simplest possible way, namely by stipulating that each context of utterance occurs 
at some point in time. 
Definition 7.2.1 (Contextuallsed frames) By a contextualised frame (c-frame TC 
is meant a 4-tuple (T, <, C, g) where: 
1. (T, <) is a frame; 
2. CEO, andTnC=O; 
3. g: C ---1 T. 
C is called the set of contexts of utterance or contexts on T. We often write contex- 
tualised frames as 3-tuples (T, C, g), where T is the frame (T, <), and we say that a 
c-frame Tc is based on the frame T. If TC and TC' are c -frames based on the same 
frame T then they are called contextual variants. 0 
Thus we have our usual model of temporal flow (T, <), a collection C of contexts of 
utterance, and we know (via g) where each context is temporally situated. 6 
6Note that although we have the shifter L in contextualised languages we have not explicitely 
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The simplifications introduced by this modeling hardly need elaborating: to the usual 
objections that a point based temporal ontology is inadequate we can add the complaint 
that introducing a simple set C as a model of the notion of context hardly counts as 
a profound analysis - at the very least we would expect contexts to `take time', and 
thus perhaps g should assign intervals to elements of C. In fact we would demand an 
awful lot more of anything that was to count as an adequate model of context: we would 
certainly expect any such modeling to give contexts a rich internal structure, possibly 
including such features as agent(s), patient(s), and location(s); and we would want this 
internal structure to aid in imposing useful structure on the set of contexts - such useful 
(external) structure perhaps including relations such as sub-context, contextual overlap 
and causal linkage. In short, an adequate modeling of the notion of context would have a 
lot in common with the sort of structures demanded by situation theory [3]. Although in 
the course of this section we progressively remove some of the limitations of our modeling, 
we never attempt the difficult task of giving an adequate account of context. The main 
reason for this is that in order to model some of the more obvious features of natural 
language temporal reference and its interaction with tense, such modeling is unnecessary. 
For the simple matters considered here, all we need to know is that there are such things 
as contexts, and that they are situated in time. 
We now link £ with our new semantic structures: 
Definition 7.2.2 By a valuation for £ on a c-frame Tc = (T, C, g) is meant a function 
V : ATOMco X C ---i Pow(T), 
included the universal relation; instead we will state L's truth condition directly. (The only reason 
we used the multiframe definition in the previous chapter was for its convenience when proving 
completeness results.) In passing, our gloss of C as `contexts of utterance' shouldn't be taken too 
literally; `contexts in which a sentence might be uttered' is more accurate. Nonetheless, as long 
as we keep the (fairly obvious) limitations of our modeling in mind the gloss is both harmless 
and appealing. 
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such that for all i E NOM, V (i, c) is a singleton subset of T; and for all e E INOM, 
V(e,c) E Int(T). By an L° model M° is meant a pair (TC,V) where Tc is a contextual 
frame, and V a valuation for L° on Tc. 
Nominals and interval nominals no longer denote uniquely - however within any 
particular context of utterance (`on any particular occasion of use'), they do. Note that 
the definition of valuation has a pleasant flavour of `local truth': valuations V can assign 
different truth values to the same atom in two temporally coincident contexts. That is, 
both p and -,p can hold at the same time - as long as the contexts are different. It can 
be raining in Edinburgh, yet sunny in Glasgow. 
Given an L° model M° = (TC, V) and an L° wff 0, we define the notion of truth of 
in M° at a point t E T relative to a context c E C as follows: 0 
M° = a[t,c] iff t E V (a, c), for all atoms a 
M° = - O[t, C1 iff not M° 1 O[t, c] 
M°=0AO[t,c] iff M° = O[t, c] and M° = +/.'[t, c] 
M° = F4[t, c] iff 3t# (t < t' and M° = O[t', c]) 
M° = PO[t, c] iff 3t'(t' < t and M° = O[t', c]) 
M° J LO[t, c] iff M° = 4[t', c], for all t' E T. 
(We often talk of evaluating a wff 0 at a pair It, c].) Note that none of the above 
clauses changes the value of c during the process of evaluating the truth value of wffs. 
That is, if we evaluate a wff 0 in a context c at time t, the truth value of 0 depends on 
the truth value of its subformulas at other context/time pairs, but only on pairs of the 
form [t', c], where c is the context 0 was originally uttered in. None of the clauses exploits 
the presence of the c coordinate in any fashion: contexts for L° are idle additions. The 
following lemma, immediate by induction on deg(O), makes this clear: 
Lemma 7.2.1 Let Tc = (T, C, g) be a e -frame, (TC, VC) be an CO, model, and c some 
fixed element of C. Then if V is a TREF valuation on T such that V (a) = VC (a, c), for 
all atoms a then: 
(TC,Vc) 1O[t,c] iff (T, V) 1 O[t] 
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for allwfso. 
What is meant by validity for contextualised languages? There are (at least) three 
concepts with claim to the title. 
Definition 7.2.3 (Validity in contextualised languages) Let T° be the c -frame (T, < 
, C, g) and 0 a wff of a contextualised language. Then 0 is valid on T° if for all valua- 
tions V onTc, for all tET and all cEC 
(T°,V) = 0[t,c]. 
Further, 0 is locally utterance valid on T° if for all valuations V on T°, and all c E C 
(T °, V) 4[9 (c), cl ; 
and 0 is utterance valid on T° if 0 is locally utterance valid on all contextual variants 
T°' of Tc. We say that 0 is valid, locally utterance valid, or utterance valid respectively 
if for all contextualised frames T° 0 has the variety of validity in question. 
This definition needs some explanation. The basic distinction being drawn is between 
plain validity and the two varieties of validity involving the word `utterance'. This type of 
distinction dates back to at least 1968 and is essentially that drawn by Richard Montague 
between pragmatic validity and ordinary validity [68, page 107. Montague noted that 
while certain expressions involving indexicals such as `I exist' were not `logically' or 
`semantically' valid, the whole point about the way indexicals function was that the 
utterance of such an expression was a guarantee of its truth. This is an interesting 
property, and Montague introduced the term `pragmatic validity' for it. 7 
7The distinction is fundamental in the Californian tradition: for example David Kaplan in- 
troduces the notion of `validity' [56, page 408], which is essentially what we have termed above 
`local utterance validity'; and `neotraditional validity' [56, page 4101, which is the analog of our 
`validity'. 
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Now the definition of validity simpliciter just given is unproblematic; the quantifica- 
tion across all pairs [t, c] captures the `logical' or `semantical' notion required. Note that 
it is a corollary of the previous lemma that for any frame T, any c-frame T° based on 
T, and any wff 4,, 4 is valid on T° if 0 is ordinary TREF valid on the underlying frame 
T of T°. 8 
Pinning down a satisfactory `pragmatic' notion of validity is rather more interesting. 
Local utterance validity is an obvious first attempt to capture such a notion, and as 
it only quantifies across pairs of the form [g(c), c] - that is, across those pairs where 
`something is actually said' - it is fundamentally along the right lines. Nonetheless, 
the distinction it draws is not subtle enough. C° is a particularly simple contextualised 
language, and none of the clauses in its truth definition makes any essential reference 
to context. Because of this insensitivity to context, any proposed distinction between 
`semantical' and `pragmatic' validity on c-frames ought to coincide for C°. However 
local utterance validity does not coincide with validity. To take a simple example, consider 
any contextualised frame (Q (D Z)° whose underlying frame Q ® Z consists of a copy of 
the rational numbers Q followed by a copy of the integers Z, and whose contexts C are all 
mapped by g into points in Q. Because contexts are all located on the rationals, contexts 
all occur in a region of density, and thus F¢ -> FF¢ is locally utterance valid. But clearly 
this formula is not valid as it can be falsified on the discrete region Z. In short, local 
utterance validity is weaker than validity for C°, and the difference noted has nothing 
to do with issues we would would term pragmatic; it reflects local structural differences 
of the underlying frame. 9 We should abstract from these effects, and this is achieved 
in the definition of utterance validity by quantifying over all contextual variants Tc' of 
8To see the left to right implication, argue by contrapositive. Suppose for some valuation V 
and point t E T that (T, V) fi[t]. Choose any c E C and let V° be any to valuation such that 
V °(a, c) = V (a) for all atoms a. Then by the previous lemma (TC, V°) 4[t, c], the desired 
result. The reverse implication is similar. 
9More precisely, local utterance validity fails to coincide with validity in this example because 
the underlying frame Q ® Z is not homogeneous. van Benthem [5, page 39] defines this as follows: 
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To. The stronger notion of utterance validity draws the distinction we are interested in 
more accurately, and it is straightforward to show that an L° formula 0 is valid if it is 
utterance valid, just as we would hope. In the stronger languages we shall later consider 
these two notions will be distinct, and the divergence will be for genuinely pragmatic 
reasons. 
Before introducing our first properly context sensitive language let us briefly compare 
the contextualisation strategy being adopted here with that of three major papers in 
the Californian tradition from which the ideas of this section ultimately stem: Kamp's 
"Formal Properties of 'Now'" [52], Kaplan's "On the Logic of Demonstratives" [56], and 
Richard Montague's "Universal Grammar" [69]. 
Kamp does not include a set of contexts. He does evaluate wffs with respect to a pair 
of indices - and indeed this paper was the first to show how useful this `double indexing' 
strategy could be - but both elements of the pair are times. As with our semantics, 
however, one temporal component is the timestream, and is used in defining the semantics 
of the tense operators; while the other `lies idle' for this part of the language, and comes 
into its own (as will our contexts), when treating such indexicals as `Now'. In effect, 
Kamp is using c-frames which have the form (T, <, T, idT), where idT is the identity 
function on T. But while the difference is technically trivial, it's precisely the isolation of 
this special case that opened the way for the symmetrical treatment of the two indices 
that became routine in two dimensional logic. Conceptually the two indices are distinct: 
one is a context, the other a time, and should be exploited differently. In passing, Kamp 
did think of the second time as recording time `utterance time': see [52, page 238], and 
his exploitation of this second index is `clean'. 
The presentation here is essentially Kaplanian. In particular, the idea of using a 
function to assign an utterance time to an independent set of contexts is his. Conceptually 
a frame T is homogeneous if for any t, e E T there is an order automorphism a on T such that 
a(t) = t'. It is easy to show that if qS is locally utterance valid on some c-frame Tc based on a 
frame T that is homogeneous in this sense, then 9S must also be valid on Tc. 
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this is the crucial move: it firmly underlines that the second index is intended to be a 
context of utterance, not just another time we can treat as we please. Although the 
change seems trivial, as we shall see its effects run deep. 
Nonetheless, although the basic machinery is Kaplanian, the presentation I have cho- 
sen is more akin to Montague's [69, page 228]. There is nothing deep about this choice; 
it's merely that I wanted to avoid discussing such matters as `character' and `content'. 
While Kaplan's distinction was historically influential, I don't find this terminology par- 
ticularly useful. 
This then is our base language C°, a language of TREF interpreted on frames aug- 
mented by a notion of context. The next step is to exploit these contexts in a fashion 
that reflects the workings of indexicals in natural language. This will be done by sorting. 
7.2.2 The language Cl 
We now introduce the simplest extension of C°, the language C. This language is to 
extended by the addition of a new sort of atomic symbol, a sort with only one element 
which we write as now. All four sorts of V - VAR, NOM, INOM and {now} - are 
pairwise disjoint and the wffs of ,C are constructed in the usual TREF fashion from this 
base. 
now is intended to be a `name for now', which given our sorted atomic sentence 
strategy means that we want it to be a special atom which in any context c is true 
at the `now time' or `utterance time' of c, and true at no other time. To accomplish 
this we interpret V on c-frames (T, <, C, g) as follows: we demand of any function 
V : ATOMCa x C --- Pow(T) if it is to count as an PQ valuation that not only must 
it satisfy the constraints obeyed by the C° valuations, but in addition that V (now, c) = 
{g(c)}, for all c E C. We define an PQ model Ml to be pairs (T°, V), where T° is a 
c-frame and V an C1 valuation on T°; and evaluate V wffs at pairs It, c] in PQ models 
by following the recipe specified in the previous section for C° wffs. In short, we have 
a new (extended) concept of valuation, but once this has been specified all else remains 
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unchanged, a pattern repeated in the remaining languages that will be introduced in this 
section. 
In any context now is assigned a singleton subset of the frame, namely {g(c)}, thus 
now is a nominal. The important point of course is which singleton subset is assigned: 
unlike ordinary nominals which in any context `freely refer', now is highly constrained. 
Note the `direction of constraint' - it lies along the contextual dimension. If you like, 
when we were working in ordinary (uncontextualised) tensed languages what we did 
was sort the denotation of atoms on the temporal line, creating in the process such 
referential sorts as nominals and interval nominals. What we are doing now is to subsort 
the referential sorts by exploiting the additional structure provided by C and g. 
Let us examine some examples of L validities and utterance validities. Firstly some 
plain validities. Assume that all the frames underlying our c-frames are STOs. As these 
frames are all irreflexive, now -+ -'Fnow is valid, as is its mirror image now - -+Pnow. 
Similarly now --+ GPnow, now --* G(Fnow -- now) and FFnow --* Fnow. 
What about utterance validity? As the semantics of now is clearly bound up with 
the context of utterance we would hope that we do have some genuinely `pragmatic' 
validities. We do: now! Clearly now is not valid, so our two notions of validity differ in 
L . Further note that if 0 is valid, 0 must also be utterance valid, so all the examples 
of validity just noted in the previous paragraph are also utterance valid. But then, by 
modus ponens, we have that -+Fnow, -,Pnow, G(Fnow -+ now), and GPnow are all 
utterance valid. None of these wffs is valid. Note that the conjunction of these first two 
wffs amounts to saying that any contextualised observer knows that now occurs right 
now, and not before and not after. 
The introduction of now allows us to mimic in our tensed languages what we might 
term the `canonical use' in natural language of the word now. 1° What is this canonical 
use? Simply, to refer to the time of utterance. As Hans Kamp pointed out in "Formal 
10This cheerful use of the word `canonical' glosses over many difficult issues. The uses of `now' 
in natural language are diverse and subtle. 
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properties of `now' " [52], there is a temptation to think that the function this word 
performs is vacuous - surely "It is raining" has exactly the same truth conditions as 
"It is now raining"? In this case the `now' is redundant, but Kamp gives two examples 
which show that `now' can have a genuine semantic role: 
(1) I learned last week that there would be an earthquake. 
(2) I learned last week that there would now be an earthquake. 
Clearly the `now' serves to make the second sentence more temporally specific than the 
first, so `now' in general is not vacuous in natural language. Let us consider another pair 
of examples, also due to Kamp [52, page 231]: 
(1) A child was born that would be ruler of the world. 
(2) A child was born that will be ruler of the world. 
The first can be translated into quantified tense logic by 
P(3z)(x is born A F(x is ruler of the world)) 
The second has no such transcription. The problem lies with the `will'; this forces the 
time when the child assumes its role to occur after the point of speech. This effect cannot 
be coded in orthodox quantified tense logic. Kamp introduces his Now operator N to 
cope with this. Essentially this operator works by `remembering' the time of utterance 
11 and whenever a wff of the form No is encountered, 0 is evaluated at this time. That 
is, N forces a jump to the time of utterance and evaluates 0 there. This enables Kamp 
to transcribe the second sentence, by: 
P(3x)(x is born A NF(x is ruler of the world)). 
"Our g(c). As has already been mentioned the formalities of Kamp's system are different from 
those of L!, but the semantics of the N operator essentially involves keeping track of 9(c). In the 
notation van Benthem uses in a paper we will later resort to frequently [4, page 412], the Kamp 
style semantics of N is given by M = N¢[to, t] iff M = ¢[to, to]. That is, N is a diagonalisation 
operator. 
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In L we would write this as 
P(2x)(x is born A L(now --> (F(x is ruler of the world)))-" 
221 
As this last example suggests, Kamp's calculus can be simulated in L. We can define 
a now operator in L by No =def L(now -- 0). We have decomposed Kamp's operator 
into a `shift' and a `referral'. 
However Kamp's calculus cannot simulate V - indeed it cannot even simulate the 
fragment of L consisting of all and only the wffs made using variables and now. The clue 
is Kamp's `Eliminability Theorem'. 13 This theorem shows that for the propositional 
part of the Now calculus, every formula containing occurrences of the N operator is 
equivalent to a formula not containing such occurrences: N is eliminable. But this means 
that irreflexivity is not definable in Kamp's calculus - no purely priorean formula defines 
this condition, and every N containing formula is equivalent to such a wff. On the other 
hand we can define irreflexivity in the VAR U {now} fragment of L; now - -+Fnow 
suffices. 
In the paper ""Now"" [80, pages 112-113] Prior very briefly introduces a name for 
`now' in precisely the fashion we have been discussing in this chapter. However, after 
toying with the idea for a couple of paragraphs he drops the idea in favour of taking 
Kamp's operator as primitive. He doesn't seem to have observed that the two approaches 
12Actually, we wouldn't. Adhering to our `the simple past refers' motto we would represent it 
by 
P(i A (3x)(x is born A L(now -- (F(x is ruler of the world))))). 
where the i picks out the time of birth. 
"This is what Burgess terms it [16, page 121]. Kamp's original proof may be found in [52, 
page 251]. 
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are not equivalent. 14 We'll later see reasons for preferring the use of a referential sort 
for `now', to Kamp's diagonalisation strategy. 
7.2.3 The language L2 
Let us now consider an extension of L that mimics the adverbials `yesterday', `today' 
and `tomorrow', the language L2. L2 has a fifth atomic sort in addition to those of L, 
the sort 
CDA = {yesterday, today, tomorrow}. 
CDA stands for contextualised day adverbials. We select yesterday, today, and tomorrow 
so that they are distinct from all the L atoms, and then define the ATOM12 _ 
ATOM,11 U CDA. The L. wffs are then formed in the usual way from these atoms. 
Clearly yesterday, today and tomorrow are going to be interval nominals contextually 
constrained in some fashion; but in fact we are going to have to introduce some more 
structure for these adverbials as they don't denote just any interval, they denote days. 
That is, the use of their natural language correlates presupposes a view of time rich 
enough to support a `day structure': a division of the temporal flow into equal length 
time periods such that every point of time occurs on a unique day and such that the 
sequence of days is a discrete structure; and further such that each day contains many 
(if not infinitely many) points of time. Moreover, once we consider days it's natural to 
move on and model `calendar terms' which, at least in western traditions, seem., ' to 
presuppose that time is linear. In short, in order to give an adequate model of these 
adverbials and dates we are going to have to restrict ourselves to a class of linear frames 
rich enough to support a day structure. 
14 Jon Oberlander earlier noted a weaker version of this result as part of his comparison of 
Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives and the system IQ. Details of his result may be found in 
[73] or [71]. 
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Now we could just straightaway opt for one of the `scientific' structures of time, say 
R or Q, but doing so seems rather silly; it overstructures our temporal ontology. 15 Our 
intuitive notions of time are rich - the concept of a `day', for example, is sophisticated 
- but they are `fuzzy' as regards many mathematically important choicepoints such as 
that between discreteness and continuity. So let's try and isolate a class of frames rich 
enough to support a `day structure' that does not impose such choices - or at least, 
let's try to minimise our impositions. The class of Q-containing frames is my choice, at 
least for the purposes of this section. 
A frame T = (T, <t) is called Q-containing if T is a strict total order and there is 
an injection f : Q ---> T that isomorphically embeds Q in T in the following fashion: for 
any t E T there are q, q' E Q such that f (q) <g t <t f (q'). This last condition guarantees 
that Q is `indefinitely mingled' in T: there are no points t E T greater than (or less 
than) every point in the image of f - no part of T `sticks out of the end' of the image 
of Q. Some examples of Q-containing frames are Q itself, R and the structure Q O Z. 
Before defining the obvious `day structure' on such frames, some conventions. Firstly, 
given a Q-containing frame T we act as if Q C T. Thus we treat certain elements q E T 
- namely, the image points of f - as if they actually were rational numbers and add 
and subtract them. There is a certain sloppiness in doing 'this: given a Q-containing 
frame T there may be many distinct injections f that isomorphically embed Q in T in 
the required fashion, and each f gives rise to a different set of `rationale' in T; but we'll 
ignore this and pretend that we know which of the points in any Q-containing frame 
are rationals. Indeed we'll act as if Z C Q and treat certain elements of such frames as 
integers. 
We now impose a day structure on such frames. We define a set of days and three 
functions: a next day function, a previous day function, and#unction that answers the 
question `What day is it?'. Let T be a Q-containing frame. Firstly the days on T are 
15See [4, page 404]. 
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defined to be: 
D={[z,z+1):z,z+1EZ}. 
As usual- by the half-open interval [z, z + 1) is meant {t E T : z <t t <t z + 1}. Clearly 
U D = T, and moreover every point t E T occurs in a unique day. The successor and 
predecessor functions on days of T are both functions with domain D and range D and 
are given by: 
next ([z,z+ 1)) = [z+ 1,z+2) 
prev([z, z + 1)) = [z - 1, z); 
and the `What's today?' function on T is the function day with domain T and range D 
defined by: 
day(t) = [z, z + 1) E D such that t E [z, z + 1). 
Putting all this together, given a Q-containing frame T, by the day structure DT on T 
is meant the 4-tuple 
(D, next, prey, day) 
where D is the set of days on T, and next, prey and day are the functions just defined. 
We now interpret £ on c-frames that carry a day structure. That is, we interpret 
.C,2 on structures of the form (T, C, g, DT ), where T is a Q-containing frame, (T, C, g) is 
a c-frame, and DT is the day structure on T. As usual we use constrained valuations to 
interpret our various sorts of atoms. Z,2 valuations are functions 
V: ATOM2 xC--Pow(T) 
that satisfy all the constraints placed on £l valuations, and in addition such that: 
V (yesterday, c) = prev(day(g(c))) 
V (today, c) = day(g(c)) 
V (tomorrow, c) = next(day(g(c))), 
for all contexts c. As the presence of the g in the above definitions makes clear, yesterday, 
today and tomorrow are being treated as indexicals. 
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As usual, these atomic level semantic stipulations are all we need to state: compound 
wffs are treated in the usual way. That is, the definition of an L.2 model, and truth in 
such a model at a pair [t, c] is defined as for L° and L,'. 
With all this to hand, what can we do? First let's encode "John ran yesterday", "John 
ran today" and "John will run today" using our heuristic of decomposing the tense into 
a shift and a referral. In the first sentence the tense is past, thus a backwards shift is 
required and hence we use P. Equally clearly the function of `yesterday' is to give more 
precise information about which past time is being referred to, so we should fill the referral 
slot by `yesterday'. This yields P(yesterday A John runs). In similar fashion we may 
translate the other two sentences to P(today A John runs) and F(today A John runs). 
Now these translations `work' - that is, they give the right truth conditions - but 
are there any reasons for finding the use of L.2 particularly interesting? I think two 
considerations suggest we are on the right track. 
Firstly, the use of L.2 seems to have advantages over the use of `Yesterday', `To- 
day' and `Tomorrow' operators. The use of such operators has been criticised on the 
grounds that neither of the scoping possibilities they permit allow adequate encodings 
even of such simple sentences as those just given. 16 That is, neither PY(John runs) 
nor YP(John runs) is felt to be adequate to represent the first sentence. Our encodings 
don't have this problem. 
The second reason is more interesting. There are well known sentences where the 
16To take a recent example, Eleonore Oversteegen writes: 
if temporal adverbials like yesterday are treated as operators, there is a scope 
problem: both sequences, yesterday in the scope of the tense operator and the 
tense operator in the scope of yesterday are obviously wrong. [74, page 3]. 
See also Barbara Partee's remarks[75, page 257]. 
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`tense shift' clashes with the `referral'. Two simple examples are: 
'John will run yesterday. 
'John ran tomorrow. 
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Finding representations that handle such examples correctly has proved tricky - in fact 
Harper and Charniak [44] list the ability to handle such examples as one of their five 
desiderata for any system of temporal representation. 17 Their representations in Z,2, are 
F(yesterday A John runs) and P(tomorrow A John runs) respectively. Clearly neither 
wff is satisfiable in any L, model. To some degree L, is successfully mimicking the way 
temporal reference and tense interact in English. 
7.2.4 The language C' 
L.. is an extension of L,2, that models the `calendar terms' of natural language. In addition 
to the sorts of L,2 it has five more sorts. These are: 
DAY = (Sunday,. .. , Saturday} 
DATE 31} 
MONTH = (January,..., December} 
YEARS = 11,2,3.... 1989,1990.1989,1990,. ..} 
ERA = {BC, AD} 
We define CAL to be DAYS U DATE U MONTH U YEAR U ERA - we assume of 
course that all these sets are mutually disjoint from each other and from the sorts of L,2, - and then define ATOMCQ = ATOM 2 U CAL. The L,", wffs are made in the usual 
fashion from these atoms. As an example of how we hope to use this language, the 
sentence "John ran on Monday 4th December 1989" will be represented by: 
P(Monday A 4 A December A 1989 A AD A John runs). 
17Jon Oberlander's work first drew my attention to these types of clashes. For his solution to 
the problems they pose, couched in the language IQ, see [72] or [71]. 
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Before sketching the semantic machinery, a remark. Note that with the exception of the 
atoms in ERA - and the atom 1 of YEARS - none of these atoms are interval nominals 
as they either `denote periodically' or denote two intervals. `Tuesday' for example must 
denote a day every seven days. In general, we might describe all the elements in DAY, 
DATE and MONTH as `periodic interval nominals'. `Binary interval nominals' seems 
an appropriate label for the atoms in YEARS save 1. 
The semantics of L2 was based on 4-tuples of the form (T, C, g, DT), where T was a Q- 
containing frame. We extend these structures to 5-tuples of the form (T, C, g, DT, Ca1D) 
in order to give the semantics of L. The new component is called a calendar structure, 
and as the superscript on Ca1D is intended to indicate, its definition will make use of the 
day structure DT. CaID is a 4-tuple: 
Ca1D = (Weeks, Months, Years, Eras) 
Each of its four components, Weeks, Months, Years and Eras, is a partition of T = U D. 
18 We place the obvious conditions on each of these partitions. Consider the case 
of Years, for example. Firstly, let a year, be a set containing 365 or 366 consecutive 
elements of D. 19 We then define a years to be U year,, for any year,. The element Years 
in any calendar structure CaID is then defined to be a `leap year structured' partition 
of T such that every element of the partition is a years. (By `leap year structured' is 
meant that every fourth element in Years is a years made from a year, containing 366 
days, while the remaining three out of four years are made up of year, containing only 
365 days.) 
We construct Weeks, Months and Eras in similar fashion. Every week2 in Weeks 
is made up of the points in seven consecutive days; every month2 in Months is made 
18By a partition of a non-empty set X is meant a subset P of Pow(X) such that UP = X, 
each p E P is non-empty, and for all p, p' E P, p # p' implies p fl p' = 0. 
"Recall that we have both successor and predecessor functions on D, so `consecutive days' can 
be defined in the obvious way. 
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up of the points in either 28, 29, 30, or 31 consecutive days; and Eras partitions T into 
two. In addition we must ensure that each of these four sets Weeks, Months, Years and 
Eras `hangs together' correctly. For example, the end of the first era should coincide 
with the end of some year; the start of a year should coincide with the start of a month 
containing 31 days, while the second month in any year should contain 28 days, unless 
the year is a leap year when it must contain 29; and so on - the details can be left to 
the reader's `calendar knowledge'. We assume without further ado the natural induced 
ordering of Weeks, Months, Years and Era. For example, if m, m' E Months we say 
that m < m' iffVtE mbt'Em'(t <t'). 
We now describe C valuations. These will link L with our structures (T, C, g, DT , CaID) 
and are functions 
V:ATOM13xC-)Pow(T) 
which obey the constraints that typify C valuations, and in addition constraints con- 
cerning the sorts in CAL. Clearly the constraints on these new sorts will be stated in 
terms of the additional structure CaID. 
I'm only going to deal fully with the two simple atoms in Era. Firstly recall that 
Era is a binary partition of T; let us write it as {bc, ad), where be < ad. We demand 
that functions V, if they are to be £ valuations, must be such that: 
V (BC, c) = be 
V (AD, c) = ad 
for all c E C. Note that these atoms are not indexicals. Essentially we have said that 
V must `ignore context'; both BC and AD rigidly designate the obvious eras no matter 
what context they are uttered in. 
As to the other sorts, let day, date, month, and year be metavariables over the 
atoms of DAY, DATE, MONTH and YEAR respectively. Then we demand of any 
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function V with aspirations to valuationhood that: 
V (day, c) 
V (date, c) 
V (month, c) 
V (years, c) 
S, where S C DT 
S, where S C DT 
S, where S C Months 
S, where S C Years 
for any c E C. I'm not going to attempt to fill in the details - I'll merely note that 
doing so is not quite as dull as it may appear. Firstly, note that the atoms are mutually 
constrained in their interpretation. For example, given the denotation of any year, we 
know it contains the denotations of twelve different months. This immediately takes us 
beyond the simple definition of sorting given in the previous chapter. Also note that 
calendar terms cover frames in a fashion reminiscent of strong nominals, by means of 
periodicity. In fact periodicity seems an interesting intermediary between the covering 
of frames by totally independent strong nominals, and the `structured term covering' of 
languages of arithmetic. 
With C we have a system with a fairly wide repertoire of referential sorts. Other 
extensions are routine. For example, we could add `clock terms' to the language, and 
define `clock structures' in a manner that would allow "John reached the summit at three 
o'clock" to be represented by 
P(three o'clock A John ... summit). 
7.3 Then and now: some history 
In this section we revert to the discussion of TREF and Reichenbach. We will learn more 
about the modeling capabilities of TREF, but our concerns are primarily methodological. 
We will examine the main line of development of two dimensional logic and find it 
wanting. In order to appreciate why, we need to consider anew what we have done in 
this chapter. 
TREF can plausibly be regarded as a model of Reichenbach's ideas in a Priorean 
framework. Importantly, double indexing is not used in TREF semantics. While later we 
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did introduce such ideas, in a Kaplanian or contextualised form, to allow certain atoms 
(now, yesterday, today and tomorrow) to have special referents - double indexing 
was not used to `simulate reference'. As always throughout the thesis, sorting was the 
referential mechanism. 
I am emphasising these points because there were earlier attempts to model Reichen- 
bach in tense logic, and these attempts crucially depended on the use of a doubly indexed 
semantics exploited by powerful, and in some cases unintuitive, two dimensional opera, 
tors to simulate reference. In fact, as far as the development of `double indexed' logics is 
concerned, these attempts have set the agenda for most subsequent work. The reason is 
this. The first attempt to extend the use of two dimensionality to model reference beyond 
Kamp's modeling of `now' was Vlach's modeling of `then'. Vlach did this by introduc- 
ing an operator with a number of interesting properties - it's the other diagonalisation 
operator. Subsequent logical developments concentrated on the properties of these op- 
erators, and a number of more complex ones later introduced to model Reichenbachian 
ideas. 
As was stated in the introduction, the effect of these developments on the application 
of tense logic in natural language semantics has been largely malign; it's doubtful whether 
many enthusiastic advocates for its use could be found nowadays. This seems due at least 
in part to the direction the extensions discussed below have led. 20 Some of the later 
extensions have little - if anything - to recommend them at the intuitive level. They 
succeed in simulating reference, but the negative conotations of `simulate' apply here: 
the results are exercises in `clever programming'. 
The discussion that follows will be largely critical of this tradition, but the criticism 
has a point. "Tense Logic and Standard Logic" by Johan van Benthem [4] is the most 
"There are other reasons. One is that tense logic (like classical logic) has always been tra- 
ditionally preoccupied with sentence level phenomena, while much current research on temporal 
semantics is concerned with the discourse level. 
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searching critique of the aspirations of tense logic I know of. 21 One of its major themes 
is this: if one of Priorean tense logic's virtues is simplicity, this virtue is quickly lost 
when devices to cope with further aspects of natural language are added - indeed quite 
quickly the use of classical languages as a modeling formalism seems simpler. In fact, 
as the paper notes, the two dimensional formalisms surveyed below lead with seeming 
inexorability, to 'intensional languages' that appear to be merely notational variants of 
Quinean variable-free formulations of first order languages. Once this stage has been 
reached, or neared, the natural question to ask is "Why on earth use tense logic? Why 
not use a classical language straight off and have done with it?" 
My answer is that the uses the sorted atomic sentence strategy have been put to so far 
have been extremely simple, and intuitively revealing - we don't seem to be embarking 
on the path that van 8enthem condemns. However simplicity is partly a matter of taste, 
and it would be nice to be a little more objective. In this section we are going to show 
that two of the natural language examples which motivated first the addition of Vlach's 
operator, and later the introduction of a countably infinite sets of N operators and Vlach 
operators, can already be represented in TREF. This is not difficult (the corresponding 
wffs can be written down as easily as first order representations), and for TREF we have 
a complexity measure: we're not above D logic in the expressibility hierarchy. Actually, 
I suspect that the languages L,' to C- are also simple, but as we shall see later in the 
section, this is definitely something that needs proof - hence the usefulness of the purely 
TREF examples. In short, I don't believe that van Benthem's criticisms can be applied 
to TREF - and this for both intuitive and technical reasons. I further believe that the 
series Q, Q and L' escapes similar censure, though (for the time being) my defense 
relies purely on the grounds of their naturalness. Of course none of this establishes that 
we should use such languages - but positive arguments in their favour must await the 
conclusions of the thesis. The following discussion is closely based around van Benthem's 
21It's certainly the most interesting: many papers, both for and against the use of tense logic, 
predate such logical developments as correspondence theory, and now read like reports of distant 
(perhaps apocryphal) battles concerning angels and pinheads. 
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presentation on [4, pages 412 - 428], and his definitions of these operators are used in 
what follows. 
Consider the sentence "One day, all persons alive now will be dead". Like the example 
considered earlier this can be represented with the help of Kamp's operator by means of: 
FVx(NAlive(x) -+ Dead(x)), 
but not by any purely Priorean formula. Frank Vlach [109] noted that the past tensed 
version of this sentence, "One day, all persons alive then would be dead", required even 
more equipment. Simply affixing a P to the previous wff, the Priorean recipe for forming 
past tenses, does not yield a suitable representation; and in fact no Kampian formula 
will suffice. "As a true Priorean", writes van Benthem, "Vlach introduces a new operator 
K"[4, page 416]. In van Benthem's notation the semantics of this operator is given by: 
M = Kc[t,t,] if M = 4S[t,t]. 
K takes the other route to the diagonal and forces evaluation there. It's hard to express 
the semantics of the Vlach operator in Kaplanian semantics, 22 but intuitively K `moves 
now'. `Pretend until further notice that the present point of evaluation is now', is a rough 
gloss. Using Vlach's operator the previous sentence can now be represented: 
PKFVx(NAlive(x) -+ Dead(x)). 
As we shall shortly see, Vlach's addition is not enough to cope with the demands of nat- 
ural language, but this is the least of our concerns: Vlach's ideas are incompatible with 
the contextual ideas of the California theory of reference. Adding the Vlach operator 
effectively changes the meaning of the N operator: we can now `overwrite' the value N 
forces evaluation at. Whatever N means in the richer language, it doesn't mean `now'. 
22How hard depends on how many simplifying assumptions one is willing to make, and how far 
one is prepared to tinker with the contextual semantics. The N diagonalisation operator makes 
sense in a Kaplanian framework; it's rather doubtful that K does. (See the later discussion of 
Aqvist's id.) 
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It may be objected that it never did mean this, and to some extent (as I prefer the sorted 
approach using now) I agree with this. Nonetheless, N makes sense in Kaplanian seman- 
tics, whereas the addition of the Vlach operator is incompatible with further contextual 
aspirations. 
Note that from the contextual perspective Vlach's attempt to use double indexing 
machinery to model `then' is misguided. `Then' is not context sensitive in the way that 
`now' or `today' are. Its referent does depend on contextual features, but is not calculable 
as a simple function of utterance time. It's a word that typically accompanies either an 
act of temporal deixis (for example, when watching a historical film) or temporal anaphor 
(when telling a story), not a true indexical. Using the simple contextual apparatus of 
the Kaplanian approach to simulate such reference is misleading. 
The introduction of the Vlach operator bifurcated the concept of `double indexing': 
from then on there was the original contextual sense, and the newer two dimensional 
one. Indeed the term `two dimensional' is an excellent description of the branch that 
came to dominate in formal work. In Vlach's system the two indices are treated on a par. 
They're both times, there is no conceptual distinction between them any more, and we 
are free to introduce operators to manipulate them as we please. It's a relatively short 
step from here to the use of multiple indices and arbitrary manipulation operations, and 
the step was shortly taken. 
Note that the above example can easily be represented in TREF using our `shift and 
refer' heuristic: 
P(j A Fdx(L(j -+ Alive(x)) -+ Dead(x))). 
The tense gives us a point of reference (here labelled by j), tells us where to look for it 
(backwards), and the subsequent use of `then' shifts our attention to the people alive at 
this time (the construction L(j -+ Alive(x))). If we liked, we could compress this last 
complex into a subscriptedthen operator: 
P(j A Fdx(ThenjAlive (x) -+ Dead(x))). 
In passing, I think the use of an interval nominal here would be better: 
P(e A Fdx(Then6Alive(x) -+ Dead(x))), 
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and more generally I think such examples show that Reichenbach's `point of reference' 
should be thought of as an interval. 
Vlach's addition doesn't suffice to cope with the vagaries of natural language temporal 
reference. Consider the following sentence: "There will always jokes be told that were 
told at one time in the past." This is not representable (at least in its `strong' reading) 
with Vlach's apparatus. In TREF it is represented in the obvious way: if a unique time 
is wanted, grab it with a nominal (or an interval nominal): 
G2x(Uttered Joke(x) A L(i - Uttered joke(r))) A Pi. 
Vlach's response to such examples was to propose adding a collection of new Now 
operators N1, N2, N3 ... ; and new K1, K2, K3, ...; observing that this would take care 
of such anomalies. It would, but the objections are obvious. I'll content myself with 
the following one. The introduction of multiple Ns merely as a counterbalance to the 
multiple Vlach operators removes the remaining (apparent) vestiges of contact with the 
Kaplanian motivation for two dimensional machinery. Such Ns have little to do with 
`now'; their status is merely formal - though this had not yet been realised. 
The first person to knowingly introduce purely formal two dimensional operators into 
a system intended to model natural language was Aqvist [1], who introduced an operator 
0 into Kamp's system. 23 In van Benthem's (simplified) account of it, this operator 
works as follows: 
M = x¢[t, to] iff M H O[to, t]. 
The reader who ponders the semantics of this operator in Kaplanian terms will probably 
agree with Aqvist's assessment that this is an operator "for which no independent reading 
is codified" [1, page 4]; certainly no contextual meaning is codified. Using this operator 
Aqvist was able to simulate Reichenbachian ideas of tense, but there is a price. As van 
Benthem notes, the system is more powerful than Until/Since logic [51], which makes it 
very powerful indeed. 
23The explorations of the earlier [99] were purely formal. 
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Aqvist's work opened the floodgates. A slightly later paper by Aqvist and Guenthner 
[2] introduced a certain four dimensional system with a wide selection of permutation 
and substitution operators; later work by Gabbay suggested generalising the enterprise to 
evaluation at arbitrary finite sequences of points [30]. From the perspective of this thesis 
there is little point to these attempts: they are not perspicuous, they have lost all contact 
with contextual intuitions, and they have effectively turned tense logic into a notational 
variant of first order logic - and all this to model the Reichenbachian notion of tense 
that TREF so straightforwardly embodies. In "Logic of Time" van Benthem remarks of 
the developments we have noted that "tense logic has embarked on an extremely abstract 
course" [5, page 132]. It has, but it needn't. 
This concludes the major argument of the section, and it's tempting to stop at this 
point and draw something like the following conclusions: that if we want to model ref- 
erence in tense logic we should add reference (via sorting), not simulate it using two 
dimensional ideas; and that the interesting uses of double indexing are those easily for- 
mulable in a Kaplan style semantics. I think the latter conclusion is by and large sound, 
but we need to be careful what we mean by the first. Just as there are `contextually 
acceptable' operators (N) and `contextually unacceptable' ones (K), so there are con- 
textually acceptable sorts, and contextually unacceptable ones. Referential sorting in 
a two dimensional setting - even if the use of `funny operators' is eschewed --- is not 
guaranteed to be a `safe' process. Intriguingly, such sorting was introduced by Aqvist 
in the two dimensional tradition, albeit in a form that I would describe as contextually 
unacceptable. Technically, however, the effects of these new sorts are fascinating. I'll 
briefly review van Benthem's discussion of this work (using his notation) 14, page 418 - 
422], and draw the appropriate moral for the enterprises of this chapter. 
Aqvist introduced three propositional constants, b f , id and a f defined by: 
M 1 b f [t, to] iff t <to 
M = id[t, to] if t = to 
M = a f [t, to] if to <t 
Roughly speaking, bf is a rather abstract name for before, of for after, and id is a sort 
of `sliding now'. Perhaps a better name for id would be `occupied', for if we defined an 
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analog in the Kaplanian semantics it would probably be: 
M = id[t, c] if there exists a c' such that g(c') = t 
(There's not a clear sense of diagonal in Kaplanian semantics.) 
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The addition of id yields a very powerful language. We can define the other two 
constants by means of Fid and Pid respectively, and then, trading on the linear nature 
of Aqvist's frames define the Now operator by: 
NO =def H(id 0) A (id -+ 0) A G(id 0). 
It is this sort which then allows the Until/Since operators to be defined. For example: 
S(0, 0) =def NP (0 A G(b f --, tfi)). 
This example shows that referential sorting in a two dimensional setting can be an 
extremely powerful mechanism. It certainly adds weight to the evidence that if we want 
perspicuous and tractable logics that mimic aspects of natural language we should work 
in the Kaplanian tradition. Nonetheless, the above discussion of id should also make us 
extremely wary believing that sorting in the Kaplanian framework is inherently safe. At 
present I have no expressibility results for C through to C3, and while I believe they're 
relatively constrained languages, this is something that will require detailed examination. 
I am investigating this matter, and looking for completeness and decidability results as 
well. 
7.4 Referential sorting and discourse phenomena 
At the beginning of the chapter we saw how to represent in TREF examples of the deictic 
uses of tense ("I didn't turn off the stove") and anaphoric uses, where the anaphor had 
a definite antecedent ("When John saw Mary she crossed the street"). These examples 
were taken from Partee's well known paper "Nominal and Temporal Anaphora" 1751. 
In the same paper Partee discusses three other temporal analogs of pronominal forms: 
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temporal anaphora with definite antecedents, bound variable forms, and sentences that 
may be temporal analogs of donkey sentences. Partee's discussion is couched in the 
language of (temporal) DRT [53] [54], and draws on earlier work by Hinrich's' [47]. In 
this section I will show that Partee's examples can be straightforwardly accommodated 
in TREF (or one of the C. languages). I will largely defer making any general comments 
until I have presented the examples, all of which (with the exception of the very first) 
are taken from Partee's paper. 
Consider the sentence "The shutters were closed. It was dark." The tense in the 
second sentence (which is a state sentence) anaphorically picks out the time referred to 
by the tense of the first sentence (which is also a state sentence). We would represent 
this in TREF by 
P(e A The shutters... closed) A P(e A It dark). 
Actually, this permits the times of shutter closure and darkness to be disjoint, which 
may be felt to be undesirable. (Partee insists on an `overlapping' reading [75, page 255].) 
The non-overlapping sense can be captured as follows: 
P(e A L(e -> (The shutters ... closed)) A (P(e A L(e -> It dark)). 
Arguably the original representing wff captures the semantics, and the additional ma- 
chinery is an explicit encoding of its implicatural force: namely that there really was an 
interval in the past throughout which both pieces of information held. At any rate, I'll 
always use the simpler form when interpreting successive state sentences in the following 
examples, and merely note that the stronger form is representable. 
Things are more interesting when we have a sequence of two or more event sentences. 
Consider the discourse: "Mary woke up sometime during the night. She turned on the 
light." Representing this in TREF by 
P(e A Mary wake ... night) A P(e A Turn ... light) 
is clearly inadequate: this representation allows illumination to precede awakening. Us- 
ing a nominal i in place of the interval nominal e does not improve matters: Mary would 
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have to move impossibly fast. In the above discourse the time referred to by the second 
tense is `just after' the time picked out by the first tense. This temporal advance of the 
a 
referential focus through the discourse isjtypical feature of many sequences of sentences 
involving event verbs. Roughly, event verbs advance the narrative focus in time. Sta- 
tive verbs don't, but comment on the most recent interval. (Needless to say this is a 
oversimplification, but here my aim is only to deal with Partee's examples.) I'll defer 
saying anything about the `just' in the `just after' till the end of the section; however 
encoding the `after' is simple. To make the representations as perspicuous as possible, 
define After(e) to be (-e A Pe). As usual c is a metavariable over interval nominals. 
Using this notation we can now represent the previous discourse by: 
P(e A Mary ... night) A P(d A After(e) A Turn ... light). 
As a second example consider the following discourse which mixes stative and event 
verbs: "John got up, went to the window, and raised the blind. It was light out. He 
pulled the blind down and went back to bed. He wasn't ready to face the day. He was 
too depressed." We can represent this as follows: 
P(e A John get up) 
A P(d A After(e) A go to the window) 
A P(c A After (d) A raise the blinds.) 
A P(c A It light out) 
A P(6 A After(c) A He pull blind down) 
A P(a A Al ter(b) A go back to bed). 
A P(a A He not ready to face the day) 
A P(a A He too depressed) 
This representation merely amounts to `shift and refer' coupled with `advance the refer- 
ence time when an event verb is encountered'. 
Let's turn to the `bound variable' case. Consider the following sentence: "Whenever 
Mary wrote a letter, Sam was always asleep." As a first approximation we might try 
L(Mary write a letter -+ Sam asleep) 
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trading on the gloss mentioned in the previous chapter that L(¢ -+ 0) means `Whenever 
¢, 10'. Clearly this is very bad. It's good as a representation of "Whenever Mary 
writes a letter, Sam is always asleep", where the present tense in conjunction with the 
temporal quantifier `whenever' achieves the effect of abstracting from temporal placement 
completely, but in the previous example the quantification is clearly restricted to past 
times. The required representation is thus: 
H(Mary write 4 letter -+ Sam asleep) 
In short there is no referential effect (no nominals or interval nominals are required) 
and we can think of the effect of the temporal quantifier `whenever' on our `shift and 
refer' strategy as amounting to `throwing away the refer', and changing the shift from 
an `existential shift' to a `universal shift'. Note that the syntactic representation is 
actually somewhat simpler than in the referential cases: on the other hand, viewed as 
an instruction (say to examine a temporal database) the above representation is more 
complex - it could trigger a huge search. Actually, looking at matters this way suggests 
that there is an implicit reference even in the above sentence: clearly not all times 
are relevant to its truth. This suggests we ought to augment our representations with 
an explicit relativisation to relevant times. Accordingly, we'll introduce new interval 
nominals, parameterised on discourses D, to remind ourselves that we're not in general 
talking about all times, but only the discourse relevant ones. The `relevantly referring' 
representation of the above bound variable sentence is thus: 
H(relevantD A Mary write a letter -+ Sam asleep). 
(Of course, calculating relevanty for any discourse D is exceedingly difficult. For the 
present discussion our new interval nominals are merely going to serve as a sort of formal 
semantical momento mori.) 
One of Partee's candidates of temporal donkeyhood is "If Mary phoned on a Friday, 
it was (always) Peter that answered." This can be represented (in .C3) by: 
H(relevantD A Mary phone A friday -+ Peter answer). 
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Partee also notes an interesting negative piece of data: the sentence "If Sheila always 
walks into the room, Peter always wakes up", is clearly semantically ill-formed. Partee 
shows that this violates the usual DRT box embedding restrictions for her translation. As 
far as I can see, this sentence cannot be represented in TREF. 24 Intuitively, the `shift' 
is in the wrong place, and representing this wff requires introducing variables over times 
and some first order quantification. 
As an example of an acceptable sentence that I can't encode into TREF, consider 
"When John makes a phone call, he always lights up a cigarette beforehand." This is a 
nice example: we need for each phone calling event a cigarette lighting event that occurs 
`just before'. The obvious attempt is: 
L(John ... call - P(he light ... cigarette beforehand)), 
but this won't do: it would be satisfied if John works as a telephone salesman, and 
had once, but only once, when young tried smoking. Partee's DRT can't cope with such 
examples either. Her box construction algorithm yields essentially 
L(John ... call - H(he light ... cigarette beforehand)). 
I'll mention this example again near the end of the section. 
This concludes the survey of Partee's examples. To sum matters up, in TREF we 
are able to write down expressions which represent discourses exhibiting all the various 
types of phenomena that Partee discusses. Moreover, the degree of accuracy of the TREF 
and the DRT representations seems about the same (neither provides a more detailed 
picture of history than the other), and both approaches have difficulty with the same 
data. What are we to make of this? Is temporal DRT just TREF in disguise? 
A couple of observations will make at least some of this match appear less surprising. 
Partee's system is a very simple one. Following Hinrichs, she assumes that whole tenseless 
clauses are atomic (thus, at least for the non-temporal information, she is working in some 
240f course this requires a proof. I haven't yet tried showing this. 
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sort of propositional calculus), and only considers a very restricted range of possibilities 
of inclusion and precedence. Although the two formalisms look very different, it's clear 
that they're attempting to model natural language at about the same level of detail. 
Moreover the two formalisms have more substantial matters in common: TREF inter- 
nalises forms of two key mechanisms of DRT: discourse markers and box embedding. I 
think it is clear that nominals and interval nominals are something like discourse mark- 
ers. (Note that we can consider nominals and interval nominals to be some kind of 
`well behaved free first order variables', if we like.) With L (and G and H for directed 
versions) in such formations as L(O -> tk) we effectively have a `box embedder' in the 
language. These ingredients work together nicely. We get (some of) the reference we 
want using our `free variables' (crucially we get most of the simple deictic and anaphoric 
connections), and we achieve `bound' or 'non-referential' readings in the most natural 
way possible: we don't bind - we can't - instead we simply don't refer. Even the coin- 
cidence in coverage between the two formalisms is easy to explain. The box embedding 
and the simple formation rules of TREF (that is, its lack of binding) have the same sort 
of `geometrical complexity': operator scopes mimic box embeddings and vice versa. 
Now I believe one could prove results here: given a formal specification of a system of 
temporal DRT similar to Partee's it should be possible to show that there were non-trivial 
sublanguages of TREF and DRT with the same expressive power. Such translations might 
prove useful to both TREF and DRT - for example the former could induce at least 
partial proof theories on the latter. More importantly, it would pin down precisely how 
far the coincidence of coverage extends. Unfortunately I have never seen such a fragment 
of DRT (I'm told they exist), and lacking the prerequisites for a formal comparison I'll 
simply state my belief that TREF does capture an important chunk of the intuitions that 
fire DRT. Nonetheless, I think it's also clear that temporal DRT will cope with many 
issues that TREF cannot. In spite of the observed overlap it's misguided to regard them 
as rivals; rather the best thing to do is try and develop the strengths of each. What are 
the strengths of TREF? 
I believe the obvious answer is the right one: _TREF is an intensional language, and 
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the L, languages are `doubly intensional'. Both are good at coping with contextualised 
aspects of discourse. The sensible thing to do seems to be to develop this ability by 
further enriching the (at present weak) Kaplanian notion of context. In particular, I 
think it would be sensible to develop a suggestion of Ewan Klein's mentioned by Partee 
21 for capturing the content of the ' ̀ just' in the `just after"incrementation of reference 
time. Klein suggests defining t' to be just after t if t' is after t and there is no contextually 
relevant t" between t' and t. It's the notion of contextually relevant times that beckons 
here; is it possible to build such a notion into our L, languages? 26 At present I don't have 
an account of this notion I am satisfied with, but there are two reasons why I believe 
it should be investigated, one practical and one methodological. In practical terms 
I believe that such an account might help us deal with two other issues, the present 
perfect and the earlier `cigarette lighting' sentence. Both seem to involve a notion of 
relevant times. The present perfect is traditionally regarded as a kind of past tense with 
present relevance, and the cigarette lighting example seems to trade on the notion of 
always having available some `just past' cigarette lighting episode. Methodologically, I 
think the matter is worth pursuing for the following reason. Although I took pains to 
emphasize that the notion of context modeled in the Kaplanian framework is minimal 
in the extreme, part of the reasons for my interest in this theory (and more generally, 
the ideas involved in the California theory of reference), is that these can be extended to 
give non trivial models of context. I further believe that (sorted) intensional languages 
may prove an elegant way to exploit the richer framework. Needless to say, this is idle 
talk without concrete evidence. Attempting to build in a notion of contextually relevant 
times into the Kaplanian frameworks, and exploiting them (at least partially) by new 
sorts, seems an excellent way to test the worth of this program. 
This concludes my case for the worth of referential sorting - however I hope that the 
25See [75, page 283, footnote 28]. Also note [75, page 284, footnote 35]. 
26For a discussion of some logical issues relevant to such an attempt (but springing from the 
theory of comparatives) see [5, pages 11-17 and pages 115-118]. 
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case for sorting is hardly yet begun. I feel the real worth of sorted intensional languages 
may lie in providing more sophisticated event logics, based around the type of information 
to be found in verb classifications: however that's another story, and apart from some 
hints mentioned in the next chapter, most of the plot is as yet unknown. I'll close here 
with a `to be continued'. 
Chapter 8 
Two Loose Ends Tidied 
We complete the thesis by attending to two outstanding issues. Although with the aid 
of TREF interval nominals we have some grip on interval structure, it is natural wonder 
what sorted interval based languages would be like. In the first section we present 
some preliminary results for such languages, and discuss the role of sorting in the richer 
framework and its possible relevance for natural language semantics. In the following 
section we survey the original work of Arthur Prior and Robert Bull on systems related 
to NTL. 
8.1 Sorted interval based languages 
The main aim of this section is to present the results of an initial examination of interval 
based languages with referential sorts. 1 We present a sequence of three such languages, 
culminating in the language IREF, an interval based correlate of languages of TREF, and 
discuss some of their properties. Actually we do a little more. When we define our 
languages we take the opportunity to introduce a sortal distinction on our information 
1For accounts of interval structures and interval based languages respectively the reader is 
referred to [5, Chapters 1.3 and 2.3] respectively. 
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bearing sorts, or variables. That is, as well as introducing referential sorts we are going 
to have two sorts of variables. The distinction imposed is rather trivial, but it does 
eventually lead to a brief discussion of more general issues involving sorting in interval 
based languages. We postpone the informal discussion till the end of the section. 
We first introduce a sublanguage of IREF called simply L. L has three sorts: SA = 
{p, q, r,. - -}) 0 = {01i 02, 03 ...}, and INOM = {e, d, c ...}. Both SA and 0 are infor- 
mation bearing sorts: SA variables represent states and activities, and 0 variables all 
other types of information. INOM is a referential sort, and we call its elements interval 
nominals - though as we shall see, their properties differ from those- of TREF interval 
nominals. The wffs of L are constructed in the usual way using boolean and Priorean 
operators, and two new one place sentential operators, j and T. I and T are the existential 
operators that will deal with the subinterval relation. Their respective duals are 11 and 
11 
2 
The semantics of L is grounded in biframes T = (T, <, C). Although arbitrary 
biframes are not interval structures - we shortly define this special class of biframes - 
for convenience we generally refer to the elements of any biframe as intervals. 
By an L valuation on a biframe (T, <, C) is meant a function V : ATOM -+ Pow(T) 
that satisfies two constraints: for all atoms e E INOM, V (e) must be a singleton subset 
of T; and for all p E SA, V (p) must be downwards persistent. This means that for all 
t, t' E T, t E V (p) and t' C t implies t' E V (p). A pair M = (T, V) where T is a biframe 
and V a valuation for L on T is called a model. The truth of a wff ¢ at an interval t in 
a model M is given the usual inductive definition, augmented by the two clauses: 
MN [t] iff ]t'(t'CtandM = [t']) 
M T ¢[t] iff ]t'(t C t' and M = ¢[t']). 
In short, we have two tense logics running in parallel: one in FP and one in IT. We say 
that ¢ is valid on a biframe T if for all valuations V on T and all t E T, (T, V) 1 ¢[t]; 
2This perspicuous notation is due to Jaap van der Does [23]. 
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and when this is the case we write T = 0. We say 0 defines a class of biframes T just 
in caseT--0iffTET. 
Because our interests are temporal, a special class of biframes is of particular concern: 
interval structures. These are biframes T satisfying the following three clauses: 
1. < is an SPO. 
2. C is a PO. 
3. For alls,t,t'ET 
s C t and t < t' implies s < t', and 
sCtandt'<timplies t'<s. 
(The conditions governing the relationship between < and C specified in clause 3 are 
called right monotonicity and left monotonicity respectively.) For reasons which will 
become apparent later, at present I cannot axiomatise the class of interval structures. I 
can, however, give a `next best' result: an axiomatisation of the class of biframes that 
satisfies all the clauses in the definition of interval structures save that < need not be 
irreflexive. This class I call the class of semi interval structures. Bowing to the demands 
of present tractability, for the purposes of this section I will say that a wff 0 is valid if 
it is valid on all semi interval structures, and in such a case will write = 0. 
First some model theoretic observations. Let's examine the purely interval nominal 
fragment of Z. The basic correspondence for this part of £ is with a fragment of the first 
order language Lo . This language is Lo augmented by a second binary predicate C. To 
translate purely interval nominal wffs into Lo we take as our base clause ST(e) = (e = to) - interval nominals, like ordinary NTL nominals, correspond to first order variables. We 
use the standard translation for the boolean connectives and Priorean operators, and add 
the obvious clauses for J. 0 and r 0. (These mirror the clauses for P and F respectively, 
but introduce occurrences of C instead of <.) It is clear that the only conditions a purely 
interval nominal wff can define are Lo expressible. 
We can define the class of interval structures using a purely interval nominal wff. The 
clause 
(FFe --- Fe) A (e --+ -nFe) 
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ensures that < is a SPO; 
(lle -I e)A(e-'4 (le-e))A(e-I e) 
ensures that C is a PO; while 
(Fe -+4 Fe) A (Pe -+4 Pe) 
implies that < and C are yoked together right and left monotonically. Apart from the 
final condition, there is nothing we haven't already seen in another guise in NTL. The only 
point worth remarking on is the difference in definitional powers these reveal between 
the interval nominals of L and those of TREF. The latter can be true at a collection of 
indices, and cannot define either irreflexivity or antisymmetry; the former are true at a 
single index and can define both. 
There are conditions on biframes of special interest in interval logic which are definable 
with the aid of interval nominals, but not in ordinary interval based languages. s The 
first is convexity. In the intervallic setting this means that `intervals must be unbroken' 
and the relevant Lo wff is: 
Vxyzw((xEunx<y<zAzEu)-+yCu) CONV 
This is defined by the L wff j (e A F(d A Fc))A j c -+j d. A second is descent, expressing 
the option that intervals `descend forever'. In Lo this is expressed as 
VxbyE- x3zCyz36 tj DESC 
which can be defined by the L wff .u (e -+j -,e). On transitive frames this condition 
simplifies to Vx3y C xy 36 x, and under this assumption DESC can be defined by e -+j -'e. 
Another desirable property is separability. In the Lo wff expressing this condition we 
use the predicate xOy - x overlaps y - which is defined by 3u(u r- x A u C y). Then 
separability is: 
Vxy(x < y -+ -,xOy) SEP 
3The definition of these conditions is taken from [5, pages 59 - 691. A discussion of the 
correspondence theory of standard interval based languages may be found in [5, pages 202 - 209). 
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which can be defined in L by Fe --> -, jT e. The intervallic analog of linearity is that 
given two intervals, either one precedes the other or they overlap. In Lo , 
Vxy(x < y V y < x V xOy) LIN 
which can be defined by the L wff PeV Fey jT e. Another useful condition, also definable 
in L, is freedom - "non-inclusion implies having a disjoint sub-period" [5, page 62]. In 
contraposed form this amounts to the Lo wff 
Vxy(Vz C x zOy -+ x C Y) FREE 
which is defined by 4jT e -+T e. 
Note the utility of the IT construction in these formulas. Often the T operator is omit- 
ted from interval based languages - but clearly it is useful in collaboration with interval 
nominals. Such examples also make more pressing the search for criterion distinguishing 
conditions definable in nominal modal (j only) languages and nominal tensed (both j and 
T) languages. 
Let's turn to the effects of the constraint on the interpretation of SA variables. How 
far does downwards persistence `spread' from the SA variables to complex wffs? One 
type of answer, involving truth in a model, is provided by van Benthem [5, pages 197 - 
198]. In the terms of this chapter, what van Benthem shows is that if 0 is any formula 
whose only atoms are SA variables, and whose only connectives area, F, P, A and V - 
negations are not allowed - then the truth of 0 at an interval t in any interval model M 
guarantees its truth at all subintervals t' of t in M - provided that < and r- are right 
and left monotonically related, and C is transitive. 
A second type of answer, involving validity, is provided by the following. Let 0 be 
any formula of our language constructed from any atoms using only F, P, A, V and 
We call such a wff an FP formula. Intuitively the constraint on the assignments to SA 
variables has no effect on which FP formulas are valid - this fragment cannot see its 
feet. We make this precise as follows. Given any biframe T, by an O-valuation for L on 
T is meant any function V° : ATOM --> Pow(T) that assigns singletons to all interva 
nominals. That is, an O-valuation is free to treat SA variables as 0 variables. We call 
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a pair (T, V°), where T is a biframe and V° an O-valuation, an O-model. We define the 
truth of a wff 0 at an interval t in an 0-model M° just as we did for models, and we 
say that a wff 0 is O-valid just in case for all semi interval structures T, all O-valuation 
V on T, and all t E T, (T, V) 1 0[t]. In such a case we write H. 0. What we wish 
to show is that for all FP wffs H° 0 if = q. The left to right direction is trivial. 
The construction required to establish the right to left direction is provided by the next 
lemma. 
Lemma 8.1.1 (C weakening lemma) Let M = ((T, <, C), V) be any O-model such 
that (T, <, C) is a semi interval structure. Define CW by: 
CW=C \{(t', t) : t' C t and, for some p E SA, t E V (p) and t' ¢ V (p)} 
and let MW = ((T, <, C"'), V). Then MW is a model and (T, <, CW) is a semi interval 
structure. 
Proof: 
As T, < and V are unchanged we need only check that (T, <, C"') is a semi interval 
structure, and that V is downwards persistent on this new construct. 
It is immediate that CW is reflexive and antisymmetric and interacts with < in the 
required fashion. Transitivity is assured by the following argument. Suppose t" Cw to 
and to CW t but t" ¢W t. As CW is a subrelation of C, we must have both t" C to and 
to C t, which by the transitivity of C means t" C t. As t" ¢W t, it can only be that for 
some SA variable p, t E V (p) and t" ¢ V (p). But this is impossible. As to CW t then 
as t E V (p) we also have to E V (p). But then as t" Cw to, as to E V (p) we also have 
t" E V (p) - contradiction. So (T, <, CW) is a semi interval structure. 
But V is downwards persistent on this new semi interval structure, as we weakened 
in precisely the fashion required to ensure this. 
We now have that for any FP formula 0 and any interval model M, M 1 0[t] if 
MW H 0[t]. This follows by induction on deg(c6), because in the definition of MW we did 
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not change the original O-valuation or <, but merely altered C. As a corollary we have 
that V--, 0 implies 0. Thus we have established that = 0 iff Hh 0, for all FP formulas 
0. 4 
Let us turn to axiomatics. To axiomatise the validities we start with Kt as a basis, 
and add the minimal tense logical apparatus for the C relation. That is, we add as 
axioms all instances of: 
(TL1r) 
1(--)'(u --'i) (TL2r-) 
4)-j (TL3r ) 
4) -414) (TL4r-) 
and the rules of inference I- 4) = I-R 0, and I- 0 NJ. 0. 
Next, to control the interval nominals, we need some sort of intervallic NOM or 
SWEEP variant. So, first we define the notion of an existential operator: this is any 
unbroken, possibly mixed, sequence of Fs, Ps, is and Is including the null sequence. 
Using E as a metavariable over existential operators, and c as a metavariable over interval 
nominals, we add the following version of NOMw: 
E A E(E n4) --> 0 (NOME,.) 
In order to deal with the relational constraints we have placed on < and C we shall 
need in addition all instances of: 
FF4) - F4) (4) 
1J 0 -->10 (4r) 
--1 (T( ) 
E --> E) (Antic) 
F4) -. F4) (RMon) 
P4 -. P4 (LMon) 
"Although the statement and proof of this result are my own, and I have not seen it proved 
elsewhere, I would be rather surprised if it was new. The question it asks is so natural, and the 
proof so simple, that it is likely to have been noted before. 
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Finally, to deal with the downwards persistence of the SA variables we add as axioms 
all instances of 
v -u v . (Triv) 
where v is a metavariable over SA'variables. Call this axiomatisation Kp,. 
The completeness proof will use the usual method of generating subframes of canonical 
Henkin frames, so first we need to define notions of generation and paths for biframes. 
By a generated biframe S.of a biframe T is.meant a triple (S, < E,) where "S C T such 
that S is closed under <, >, E and D; <,=< nS2; and E,=E nS2. Given an biframe 
T and an interval t E T, the biframe generated by t is the smallest generated biframe St 
of T containing t. By a bipath through a frame is meant a finite sequence of intervals 
E T , and 
tm < tm+1 or tm+1 < tm or tm C tm+1 or tm+1 C tm, 
for all elements tm in the sequence. If St is ,a biframe generated from some interval t, then 
there exists a bipath between any two intervals in St. We can now prove our completeness 
result. In what follows we assume the obvious definitions of Kp,-consistency and so on. 
Theorem 8.1.1 Kp, is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of semi 
interval structures. 
Proof: 
Soundness is immediate. To prove completeness, let HP = (H, <, E) be the canonical 
Henkin biframe for Kp,. (That is, H is the set of all Kp,-MCSs; < is defined by h < h' iff 
GO E h implies 0 E h', for all wffs 0; and E is defined by h' E h iff 4 0 E h implies 0 E h', 
for all wffs 0. Because we've included the minimal tense logical axioms for both the FP 
C------ayfd 1T op a f pairs, all the usual tense logical lemmas hold for both < and E.) Given 
a Kp,-consistent set of sentences E, form E°°, and `doubly generate' a sub-biframe of HE' 
from E. That is, we first generate a subframe of HP+ from E°°, and use the fact that 
a bipath between any two intervals in this frame must exist, together with the fact that 
all instances of NOMK, are in every h E H, to prove a Unique Occurrence Lemma. Then 
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we select a second generated sub-biframe of H", constructed in such a way as to contain 
all and only the interval nominals driven out in the first generation stage. (In short, we 
proceed as was shown in the second minimal completeness proof for NTL given in Chapter 
4.) Thus every interval nominal occurs in exactly one MCS in our doubly generated 
biframe, and the natural mapping satisfies the constraint placed on the interpretation 
of interval nominals. Further, it also satisfies the constraint demanded of assignments 
to the SA variables: this follows immediately from our inclusion of the instances of the 
Triv schema. Hence the natural mapping on this doubly generated biframe is an L 
valuation and we have built a model. Call this model M = ((HE, <E, CE), V). 
The inclusion of the instances of 4 as axioms guarantees that <E is transitive, and 
the inclusion of the instances of 4r and TT guarantees that CE is both transitive and 
reflexive. Further, the inclusion of the RMon and LMon schemas ensures the two relations 
are correctly interrelated, as a straightforward argument shows. The only problematic 
part comes from the demand that [-:E be antisymmetric. In general this cannot be 
assured, nonetheless the following version of the Simple Cluster Lemma holds because of 
our inclusion of the instances of Anti: any h E HE containing any interval nominal is 
a simple CE-cluster. Obviously we want to lightly bulldoze CE, and this can be done as 
follows. 
Form the structure ((S, < C,), V,) as follows. Create S and E, by lightly bulldozing 
the frame (HE, CE). Let f be the bulldozing p-morphism used. Define V, as described 
in Chapter 5; that is, s E V. (a) if f (s) E V (a), for all atoms a. Finally, <, is defined 
by s <, s' if f (s) <, f (s'). (In effect we've flattened CE to a P0 and left <E alone.) In 
fact our new structure is a model. No h E HE containing an interval nominal was in a 
proper cluster, hence no such cluster was bulldozed and V, assigns singletons to interval 
nominals. Moreover V, obeys the constraint on assignments to SA variables. For suppose 
81 C ss and ss E V,(p). As f is a morphism in C f (sl) C f (ss). By our definition of V,, 
f (82) E V(p). But V is a valuation, thus it is downwards persistent in its assignments 
to SA variables, hence f (si) E V (p). By the definition of V, we have that si E V,(p), 
our desired result. Hence V, is a valuation and we have built a second model. By design 
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f is a multimodal p-morphism from (S, < C,) to (HE, <E, CE) -- in fact it's a strong 
homomorphism in <, - hence the new model is equivalent to M. 
It only remains to check that the relations on the new model satisfy all our structural 
requirements. By construction C, is a P0. That <, is transitive is immediate. It only 
remains to check that that <, and C, are right and left monotonically related. They 
are. Suppose sl C s2, and s2 <, ss. As f is a morphism in both <, and C, we have 
that f (s1) CE f (82) and f (s2) <E f (ss). As the two relations in M interact right 
monotonically we have f (sl) <E f (ss). But f is a strong homomorphism in <,, hence 
sl <, 83. Thus right monotonicity holds in the new structure, and by a mirror image 
argument so does left monotonicity. Thus we have verified E on a model in the desired 
class and have our completeness result. 
Why can we not strengthen this result to a completeness theorem for the class of all 
interval structures? Plausibly Kp, + (e --1- -+FE) axiomatises this class; and surely we 
could prove this by performing a second round of (heavy) bulldozing, this time on the <, 
relation? Unfortunately this won't work: we certainly turn <, into a SPO, but we have 
no guarantee that the monotonicity conditions still hold afterwards. The problem lies 
with the structure of <,-clusters: while these have the monotonicity properties - these 
hold for the entire frame, so they certainly hold for all clusters - they needn't have the 
separability property. Suppose C is a <a cluster and that sl and s2 are elements of C 
such that sl C S2. Then as sl and 82 are in C, sl <, s2 and ss <, sl, and sl and s2 are 
not separated. The consequence is that when we bulldoze, sl and s2 `infinitely oscillate' 
in a STO and monotonicity is lost. 
I'll make some remarks about this. Firstly this problem is nothing to do with sorting - it's due to the inherent complexity of interval based languages. If we were working 
with an unsorted interval based language, and we dropped all the schemas containing 
metavariables over interval nominals and Triv, from the axiomatisation Kpe, we would 
have the axiomatisation van Benthem calls Kp. Obviously we could show that this 
axiomatisation is strongly complete with respect to the class of biframes T such that T 
satisfies all the conditions enjoyed by semi interval structures save that C need not be 
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antisymmetric. (The details of the proof above prior to bulldozing establishes this.) We 
could then sharpen this result to prove completeness for Kp relative to the semi interval 
structures. (The unsorted language is blind to r- antisymmetry.) It would be natural to 
suspect that bulldozing < would yield a sharpening result with respect to the interval 
structures - but even in the unsorted system we would be stymied at this point, and 
for the same reason: bulldozing will not work. 
Now van Benthem proves precisely the first two results for Kp [5, pages 209 - 211]. 
(The sharpening to the semi interval structure is obtained by unravelling C however, not 
bulldozing.) He then remarks, though gives no details, that a more complex unravelling 
argument will show that Kp is strongly complete with respect to the class of period 
structures. (Period structures are interval structures that satisfy the further CONV 
demand given in Chapter 6.) As yet, I have not been able produce such a proof, but van 
Benthem's remark makes me suspect that Kp, must be strongly complete with respect 
to the interval structures. Briefly, my reasons are as follows. Given that there is a way 
to unravel <, (or <c) clusters in such a way as to preserve the right and left monotonic 
interaction of <, and C we should be able to apply the method even in L: by the 
intervallic analog of the Irreflexivity Lemma, points in such clusters are not assigned 
to interval nominals. Of course without details this is merely (informed) speculation, 
nonetheless van Benthem's result does suggest that the above setback is only temporary. 
While bulldozing may not be a subtle enough model transformation technique anymore, 
this need not mean that cluster analysis methods are exhausted. 
On the other hand, these methods are beginning to get quite complex, and it is well 
worthwhile trying to find alternatives. There is at least one obvious option to pursue: 
adapting COV to the interval based setting. I am presently investigating the matter. 
Let us now examine the second sublanguage en route to full blown IREF. We make 
L" out of L by adjoining the elements of a fourth sort NOM = {i, j, k ...}, the sort of 
nominals, to our stock of atoms. (These nominals are entirely new symbols.) As usual 
this is the sole syntactic change, and the wffs of L" are made from this enriched selection 
of atoms in the manner prescribed for L wffs. 
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Nominals will be names of `points', which in the intervallic setting can be taken to 
mean that they denote atoms; thus we will interpret L' on the class of atomic biframes. 
By an atomic biframe (T, <, C) is meant a biframe such that 
VtETBa(aEt&Vt'Eat'=a). 
Such an interval a is called an atom. By an fn valuation on an atomic biframe T is 
meant a function V : ATOMZ. -+ Pow(T), such that V satisfies all the constraints 
demanded of L valuations, and in addition satisfies the constraint that for all i E NOM, 
V(i) is a singleton subset of T containing an atom. We define an L" model to be a pair 
(T, V) where T is an atomic biframe and V an L" valuation. The concept of truth at 
an interval in an L" model is defined by the same inductive definition as for L, and we 
say that an .C" wff is valid iff it is true at all intervals in all L" models (T, V) where T 
is an atomic semi interval structure. 
We proceed straight to axiomatics. By the axiomatisation Kp; is meant the axioma- 
tisation obtained by taking all L" instances of the Kpe axiom schemas, using the Kp, rules 
of inference in the new language L", and in addition taking as axioms all L" instances 
of the following schemas: 
nAE(nA¢) -¢ (NOMw) 
4T ¢ -+14 ¢ (McKinseyg) 
n --4 n (Atom) 
(Here n is a metavariable over nominals, and E a metavariable over existential operators, 
not just existential tenses.) We now show how to turn the previous completeness proof 
into a proof that Kp; is strongly complete with respect to the atomic semi interval 
structures. 
Doubly generate a Henkin structure ((HE, <E, CE), V); as in the previous proof. 5 
By previous reasoning we know that a Unique Occurrence Lemma holds for the interval 
$Of course we are now dealing with Kp;-consistent sets of sentences, not just Kp,-consistent 
sets, and so on. 
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nominals, that the natural mapping respects the constraint demanded of assignments 
to SA variables, and that the generated model satisfies all the relational conditions 
demanded of semi interval structures save possibly that CE may not be antisymmetric. 
Before bulldozing we must check that the structure we have generated is in fact an C" 
model: that is, that the underlying biframe is atomic in CE, and each nominal denotes 
a unique atom. 
The difficult part is showing that McKinsey's axiom, in conjunction with the tran- 
sitivity schema 4E and the reflexivity schema TE, ensures that the Henkin structure is 
atomic in E. However most of the work involved is standard: it's the content of Lem- 
mon and Scott's 1966 completeness proof for S4.1 [61, section 5]. 6 In intervallic terms, 
they showed that the McKinseyE schema and the 4E schema conspire to impose the 
structure 
(Vh) (3ha) (ha C h & (Vh', h") (h' C ha & h C h" h' = h") ), 
on the canonical Henkin frame. (The variously decorated hes are variables over ele- 
ments of the canonical Henkin frame.) The essence of their argument is as follows. The 
McKinseyE schema is equivalent to the schema j (j 0 --4 0). From this observation, 
one can use the McKinsey axiom in conjunction with the 4c: schema to show that Kpe; 
has as theorems all instances of 
1((101--401)A...A(ltk--4tk)) Mk, 
for all k > 1. Given this one can show that the canonical Henkin frame must have the 
property noted above. Argue as follows. Pick an arbitrary h E H. Form the set of 
sentences 
E= {¢:u.¢E h}U{J -4 0:0 is awff}. 
Because we have all instances of Mk as axioms, E is consistent. Let ha be any MCS 
extending E. It is straightforward to show that ha has the property demanded above. 
6S4.1 has as axioms, in addition to the minimal modal logical base K, O -' O 
(McKinsey), and 000 -' 00 (4). 
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Given that the canonical Henkin frame has this property, it is immediate that any of its 
generated biframes has it too. In short, what Lemmon and Scott's argument establishes 
is that any point h in any generated biframe of the Henkin frame has a subinterval ha 
such that ha has a unique subinterval. But now we simply note that by our inclusion of 
the reflexivity schema Tc, any such interval ha is its own subinterval, and hence its own 
unique subinterval. That is, all such ha are atoms, and our doubly generated Henkin 
structure is atomic in CE. 
We next note that each nominal denotes a unique atom: because of the instances 
of NOMw in every MCS, a Unique Occurrence Lemma can be proved for the nomi- 
nals; moreover, because of the inclusion of the instances of the Atom schema, these 
unique denotations of the nominals must always be atoms. Thus our generated structure 
((HE, <E, CE), V) is a L" model; call this model M. 
It only remains to show that we can turn M into an equivalent model based on an 
atomic semi interval structure by light bulldozing. So, lightly bulldoze CE to make the 
structure (S, V,) as described in the previous proof. We know that S = (S, <,, C,) is 
a semi interval structure, but has bulldozing affected the assignment to the nominals, 
and is S atomic? First note that no atom of M could possibly have been in a proper 
CE-cluster, so no atoms were bulldozed - hence nominals are still assigned singletons in 
S by V,. (We don't yet know that they're assigned atoms however.) Secondly note that 
S is atomic. For let s be an arbitrary element of S. As M is atomic, there is an atom 
ha in M such that ha CE f (s). I will show that there is an a E S such that f (a) = ha, 
and a is an atom such that a C, s. By the bulldozing definition, at least one element 
a E S is such that f (a) = ha. Moreover this element must be unique; this follows from 
the bulldozing definition by noting that ha, being an atom, was not bulldozed. But now 
we have that a' C, a implies a' = a. For suppose a' C. a. Then f (a') CE f (a), that is, 
f (a') CE ha. But ha is its own only subinterval, thus f (a') = ha and by the previous 
remark a' = a. Thus a is an atom. As ha CE f (s), and as ha is not in any CE-cluster, 
it follows by the first clause in the bulldozing definition that a C, 8, and hence S is an 
atomic semi interval structure. That the unique elements that V, assigns to nominals 
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are in fact atoms in S is now immediate, hence we have built a verifying model on an 
atomic semi interval structure and have established: 
Theorem 8.1.2 Kp; is strongly complete with respect to the class of atomic semi interval 
structures. 0 
We now take the final step and define the language IREF. This is simply L" augmented 
by the shifter in the usual way. That is, we now have an additional syntactic clause 
stating that if 0 is a wff, so is L4; and semantically L makes use of the universal relation 
on any biframe as its accessibility relation. To axiomatise the logic of the atomic semi 
interval structures (with universal relation) we simply take the apparatus of Kp;, modify 
it by changing the existential operators E in the NOMK, and NOMK. schemas to the M 





LO --> Go A H4A1j. 4Af 0 (Inc). 
Call this axiomatisation K;re f. I leave the proof that this suffices to the reader: all the 
important work has been done already, both in the previous two proofs, and in the work 
on TREF in Chapter 6. 
This concludes the technical discussion. Is sorting in interval based systems likely to 
lead anywhere interesting, and will they be useful in natural language semantics? 
Interval based frameworks offer a wide range of possibilities for sorting, far wider that 
our simple minded sortal constraint on the SA variables might suggest. r Indeed the 
"Simple minded for (at least) two reasons: firstly, we have lumped together two types of 
information which need teasing apart; secondly, even in its own terms this lumping together is 
probably inadequate. (Arguably we need an `upward closure' constraint on SA valuations - 
given that a piece of SA information holds at every interval in some set, it should hold in their 
union, assuming that this interval exists. See [5, page 2001 for discussion.) 
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interval framework, not the point based one, seems to be the spiritual home of temporal 
sorting. Certainly constraints on valuations have long been considered important in this 
tradition. For example Humberstone [48], in one of the original papers on interval based 
logics, insisted that valuations had to be downwards persistent. Another constraint, 
proposed by Hamblin and discussed by van Benthem [5, page 1981, is that there should 
be no `indefinitely finely intermingled' intervals of truth and falsity for propositional 
variables. All that is missing (at least to the best of my knowledge) is the idea of reflecting 
different constraints of interest syntactically and constructing `mixed but uniform' calculi 
as suggested in this thesis. 
In fact many of the matters discussed in the last section of Chapter 6, which may 
have seemed rather odd viewed through `modal logical eyes', appear natural in the richer 
setting. Consider sortal incompleteness results; in the interval based setting these are 
both immediate and acceptable. For example, Kp, is biframe incomplete. To validate 
its axioms we would need to validate the instances of v -+4 v. But neither e --44 e nor 
o -+u o is Kp, derivable, by an easy soundness argument. The sheer folly of attempting 
to cash the content of v --44 v in terms of biframe structure requires little comment: 
the attempt obliterates the very distinction we took care to draw. More generally, the 
argument of that chapter that the task of constructing adequate temporal logics - rather 
than just 'logics of the flow of time' - involves considering constraints on information 
distributions becomes virtually self evident in the intervallic setting. Indeed, in interval 
based frameworks it's not so much that we can successfully sort, but that we must. 
In the point based setting, because we only have one dimension of variation (<), no 
matter how wildly the truth value of any wff may fluctuate we can always form some 
rough picture of the situation. (We can imagine a train rolling along a track, and a light 
on board blinking on and off intermittently, for example.) The crux of the matter is that 
it is easy to think of each point in a frame as being a `world', or a `state of affairs', and of 
frames as being sequences of such worlds. The worst that can happen is that for wildly 
implausible information distributions the individual worlds look crazy, and we cannot 
view the totality as causally linked. Perhaps surprisingly, this is tolerable to us: at some 
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level we seem prepared to countenance such collections of independent Humean worlds, 
and tense logic proceeds apace. 
This no longer seems possible when dealing with interval logic's two dimensions (< 
and C) of variation. The important difference is that we can no longer straightforwardly 
equate indexes (here intervals) with worlds or states of affairs. Each index is now intended 
to be an unbroken stretch of time - things happen during them; states of affairs change; 
and our indexes now have internal contours. `Intervals contain multiple worlds', and 
arbitrary information distributions may no longer `fit' with the shape of our interval 
structures. By working with a richer notion of the `shape of time' we have made it 
difficult to treat information distributions with Humean innocence - which, as far as 
the development of genuine temporal logics is concerned, is a good thing. 
I believe that the interval based setting is a good one in which to logically investigate 
the types of distinction codified in Vendler style verb classification [108]. By working on a 
rich class of biframes - perhaps the Q-containing ones - it should be possible to delimit 
interesting information bearing sorts that mirror some of the verb type distinctions fa- 
miliar from the literature. Indeed, work by Alex Lascarides [58] suggests that this may be 
a fruitful approach. Working in her own variant of the IQ framework [87], she presented 
a solution to the imperfective paradox. 8 Her solution hinges on sorting. Information 
is subdivided along lines suggested by Mare Moens and Mark Steedman [64] [65] [67] [66], 
and it is the interpretational constraints reflecting these subdivisions that legitimate one 
inference and block the other. Her exploitation of sorting is rather indirect - use is 
made of entities called (propositional) parameters that pick out the required information 
- and I believe that the formal machinery used could be simplified, perhaps by using 
extended versions of the languages of this section; nonetheless, her work is an attractive 
piece of formal modeling that makes clear the underlying difference between the two 
8uMax was running towards the station" "Max ran towards the station", whereas "Max 
was running to the station" K- "Max ran to the station". Why? 
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deductions. Her work deserves further attention, and may be a good starting point for 
further formal semantical work on sorting and verb classification in the intervallic setting. 
8.2 Earlier work by Prior and Bull 
Systems of tense logic employing nominals were devised and explored by Arthur Prior 
and Robert Bull in the late 1960s. Prior's introduction of nominals into tense logic was 
motivated by leading philosophical concerns, and when discussing his work I will focus 
on these. Robert Bull's work is more technical, and here I shall concentrate on the 
possible relevance of his results to further work in NTL. It will become apparent that 
their concerns - or, at any rate Prior's - are rather different from mine, and I close 
the thesis by making this difference explicit. 
I'll begin with Prior's work. First, some bibliographical details. 9 The earliest 
treatment of nominals in Prior's writing is in Chapter 5 of "Past Present and Future" [79], 
in the section entitled "Development of the U-calculus within the theory of world states" 
. In Appendix B of the same volume, in the section entitled "On the range of world- 
variables, and the interpretation of U-calculi in world-calculi" Prior examines them in 
more detail. In particular he discusses in detail defining a shifter in tense logical terms, 
using `minimal path equations' akin to those embodied in NOM. However the single most 
important paper dealing with nominals is the slightly later "Tense Logic and the Logic 
of Earlier and Later" [82]. Here they are introduced as one component - a component 
regarded as unproblematic - of a system of tense logic embodying a high grade (a 
9The following seems to exhaust Prior's major writings on nominals, though they occasionally 
occur as asides elsewhere. I have largely relied on the "Bibliography of the philosophical writings 
of A. N. Prior" assembled by Olav Flo, which may be found at the back of the collection "Papers 
in Logic and Ethics" [83, page 219-229]. 
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`third grade') of `tense logical involvement'. 10 Prior discusses the philosophical basis 
of this system and attempts to construct a system with a still higher, a fourth grade, 
of tense logical involvement. This part of the discussion involves the shifter, and Prior 
attempts another (more elegant) tense logical definition this operator. The discussion 
below largely follows this paper. In addition to these two main sources, nominals make 
a brief appearance in the paper "Now" [80], as was mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Moreover the chapter "Egocentric Logic" in "Worlds, Times and Selves" [84, pages 28 - 
45] discusses using a nominal modal logic to model pronouns, though here the nominals 
are made out of ordinary variables using an operator called Q. 11 Many of Prior's other 
writings bear on matters of relevance to nominals - for example, again in Appendix B 
of "Past, Present and Future", in the section "The uniqueness of the time-series", Prior 
further considers defining the shifter in tense logical terms. 
In order to understand Prior's motivation for introducing nominals we must under- 
stand two things: his philosophical motivation, and the UT-calculus. 12 One of the main 
goals of Prior's work on tense logic was to establish the primacy of A-series or tensed 
talk over B-series or untensed talk. Briefly, he wanted to reduce talk of `earlier' and 
`later' to talk of `past', `present' and `future', as he saw our conception of time as arising 
as a construction out of tensed facts. Now if tense logic is A series talk, B series talk 
is codified by the UT-calculus. This calculus is a two sorted first order language with 
identity that has two binary relation symbols, U and T. Both argument slots in U are 
filled by constants or variables over instants of time, and U is read `earlier than'; thus 
U(a, b) means that a is earlier than b. (Thus this part of the UT-calculus is just L0, 
possibly augmented by constants.) The predicate T can be read as `true at'; its first slot 
10The discussion of this paper is largely couched in this Quinean terminology. For Quine's 
original discussion of degrees of modal involvement see [85]. Briefly, Quine finds high grades of 
modal involvement ontologically repugnant. 
"Robert Bull later presented an algebraic account of this system [11). 
12Sometimes called the U-calculus. 
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is filled by an instant variable or constant, and its second slot by wffs of some language, 
here regarded as terms. Which language these wff-terms belong to depends on the grade 
of `tense logical involvement' desired; for now we will suppose that tense logical wffs 
fill the second slot - this choice constitutes the first or lowest grade of tense logical 
involvement. T (a, F(p A q)) means that it's true at a that p A q will be true. 
This `first grade' UT calculus played an important technical role in early tense logic: 
in effect, it was a substitute for the still fledgling possible worlds semantics, and provided 
a sort of correspondence theory. The `minimal logic' of the UT calculus is axiomatised 
by choosing some sufficient basis for first order logic and adding as additional axioms: 
T(a,-,p) F-' -,T(a,p) 
T(a,p -+ q) `-' T(a,p) -+ T(a,q) 
T (a, Gp) Vb(U(a, b) -+ T (b, p) ) 
T (a, Hp) Vb(U(b, a) - T (b, p)) 
Note that these are essentially the modern truth definition for languages of tense logic 
with T (a, 0) replacing = 4)[t], and U(a, b) replacing t < t'. Indeed the first completeness 
theorem in tense logic took the form 
-K, 0 if f-UT T (a, 0), for all points a; 
and the minimal tense logic Kt was called `minimal' because it corresponded in this 
fashion to the minimal UT calculus. 13 
But in addition to its technical role, the UT calculus provided a logical model of 
untensed talk. Prior had already noted that the UT calculus seemed more expressive 
than ordinary tense logic - in particular, he noted that neither irreflexivity (-U(a,b)) 
nor asymmetry (U(a, b) -+ -,U(b, a)) seemed to be `reflected' in tense logic [79, page 
45] -- and given Prior's philosophical position this is clearly unsatisfactory. How was a 
temporally adequate tensed talk to be constructed? Moreover, Prior believed the simple 
1SPrior credits Lemmon with this result, obtained in 1965; unfortunately no reference is given. 
A proof of essentially this result is sketched in [90, page 67]. 
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UT calculus outlined above to be inadequate. He wanted to liberalise the set of wff-terms 
allowed to occupy the second slot of the T predicate, thus allowing such expressions as 
T (a, (VaT(a, p) -> p)) to be formed. This liberalised UT calculus is called the `second 
grade' UT calculus, and it is this language that Prior wished to provide a tensed correlate 
for. He acknowledges that allowing such formations in the UT calculus "will be felt by 
some to be the step which must not be taken" [82, page 121], but appears himself to have 
regarded the step as unproblematic. 
To model this second grade UT calculus a `third grade' language is introduced, and 
this is where nominals come in. This third grade language is standard tense logic aug- 
mented by nominals, quantification over nominals, and a primitive shifter. Note the 
power of this calculus. We can simulate U and T: 
Uij =J L(i -' Fj) 
TiO =J L(i -> 0). 
It is important to note that we really are regarding nominals as variables to be quantified 
over, not as names. If we merely regard them as constants, we don't have the power that 
Prior desires. For example, to transcribe the second grade UT calculus wff mentioned 
earlier we need to write down L(i -> (d j L (j -> p) -> p)). 
The addition of nominals and quantification across them seems to have been regarded 
by Prior as a routine step. (Certainly viewed from the perspective of the UT calculus 
nominals are a natural addition to tense logic, and when so viewed the tendency to 
quantify over them becomes nearly irresistible.) He acknowledges that treating instants 
as propositions is unusual, but states that all instant talk is highly artificial anyway. 
Further, he states that considerations outwith tense logic suggest that we will need to 
quantify across propositions, and that quantification across nominals should not cause 
us concern. But one aspect of this `third grade' language strikes him as unsatisfactory: 
the use of a defined shifter. 
Prior does not consider the shifter to be a tense logical operator: it's presence in 
the third grade language he regarded as an imperfection in the attempt to construct an 
adequate tensed talk. Accordingly, he attempts to construct a `fourth grade' language 
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- by which he means the third grade language with the shifter reduced to tense logical 
terms. He begins by noting that under certain ontological assumptions - for example, 
the linearity of time - the shifter is definable. But this solution is unpalatable to him: 
it means assuming a stronger base tense logic than Kt. So he introduces the following 
definition: L°p is defined to be p, and L"+lp is defined to be HL"p A GL"p. He next 
introduces first order quantificational apparatus and defines the shifter L to be VnL"p. 
It follows immediately by first order logic that this L is an S5 operator. Prior concludes 
that the UT calculus has been reduced to tense logic, discards the U and T operators, 
and on [82, pages 131 - 132] tabulates "the stages by which tense-logic so swells as to 
encompass earlier-later logic". 
I believe there are several matters that can be objected to here. For example, what 
is the criterion for `being tense logical' that rules out the use of a primitive shifter but 
admits the use of the two forms of quantification Prior uses in the fourth grade language? 
Certainly the use of the numeric quantification seems to stretch the bounds of what is 
to count as tense logical. (It is no answer to say that we will need arithmetic eventually: 
Prior's self imposed task was to demarcate the tensed.) 14 However debating what is 
and is not tensed is not really where my interests lie, and I'll defer till the end of the 
thesis making plain the differences between Prior's position and my own. 
Robert Bull explored the properties of the third grade language in the paper "An 
Approach to Tense logic" [12]. That is, he considers a language which is essentially NTL, 
14In passing, in spite of the triumphal tone of the previously quoted sentence, Prior seems to 
have been in doubt as to whether this definition of L should be accepted as satisfactory. He 
begins the section with the words "We would reach a fourth grade of tense-logical involvement if 
we could give a tense logical definition of L", and introduces his definition with something like a 
caveat: "if we enlarge our symbolic apparatus a little we can give a purely tense logical definition 
of L" [82, page 128]. Also, the earlier discussion of this issue in "Past, Present and Future" [79, 
pagesl28-131] is couched in more circumspect tones. (The discussion here is very interesting, 
involving whether to admit the possibility that the time flow is not unique, and the ramifications 
of the decision on the choice of shifter.) 
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save that the nominals are strong nominals, these strong nominals may be quantified over, 
and the language contains a primitive shifter. Bull first proves a minimal completeness 
theorem for this system. As axioms he takes all the axioms used in Ktre f (save those 
involving interval nominals), standard quantificational axioms and rules, and in addition 
all instances of the schema (3n)n. This is a sort of `converse' to the Force schema Mn 
used in TREF: the latter says every nominal is true somewhere, the former that some 
nominal is true now. In short, it's a strongness axiom. By making use of this axiom, and 
certain first order Henkin style `witnessing' sentences, Bull is able to construct a model 
with a strong valuation, as his semantics requires, reasonably straightforwardly. 
A natural question to ask is whether this method of employing quantificational appa- 
ratus to build strong valuations might be of use in proving completeness results for lan- 
guages of NTL and related systems. Although as far as applying tense logic is concerned I 
do not favour quantification over variables over indices, for technical investigations it may 
prove a valuable tool. Is it possible to prove a (reasonably general) conservativity result 
for Bull's languages over languages of NTL? If this could be done, then - at least for 
systems involving nominally definable classes of frames - given an NTL axiomatisation 
for which a completeness result was desired one would merely need to build the model 
using Bull's quantificational axioms, observe that the strong valuation gave the correct 
relational structure (for example, irreflexivity) to the frame, and then `throw away' the 
quantificational apparatus by appealing to the conservativity result. A pleasant idea, 
but at present I have little idea of how difficult it would be to prove such a conservativity 
result. (I certainly think that if quantification was added over the interval nominals 
of the previous section, such results would be difficult to come by.) But I think the 
question is an important one to investigate - as is any matter bearing on the building 
of strong valuations. Gargov, Passy, and Tinchev report a similar `quantified nominal' 
conservativity result in [34], though the system in question is very different from Bull's. 
After proving completeness Bull turns from this system to consider the interpretation 
of future tense statements in future branching time frames. He notes that the ordinary 
operator F is probably too weak in such an ontology - F¢ cannot guarantee that 0 
holds in every alternative future - and proposes introducing an operator I with the 
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property that To being true at t means that on every `course of history' running through 
t, .0 is true at some point in the future. This is not the novel part - Prior had already 
informally discussed such an operator - it's the next move that's interesting: he states 
that as we are concerned with `courses of history' it is sensible to introduce variables 
over them. In effect he introduces a new referential sort, a referential sort for courses 
of history. 11 A completeness theorem is proved for languages with course of history 
variables. 
The final two sections are extremely interesting: he returns to the original language 
and considers how, given an algebraic model for them, we can build a Kripke model. He 
avoids the use of Stone representation and instead uses Robinson's Enlargement theorem 
[91]: by taking the enlarged non-standard model of the first order theory of the algebraic 
model, one obtains a Kripke model. For standard tensed languages the instants of the 
time series are non-standard elements of this model; what is shown in section 7 is that 
when considering the Lindenbaum algebras of Bull's system, instants arise as standard 
elements. 
The ramifications of this are not clear to me, but it raises an immediate question: 
what happens with other sorts, and in particular interval nominals? More generally, this 
seems an interesting way to build models. In passing, since Bull published this paper 
it has become a great deal more straightforward to apply the methods of non-standard 
analysis. Nelson [70] has shown how to absorb the methods into set theory; detours 
through model theory are no longer needed. 
I'll sum up the major features of Bull's work as follows. With his introduction of 
the course of history variables Bull has generalised from Prior's original conception of 
"Perhaps not quite. The emphasis, as with his discussion of nominals, is primarily on these 
additions as variables - things to be quantified across - not names. To put the matter an- 
other way, sorting in this thesis is primarily conceived as `constraining the ways that frames are 
decorated with information'; Bull's conception of sorting is primarily to do with `what we can 
quantify over in our object language'. Of course the two conceptions are intimately intertwined. 
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nominals, and anticipated the idea of sorting - and it utility - that underlies this 
thesis. Moreover the two major technical contributions of the paper - the completeness 
theorem and the use of non-standard analysis to build models - are both potentially 
relevant to further work. 
The historical survey completed, let's consider wider issues. The major technical 
difference between `third grade' tense logic and NTL is the use of quantification across 
nominals. This gives the early system enormous expressive power. Note that it's more 
powerful than D-logic, at least as far as the countable frames are concerned. 16 Firstly 
the D-operator can be simulated by means of 
D¢ =def (-i A M(i A 0)). 
However there are classes of countable frames that cannot be defined in D-logic but 
which can in third grade logic. Ron Koyman's showed by means of D logical filtration 
that the class of frames containing a reflexive loop is not D-logically definable [57, page 
491. In grade three tense logic we need merely write down (3i)M(i A Fi). 
But this result is something of a triviality: grade three systems were designed precisely 
to capture the power of the UT calculus. The obvious question to ask is, is this a good 
way to do tense logic? The answer is that in terms of Prior's philosophical motives, it's 
a very good attempt, but that from Montagovian formal semantic perspective, it's not. 
I'm going to conclude the thesis by developing this answer. 
Formal semantics is the business of logically modelling the way natural language 
works. There are two important abstractions involved with it. The first we have al- 
ready met, and it arises as follows: natural languages deal with the world, and if we 
are to model this process we need some mathematical structures that encapsulate the 
real world components we consider important. Frames, models, and interval structures 
are all examples of such `ontological abstractions'. But there islsecond abstraction in 
16The point is that strong valuations must cover frames, and we only have a countably infinite 
collection of nominals. 
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the modelling process, one that is sometimes overlooked; we cannot deal with natural 
language directly, but must model it by means of artificial languages. Such abstractions 
will highlight some aspects of natural language and diminish others, but any abstractive 
process has this effect, and it is difficult to see how a science can proceed otherwise. What 
is important is to try and model sensitively, to try and reveal general features of the way 
natural language functions. The use of strong artificial languages may reveal something 
of the way natural language works, but if we are ever to get beyond the `existence proof' 
stage of natural language semantics - the belief that formal semantics is possible, based 
on the representation of fragments of it in powerful languages - we must look for better 
models. In particular, we should be looking for models which tell us why we can use 
language so fast and efficiently. 
Priorean tense logic in its original formulation conforms to the spirit of this enterprise. 
Let's assume that modelling tenses by means of operators has at least some linguistic 
merit; what does the resulting `photograph of natural language' reveal in logical terms? 
From the point of view of correspondence theory, something fascinating: tense logic is 
a curious intermediary between first and second order languages. Blind to some simple 
(and important) first order conditions, at the same time it can impose sophisticated 
conditions on the flow of time. The Priorean model is interesting because it confirms that 
natural language cuts the cake of expressibility along unusual lines. Priorean tense logic is 
sometimes damned as a distorting picture of the subtleties of natural language temporal 
usage. The reverse is true: Priorean tense logic is one of the few models that actually 
respects this subtlety, and probably the only one that has given us (via correspondence 
theory) any logical inkling of what this subtlety actually consists of. Tense logic can 
be criticised for being a blurred photograph, but Prior pointed the camera in the right 
direction. 
In this thesis we have shown how to improve Prior's picture. By taking into account 
that tense is not just about `shift', but about `refer' as well, we have been able to simply 
model a variety of natural language temporal usages - and the attempt resulted in 
another intermediary between first and second order logic, this time with more grip on 
natural temporal conditions. The point is we modeled. We didn't assume we knew what 
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tensed talk was and then proceed to achieve it by cheerful use of first order language. 
`Tensed talk' is that which we stalk, not that which we know. 
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